INSIDE THE GERMAN EMPIRE

1916

HERBERT BAYARD SWOPE

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INSIDE THE GERMAN EMPIRE

JAMES W. GERARD, AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN

INSIDE THE GERMAN EMPIRE

IN THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR

BY

HERBERT BAYARD SWOPE

ILLUSTRATED
WITH PHOTOGRAPHS

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TO
MY MOTHER

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FOREWORD

Throughout the world there is, and should be, deep interest in the conditions—economic, political, spiritual and military—under which Germany and her allies are sustaining themselves after more than two years of war.

The facts and impressions contained in this book, gathered first hand by the author, whose friendship I value and whose professional equipment I admire, form an important contribution to contemporaneous history and possess a referential value for the future. No subject today is more vital or worthier of serious attention.

JAMES W. GERARD,
American Ambassador to the German Empire.

INTRODUCTORY

What of Germany to-day? How does she stand? How are her sons maintaining her far-flung battle-lines? Are her people despairing? Do they expect victory? When do they think the end will come? Do they starve? What of her allies? What is her attitude towards America—her dreams of peace—her fears of defeat—her plans for the future?

These are a few of the questions I seek to answer in this book. They are vital to an understanding of the condition of the world to-day and even more vital to speculation as to the status of the world to-morrow, for Germany is the key to the future. It will be her hands which will set the clock of peace, according to her strength or her weakness. So, an examination of her position to-day becomes an inquiry as to the time that peace shall come.

"Inside the German Empire" is an effort to set forth objectively the things I saw during a three

months' trip to that country, which I made in the latter part of 1916. I was fortunate in being afforded unusual opportunities for observation and the information I gained as a trained reporter, I am presenting here, keeping always in mind the duty of a reporter—to be impartial, to be open-minded, and to find the truth.

Because the Kaiser's realm is becoming more and more difficult for foreigners to enter, because the rigidity of the censorship has become extreme, because the Allies have interrupted mail and cable correspondence, Germany and the truth about the Germans become less and less known to the world. Therefore these pages may possess a double value: first, as offering an insight into the workings of the Germany of to-day; and second, in correcting certain of the evils that have arisen through misunderstanding caused by the lack of free communication, for nothing is so productive of distrust and suspicion as ignorance.

I hope that these papers may prove not without value as a contribution to the record of the last phases of the Great War. Not that the end is near—no one but a prophet could make such a pronouncement—but it is evident that Germany

and the Central Powers have settled down in plan and preparation to the final lines on which they will march to victory, compromise, or defeat. They are approaching the ultimate of their resources and in the utilization thereof, and come what may, their mental, spiritual, and physical attitudes will not be much changed when the end is reached. That is why it is proper to say that Germany to-day is in her last phase. She has called to the fighting line all her material and moral resources and now she awaits the successive moves of those alined against her.

I was in France and England at the outbreak of the war, and in Germany during the first four months of the struggle, in the service of my paper, the New York "World." The earlier visit gave me a standard of comparison that enabled me to contrast the picture of the wild exaltation of 1914 with the serious, somber, Germany of to-day.

Together, the two trips left me, I hope, truly an American and a neutral, but one who, without leanings toward either side, has deep sympathy for both, after having seen, heard and felt the black tragedy that is blocking Civilization's path with millions of dead and wounded.

Within this book I have tried to tell the story of German energies in the fields most interesting and important to America—the story of the empire spiritually and politically, financially and industrially, of her food, of her military, of her subject peoples, of her heroes, of her attitude toward herself, toward her enemies and toward the rest of the world—in short, the story of her strengths and weaknesses. And I have added scattering notes of fugitive impressions and random facts that may help to give life, color, and detail.

This volume is based upon a series of articles I wrote for "The World," and I am grateful to Mr. Ralph Pulitzer of that paper for permission to use the material in this form, and for the encouragement that he and others of my friends gave me to believe that the work has value as a record of the present and a reference for the future.

My especial thanks are due to Lewis Stiles Gannett for his assistance in the preparation and revision of the manuscript.

HERBERT BAYARD SWOPE.

New York,
January 1, 1917.

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INSIDE THE GERMAN EMPIRE

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CHAPTER I

THE FOUR WAYS TOWARD PEACE

Prospect of immediate peace small—Unwillingness to guarantee re-establishment of Belgium or to re-cede Alsace-Lorraine—Four ways out seen: (1) By complete defeat of Allies; (2) By complete defeat of Germany; (3) By compromise; (4) By liberalization of German Empire—First two not seriously considered—Hope of Russian defection to German side—Germany-Russia-Japan: a "*Dreibund* of discontent"—An end to government by divine right—The lack of a national hope—Germans ready to make peace on basis of what they have done; Allies of what they hope to do—The fear of the coming accounting keeps peace from becoming an actuality.

THE desire for peace is strong in Germany, but from top to bottom there is no belief that it is near. German hopes and expectations of the end are indefinite as to time; the most optimistic can see no real prospects within another two years, and from that period the conjectures run up to ten years. And in their economic and military planning the Kaiser's subjects are prepar-

ing to enact their motto of *durchhalten* (stick it out) for years to come.

A striking illustration of the lack of consideration given to the idea of any peace but one "wholly satisfactory to Germany's national aspirations" is the diplomatic secret that in 1915 and the first half of 1916 no fewer than eleven separate interrogatories were submitted to the German Government as to Belgium. The question has been asked by the United States, Spain, Denmark, Holland, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, and other neutrals if Germany will give a formal assurance of the restoration of Belgian entity at the end of the war; but not once has this assurance been given, nor has the Government, in its most affable moments, permitted even inferentially the idea to gain ground that it regarded Belgium's reëstablishment according to the *status quo ante* as an absolutely essential condition of peace.

While it is reasonably certain that the preponderance of enlightened German opinion favors the reëstablishment of Belgium, nevertheless in a statement I prepared for submission to the Chancellor regarding the objectives of the war

(to which I shall refer again) the suggestion that Belgium would be reëstablished within her old lines was carefully blue-penciled by an official acting for the Chancellor. The explanation was made that Belgium was, as Kaiser Wilhelm I said in a letter to his empress, a point of weakness in the empire's rear and flank. Therefore Germany must be safeguarded against this danger.

At the same time, so runs the German reasoning, the securance of German safety means the securance of Belgium's welfare. Obviously, this logic would lead to the conclusion that Belgium's greatest security against the world would be found in being a German state; and if she is or is not to take on such a condition is precisely the question that Germany will not answer. It is true that the sentiment against annexation in the empire is deeper than the sentiment favoring such a development, but even the anti-annexationists agree that certain changes in boundaries must be made or certain places taken as hostage before Germany can feel secure.

As neutral opinion is undivided in its agreement with the Allies' proclamation that Belgium

must be fully restored, and as the restoration is regarded as an absolute essential to peace, it can be seen how far from peace Germany is holding herself.

In addition, France has stated through Briand, and England and the other Allies have accepted the doctrine, that the irreducible minimum of her peace terms is the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine. Against this Germany to a man—and woman—stands opposed with all her soul. "Never," say the Germans to this proposition, "while we have life left as a nation. If peace can come to us on no other terms, then peace will never come so long as one German is left alive." And the vehemence of their assertion leaves no doubt as to their sincerity. They rage at the idea. "We shall never surrender the Reichsland," the Germans say in substance. "If the Allies want the provinces, let them take them. Then they can talk of keeping them; but now, with all of Belgium and a large share of France in our hands, it is laughable to talk of such a thing."

Thus at the very outset there are seemingly insurmountable obstacles to peace. How they

were to be removed was a subject I could bring Germans high or low to talk of only with difficulty. It is one that they do not let themselves think about often for fear the outlook may take on an even darker hue than it now wears.

For they do not delude themselves in Germany, they do not underestimate the danger of their position; they know how terrific is the battle being waged against them, and they know, too, that if it is carried to the end, they must lose. They realize this, but they hope that this end may be averted. How this can be they are not sure, for slowly they are realizing that the Allies have no thought of quitting.

The logicians in Germany, who are now for the first time shaking off the influence of their personal interest in the outcome and are able to examine the peace thesis objectively, have reduced the subject to four propositions: Peace can come, they declare:

First, through the complete defeat of the Allies by Germany.

Second, through the complete defeat of Germany by the Allies.

Third, through a compromise, and a return in effect to the *status quo ante.*

Fourth, through the liberalization of the German Empire.

In that fourth proposition lies the most astounding development of the two years of war, and the touch-stone that may yet bring order to chaotic Europe.

But to take up the hypotheses in turn.

First, Germany to-day nourishes no hope that she can conquer the world—and that is her conception of the task she faces. She might be able to accomplish even this titanic labor, her sons say, if she could only bring the war to England. But the North Sea and the British fleet make that impossible, so she has abandoned calculations on this contingency.

Second, convinced as she is that she cannot conquer, she is doubly certain that she cannot and shall not be conquered. To her people defeat means national extermination, and they are fighting magnificently because they are fighting for life. Their reasoners say that if peace cannot be adduced from the first proposition, it can never be from the second, short of annihilation.

Third—and this is still a favorite topic of discussion, although in the face of Asquith's, Lloyd George's, and Briand's solemn statements it is almost hoping against hope—peace through compromise is still held to be a possibility. Perhaps not a likely one if the alinement of the Allies remains undisturbed, for then the Germans fear no consideration would be paid to the suggestion of a throwback to former conditions.

But what if the alliance of these against us be broken? the Germans ask. What if Russia should turn from enemy into friend? they add. The statesmen of Germany regard this as a contingency graced by hope. Not a word do the censors permit to get out on this subject, not a chance does the Government fail to use to deny the possibility; but despite these subterfuges it is an open secret in German official circles that possible Russian defection from the alliance is a grave factor in the life and death struggle Germany is waging.

The diplomatic play had been carried so far that in September, 1916, there was a meeting in Stockholm between secret emissaries from Russia and Germany to confer over the prospects

and plan further efforts. In fact, matters had progressed to such a degree that one of the best-known American correspondents in Europe held himself in readiness, on secret information he had received, to go to the Swedish capital in the expectation that matters had progressed to such an extent that publicity might follow. The meeting did not reach that point, but the work goes on.

There has always been a very strong German influence in Russia, and one that which, Germans believe, can grow stronger at Germany's will; all that is needed is a reduced insistence upon Austrian hegemony in the Balkans and a lesser friendliness to Turkey and Turkish retention of European soil.

And as to Russia, apart from what Germany has to give her, as the Germans see it, she is today in the rôle of having everything to lose and nothing to gain. Even if the Czar should get Constantinople, what has he then but an empty thing? the Germans ask; and they add: As long as Britain holds Gibraltar and the Isthmus of Suez, Russia's possession of Constantinople as a real warm-water port would be a nonentity, since

all she would have is merely a harbor on a lake (the Mediterranean) to which entrance and exit are held by another power which can close them at will.

Russia's future lies in near and central Asia, her dreams of world trade through efficient harborage can be realized only in the Persian Gulf, so runs the German foreign policy; and it goes on to say that Germany's future in Asia can easily be reconciled to that of Russia through her long-cherished plan of gaining the commercial and political ascendancy in Petrograd, and directing the exploitation and development of the Russian trade, which is just throwing off its swaddling-clothes.

Russia is the German hope, Italy the German disappointment in the war. How far this hope will materialize cannot yet be said; but the hope is vital and one that is being freely mentioned in private official discussions. And if nothing should come of it at this time, it will reappear at the end of the war, if there be a Germany left to call it forth again, when the Germans see themselves allied with Russia against the world.

When the Germans talk of a new alinement of

the world powers, and speak of Russia as fighting with them, they talk also of Japan as their accessory. The political censors permit no unkind word to be said about Japan. On the contrary, such references as have been made have always brought out the fact that Japan is now assuming a negative position in the war.

It is an accepted belief in Germany that Japan and Russia have reconciled their differences, and that their futures are bound together, and to this future there are many Germans who believe their country will be a contributory factor.

Many of the German intellectuals, and other leaders, such as Professor Delbrueck, Alfred Lohmann, Herr Ballin, and others, who have always stood for a rapprochement with England, now believe that such a course will be impossible for many years to come, and that therefore Germany will be forced into an alliance, for military and commercial reasons, with two nations with which she has little of common cultural interest. As one leader of German thought phrased it to me, an alliance between Germany, Russia, and Japan will be a "*Dreibund* of discontent." But from such an alliance they see great possibilities

in that Germany will contribute leadership and system, Russia resources and power, and Japan adaptability and bold enterprise.

In a sly way some of those now advocating the ruthless *Lusitania* type of submarine warfare, which admittedly is aimed primarily at the United States, believe that their advocacy of this course is a support to the Russo-Japanese coalition, basing their belief on the hostility they fancy exists between America and Japan.

Furthermore, they accept the dictum of Tirpitz that sooner or later Germany must fight against the "Anglo-Amerikanerthum," and against such an alliance they believe that Russia and Japan also must fight.

The fourth way out, the liberalization of the German Empire, is the avenue most likely to be traveled by the peacemakers. It is a subject that Germans speak of with reluctance. To most of them it is a reform to be avoided at this time, not because it lacks virtue,—except for a few, all I spoke with welcomed the thought,—but because it would seem to be forced upon them by the Allies, and would therefore, if instituted, take on the nature of an Allied victory.

When they do speak of this change they always preface their words with a statement that it is to come after the war; but from expressions made to me by the most influential men in Germany, supported by indirect statements from the highest in the land, it is safe to say that the element of time is not unchangeable, and that before long the agitation for the erection of a responsible popular government will break out, and will lead to an end of that government by divine right which now exists, wherein the Chancellor is responsible not to the Reichstag, but only to the Kaiser, and the Kaiser owes responsibility, he says, only to his God and his conscience.

Germany, as Hindenburg has said, has a brilliant military position, but is without prospects. He might have added that to-day desperation finds more room in her heart than hope finds lodging there; for bold, courageous, unflinching, determined as the Germans are, there is little hope to feed upon in the face of the Allies' plodding insistence in fighting on long after the German military experts had assured their people that strategically and tactically the enemies' plans were futile and unsound.

And this lack of a national hope is accentuated when the Germans consider the first two of the four ways out. Such hopes as still remain of an outcome that lies elsewhere than in the conquering of Germany by the Allies or the defeat of the Allies by Germany are to be found in compromise or in liberalization.

It is difficult for an observer in Germany to see how any peace not of her own making can come except by an overwhelming military victory for the Allies. The internal conditions, whatever the indications for the future may be, are to-day well in the hand of the Government. The Germans accept absolutely the dicta of Clausewitz, Frobenius, and Treitschke that the power of the state is to be measured by its military strength, and since the military power of the central empires is not yet seriously shaken, whatever the promise of to-morrow may be, the thought of a peace forced upon them from without finds no place in the Teutonic mind. It can be said axiomatically that Germany to-day does not believe peace so necessary as to cause her to make a cession of any of her territory. She is willing to make peace on the basis of what she

has done in the two years of the war. The Allies are willing to make peace only on the basis of what they expect to do in the years to come.

Germany to-day would be happy to make a peace that has as its foundation a return to the conditions prevailing before the war, with certain reservations regarding Belgium, Poland, Serbia, and now Rumania. The Allies demand, on the basis of a victory they have not yet won, the restoration and indemnification of Belgium, the cession of Prussian Poland, the reëstablishment and indemnification of Serbia, and the surrender of Constantinople, Trieste, and the Trentino.

The great gulf separating these two sets of demands is even wider than appears upon first glance, for there are on both sides considerations of grim importance which bar the way to compromise. These are the fears of the accounting that all the governments must give their peoples if, upon the conclusion of the war, their respective countries are worse off than when the war began. The great question, "Why did you bring us into the war?" is one that those who suffer defeat will find it hard to answer. That is one significant reason why Germany would prefer

to go down with all flags flying than to accept a peace that would spell internal dissatisfaction.

It is this question that has kept peace from becoming an actuality; each of the nations is seeking to create for itself more favorable conditions for peace before it runs the hazard of the accounting that has to come.

CHAPTER II

THE WAR'S OBJECTIVES AS GERMANY SEES THEM

Germans living in the present—An official statement of the objectives as visualized in the Empire, approved by Zimmermann and read by Bethmann-Hollweg—"Germany fighting for existence"—"Seeks territorial changes only as safeguards to Germany's security"—"Allies frankly avow plans of conquest"—England accused of war of destruction—"Belgium to be safeguarded in safeguarding Germany"—"Commercial expansion to East required"—"English navalism, starving non-combatants and neutrals, a greater menace than German militarism"—"British fight to destroy Germany but talk of freedom"—"Germany wants no such freedom as England gives Ireland."

BECAUSE the future looks so black, because the situation is so muddled, because doubt and conjecture attend every theory the Germans are building for themselves to-day, they are perhaps more than any other of the belligerents living in the present, disregarding possibilities and dealing with actualities. They await a lightning-stroke that shall cleave the dark cloud and reveal a brighter prospect; and while they wait they are attempting to formulate the immediate objectives of the war as they visualize them and as they read them into their enemies' plan.

I prepared a statement of these objectives after getting expressions from various members of the Government, including views that the Chancellor himself gave. I submitted the paper to Bethmann-Hollweg through Dr. Alfred Zimmermann, then chief permanent under-secretary of state for foreign affairs. It represents the official attitude of Germany. The form in which it is herewith presented was taken on after revision and correction by the Foreign Office, and when Zimmermann returned it to me, after the Chancellor had seen it, he gave it his entire personal as well as official approbation. It was prepared just before the Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag on September 28, and a striking similarity will be noticed between the substance of certain phrases of this statement and the Chancellor's official utterances. It reads:

There is at this moment in Germany no *talk* of peace. There are thoughts of peace—of peace with honor that shall secure to the empire the place that she occupied before the great war, and that shall secure, further, the avenues of national growth and commercial expansion to which her sons believe her entitled, and to gain which they are making the great sacrifice. But these peace

thoughts are rarely given voice now—first, because the nation is too busy making war, and, second, the nation feels that before peace can be talked there must be some one to talk to about it—and the Germans are not deluding themselves that at this time the Allies are ready or willing to listen.

So, leaving the questions of peace to be settled at the green table and the causes of the war to be weighed by later historians, a statement can be made as to the actual objectives, an answer can be given to the question, "Why do the nations fight—what military and political goals are the belligerents striving to reach?"

There should be no doubt in the minds of the neutral world or in the minds of the nations allied against us as to what Germany is fighting for. It can be reduced to a one-word formula, *existence.* And because it is an appeal to the first law of nature, self-preservation, the German people are fighting so nobly and successfully and unconquerably. The devotion and patriotism of the Germans are traditional, but there is more than these sentiments holding the nation together; it is the great elemental force—the will to live—against which nothing can prevail until the last German is destroyed. For every German realizes that it is not only his own existence which is being threatened, but the right and privilege of his children to live as Germans and to nurture and develop the ideals of their heritage.

Germany is seeking no territory through conquest. She is not carrying a sword in one hand and her culture

in the other, giving the world the choice between the two, as her enemies so frequently paint her. It never was a part of the plan of the war to add to Germany's territory through conquest, but it is possible that peace may necessitate a change of present boundaries of contiguous countries where such changes are in the nature of a safeguard to Germany's security, which in turn means a strengthening of the prospects of general and lasting peace. She is quite content to live peacefully, developing her own institutions and asking only that no artificial barriers originating in fear or jealousy be placed around her. The right to live carries with it a corollary in the right to grow, and both these rights are now being fought for by us against those who would deny them to us.

However acute, albeit imaginary, may have been the fears of those who at the outset of the war saw in Germany only a desire for conquest, they must now be reassured by the solemn assertions of the German nation, taken in consideration with the present situation, where the greater part of Belgium, a large portion of France and a good share of Poland are in our hands. And still we say that we do not fight for territory. Annexation by conquest is no part of the German war. The lands we hold—the war-won gains—may be used as bases for later operations of a different nature, but they were not fought for nor won through a desire to possess them.

Once more—Germany is not fighting a war for con-

quest. Can the others say as much? France publicly declares her intention of possessing Alsace-Lorraine; Russia is bent upon seizing European Turkey; Italy demands a part of the Austro-Hungarian realm; Roumania too has covetous eyes fixed upon our ally's land; in short, all of the Allies are similarly actuated, while England's aims are the most monstrous of all—she is bent upon crushing Germany wholly and wiping her from the face of the earth. England is too fiendishly clever and her aims are too gigantic to reduce them to words. By every foul means this "friend of the little peoples" is seeking to force them to take arms against us. For their good? let me ask, or is it the time-honored tradition of England to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for her?

As we see it, Germany is fighting for existence while the Allies are waging a war of conquest and in the case of England a war of extermination. Carthage was destroyed but history shows but few other instances of succesful wars of destruction, and Germany will not be added to the list. Her sons will not permit it and I am sure that the rest of the world would not countenance it. German ideals, German scholarship and German character have done too much for the world to be rewarded with such ingratitude.

Even with Belgium a danger point in our back and flank there is no real desire in Germany to possess her land. We are anxious only for such a disposition of her future as will safeguard us, and it must always be

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borne in mind that in safeguarding us *Belgium will herself be safeguarded.* How Belgium's integrity and safety, which means our safety too, may be obtained is a problem not included in this discussion, but it will be worked out.

We ask and fight for the right to live, and to earn our living we must have room for commercial expansion. England's domination of the sea has closed that highroad against us or made it subject to her control, so we have worked out lines of development to the south and east—through the Balkans into Asia. And in that direction too they are trying to close the door in our face, although it is the only door left us leading to an opportunity to expand where the expansion does not militate against the political interests of others. It is plainly jealousy of our commercial ability and not political principles that motivates the attempt to shut us out from our just deserts in what was practically a virgin field.

How fast the door to the sea was closed at the will of England is being shown to-day when she, being able to do so, is seeking to starve our women and children. And she is making the threat of starvation, if not actually carrying it out, against the European neutrals which are seeking only to maintain their regular, domestically-originating commerce with us. The threat to the world of German militarism was a chimera conjured up by fevered minds; the actual menace and destructiveness of England's "navalism" is plainly ap-

parent to and felt by all the world, and by no means the least of those seeing and feeling this strangling, killing power is America. Perhaps the United States are powerful enough to resist this pressure in so far as it is applied to force them into war, but it is smashing and will further smash their commerce, while the pressure upon the smaller nations is so great that to keep themselves from starving they must bend to the will of the dictator of the sea. Look at Greece, at Holland, at Denmark, Norway and especially Sweden. What share can these smaller countries have in England's objectives in this war, except as England can force them to help her fight for her own aims?

The German people know why they are fighting. Do the English? Will their Government still dare to tell them they are fighting for the return of Belgium to the Belgians? Germany has never had designs on Belgian territory, so that plea falls and with it falls the mask, revealing what England has never dared to admit—*that she is fighting to encompass the destruction of Germany and the reduction of the Germans to a tributary and secondary nation. That will never be so long as one German man or woman is left alive.* That England realizes this as axiomatic is seemingly shown by the fact that she has systematically set about murdering our non-combatants by starvation, but this too will fail however deliberate and calculating that evil intent may be.

We have heard much of the war for freedom and

liberty and democracy, and similar phrases. For whom are England and her allies fighting this war of freedom? Germany is not seeking to extend her system to other lands, so the fight cannot be for them. Are we then to suppose that among England's objective is to "free" Germany? Is she waging a war of freedom for the German people? Perhaps the same sort of "freedom" that France threw off; the same sort of freedom that the American colonies ended by the Revolutionary War; the same sort of "freedom" she brought to India; the same sort of "freedom" that made her fight for the gold and diamond mines of the quiet, peace-loving Boer republics; in short, the same sort of "freedom" she is giving to Ireland at the point of a gun and with the edge of a sword. Let America but ask herself the question you have asked me: "For what are Germany and the others fighting?" and she will soon perceive, if the question be honestly answered, in which hearts the lust of aggression lies and from whence comes the spirit of destruction.

Germany to-day is without a definite peace plan. That is why the members of the Government consented to a statement as to the objectives, but made taboo any theorizing as to peace. There was a realization that Germany, fighting defensively, was not fighting constructively, except in so far as she was fighting for her national

existence, and except in so far as this war might effectuate a new political freedom within the empire. Obviously, both of these clauses were ones about which official tongues were not ready to wag too freely.

CHAPTER III

"PEACE WITH HONOR" VS. A "GERMAN PEACE"

No definite peace plan in Germany—Peace-at-any-price sentiment almost totally absent—Even Socialists want "peace with honor" —Some still hope for "German peace"—What that means—Little understanding of world-peace plans—The liberal wing, opposing ruthless U-boat campaign and seeking "peace with honor" growing in strength—This war fought for the House of Hapsburg—Germans believe England may hold Calais and that France may become a monarchy—Germans almost pity France, and are changing attitude toward England—France "bled white," they say, by England—Time fights for Allies, but the Germans are still firm.

PEACE is still a favorite subject for the Social Democrats, but it is always vague generalities with which they deal—an *"Ehrenvolle Friede"* (peace with honor) is what they call it—but how it will come about or what form it will take no one since Liebknecht has dared to say. Liebknecht's sentiments were largely those of a peace-at-any-price man, he being a strong Internationalist willing to accept any conditions that might bring about the possibility of resuming the class struggle.

Even in the extreme wings of the workingmen's party or among the most radical Socialists there is little or no sentiment supporting a peace at any price. All the views of these factions are predicated upon a continuation of the present German entity. I could discover no disintegration of the spirit of nationalism. No matter how they may differ on the method of conducting the war or as to the terms of an eventual peace, no matter what criticisms they had to make among themselves, all of the eighteen and more political parties with which Germany is cursed are stiff-necked and unyielding in their determination to fight to the end for Germany.

There are those in the empire who even at this day are firmly convinced that Germany will yet win an overwhelming victory and establish a "German peace." Professor von Stengel, whose name is widely known in Germany, when asked whether he believed the empire would participate in future international conferences at The Hague, gave "No" as his answer. He said that such conferences would be unnecessary under a "German peace," which he defined as a sort of super-state in which Germans would enforce

order in the world. "The one condition of prosperous existence, especially for the neutrals," he said, "is submission to our supreme direction. Under our overlordship all international law would become superfluous, for we of ourselves and instinctively give to each one his rights." Professor von Stengel is considered a great authority on international law and is credited with a close friendship with the royal house. It should be said that his views, while giving intense satisfaction to the *Junkerthum,* find no echo in official circles.

There is in Germany little knowledge and less sympathy of and for the plan of universal disarmament or of peace-enforcing leagues. This propaganda has made little headway among the Teutons. It was never given official recognition until the Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag in November. The Germans say that they want the end of the war to bring about conditions deeper and more lasting than those supplied by changes in frontiers or diplomatic phrases in treaties, but they have no formula to offer as to how this world betterment and peace be brought about, and it cannot be said that the censors are

especially desirous of permitting these lines of thought to be followed. For example, Dr. Alfred Fried's book, "The Restoration of Europe," which has been translated from the German by Lewis Gannett, and which goes to the very root of these questions, is prohibited from being circulated in Germany. Dr. Fried, who was the winner of the Nobel peace prize in 1911, and is reckoned one of the great thinkers of the present day, has had to take up his residence in Bern.

The main line of cleavage between the two dominant factions in Germany is to be found in the difference between "a peace with honor" and a "German peace." In the first class are counted the Social Democrats and the liberal thinkers generally, including the Chancellor, Zimmermann, Dr. Helfferich, secretary of state for the interior, and Dr. Solf, secretary of state for the colonies. In the second class are to be found the Conservatives and the National Liberals, who, under the leadership of Bassermann and Stresemann, are representative of the reactionary influence in the empire and are closely allied with the old-school Conservatives. They want Germany to dominate the world, they want Bel-

gium retained, they want portions of France held, they want Serbia wiped out of existence, they want a large slice of Russia added to the Kaiser's dominions, and want also the resumption of a ruthless U-boat campaign, pretending to believe that this course offers a sure way to a quick end and certain victory.

The reasonables—they are few in number—hold with a certain school of thought among the neutrals, that the best interests of the world in general will be served by a negative outcome to the war—a draw. They argue that compromise is the chief characteristic of the *Zeitgeist;* that with nations as with men life is a series of compromises, and that bearance and forbearance are the basis of amity. Out of the draw they can see grow the beginnings of a world confederation which shall have the supreme handling of international matters.

This sentiment is growing slowly among Germans. It will receive its major impetus when the empire's internal politics undergo liberalization. And that brings us again to the fourth way out—liberalization.

The disciples of this idea agree among them-

selves that in large part the present conflict is a war for the House of Hapsburg, and this they resent. The Austro-Hungarian Empire is a political anomaly, scarcely able to hold its constituent members in check. Historians have called Austria the miracle of Europe, because though in the last two hundred years she has been seemingly worsted in almost every war, yet upon each peace, or soon thereafter, frequently she has emerged with territorial accessions. It is feared in Germany that this time she will not be so fortunate. It is Austrian weakness that causes Germany to look to Petrograd for future aid in the Balkans, although there is an appreciation of the real importance of Hungary.

It is urged in Germany that, on the principle that the quickest way to bring peace is to make vigorous war, a new offensive against Russia should drive the German lines deep into the Czar's dominions. This is a part of the plan to bring about a peace with Russia, after which a new alliance may come about.

There is a strong belief in Germany, which has its base apart from the resentment against England, that the English will never quit Calais.

Great Britain fought for it many years, say the Germans—fought for it on the fields of Crécy and Agincourt in Picardy, where the fighting is now heaviest, and now that she has it, why should she give it up? Thus runs the characteristic German reasoning, and there are many who accept it. And there are many, too, who believe that France, which is suffering deeply through the war, will change her form of government at the end of the conflict and turn again into a monarchy. The complacent German ground for this theory is the fact that Germany has demonstrated the superior efficiency of the monarchical system over the loose republicanism which the Kaiser's subjects see in France.

The feeling toward France to-day is changed little from the sentiment I found in Germany two years ago. It is one of conciliation, of admiration, almost of sympathy and pity. The feeling toward England has changed from bitter resentment to a feeling not unmixed with admiration for the way she is fighting. It was firmly believed in Germany that the British Empire was in the process of disintegration, and that the disaffections in Ireland, Egypt, India, and

South Africa marked the beginning of the end of the great empire. And the Germans felt that military conscription would be the climax. To their overwhelming surprise, England accepted conscription, and the empire has become unified in a way that provokes the amazement of even the most pronounced Anglophobes.

By way of showing the thorough accord existing between the Government and the various political parties on the question of peace, and illustrating the fact that the Government is to-day getting its main support from the Social Democrats, an organization usually opposed to all that autocracy stands for, an excerpt from the platform of the Social Democrats, led by Scheidemann, reads as follows:

> Germany has renounced all plans of conquest and merely wishes to safeguard her political independence, her territorial integrity, and freedom for economic development. The fact that Italy and Roumania have joined her enemies will not make much difference to Germany, although it is to be regretted because it will not improve the chances for an early peace.

The similarity between Scheidemann's statement and that authorized by the Foreign Office will

be noticed. Franz Mehring, one of the radical Socialists, recently repudiated any "peace of defeat."

Germany believes to-day that England alone stands in the way of peace. She ignores France, which she considers to have been "bled white." She pretends to believe that France is ready to take peace at almost any price, and yet I can say on the highest authority in the United States that in the middle of 1916, after England had virtually stood aside, willing to await developments, it was France and France alone that objected with all her might to any attempt being made to lead to a discussion of peace.

The Foreign Office believes that the peace sentiment is gaining ground in Russia, the evidence being supplied in the recent speeches and writings of M. Bulatzel, a prominent member of the Duma, a leader of the extreme Right, and editor of a political journal, who urges a break with England and insists that Russia should have the right to make peace when she can do so "speedily, honorably, and advantageously."

Time is fighting for the Allies and against Germany. The longer the war continues, the

more significant a factor does man power become. That is why Germany is eager for peace, but not any peace.

Trifles cause grumbling, nerves are on edge, criticism of one another is lavish. All these things, and more, that catch a traveler's mind fade into nothingness compared with the big reaction made on one in Germany, and that is an impression of fixity of intention of gaining an honorable peace or suffering destruction.

CHAPTER IV

LIBERALIZING GERMANY

The old motto "siegen" replaced by a new: "durchhalten"—Kaiser Wilhelm reads signs of the times and approves liberalization—Fear that immediate democratization would be hailed as victory by Allies—No dynastic overthrow planned—Germans hold to monarchical system—Excellenz Zimmermann, Foreign Secretary and strong man of the cabinet, discusses the impending change—Real body of reformation to come after war is over—Germany has outgrown its political swaddling-clothes—A Government directly responsible through the Reichstag to the people, planned—How the leaders in Germany view the change.

SEVENTY million people with their backs against the wall; seventy million people fighting as one; seventy million people, and not a quitter among them. That is the deep impression made on me by Germany. And that is why, if peace is dependent upon a forthright German defeat, peace is still remote; for a nation unified by such a spirit is far from being humbled.

Powerful as is the pressure upon which they are standing, heavy as are the blows they receive, dark though their eventual prospects may be, the spirit of patriotism, of steadfastness,

of courage, of defiance that the Germans are showing burns as brightly and as fiercely to-day, after more than two years of the war, as at the outset.

But beneath all these attributes there is to be seen and felt a subtle change in the fabric of the German spirit. From a certainty of victory, it has been inexorably pressed down to a fear of defeat. From the ambition of world dominance, it has changed to a struggle for existence. From the hope of conquest, it has shifted to a determination not to be conquered. Exaltation has given way to desperation, and the fear that Germany once sought to impose upon others is now being imposed by others upon Germany.

When I was in Germany at the outbreak of the war the word in every one's mouth was *siegen* (conquer, or win), When I revisited the country, after two years, another word was being used—*durchhalten* (stick it out—hold through). I think the second motto is spoken with more heart than the first, for there were many in the empire who opposed a war of conquest; but now that conquest has been abandoned for existence, and the life of the nation is at stake, all feel the

need of endurance heavy upon them. Their work lies plain before them, and they do not count the costs, for they feel that no price is too high to pay for national entity, and that is what the Germans believe they are fighting for. That is why they are fighting so wonderfully; that is why their strength is renewed after each reverse; that is why there is no thought of temporizing; that is why I was told by many that before Germany, the nation, died, every woman would have to be killed. In entire seriousness, I believe that if the worst came to the worst, the German women would arm themselves and go into the trenches before they would see the victorious armies of the Allies march into Berlin. And such a prospect is no impossibility, for the German spirit stops at nothing, and such a plan is being seriously discussed.

With the German spirit so obsessed by one idea, there is scant room for others; nevertheless there is a sub-surface movement of vast political portent. Her people seemingly have time and inclination only for the fight they are in. Their Government, their mode of life, their rules of conduct, they are content to leave for the present

to the few who rule. Later an accounting will be asked. Now they do as they are told to do, not as they tell themselves they ought to do. It may be doubted if Frederick the Great, one hundred and fifty years ago, ever was able to weld his Prussia into the homogeneous, mobile, and responsive unit that Kaiser Wilhelm II has made of his empire.

But in the very unity of the nation, engaged upon the struggle for self-preservation, can be found the certain evidence that when the time comes, this unity will be used for their own purposes—for the establishment of a truly liberal government in which each shall govern as well as be governed.

The Germans have met the test of their right to self-government, which Bismarck feared to grant because of his belief that they were not ready for it. And the Kaiser himself has approved. Perhaps he has read the signs of the times, perhaps he is actuated by a finer motive; but whatever the impulse, the emperor has said, "My people have shown that nothing is beyond them, and they shall have as large a share as they desire in the affairs of their Government."

The imperial indorsement forms the capstone of the liberal structure that the war has built and is building. Every time the nation meets the new demands upon its strength the work goes forward. But when it will be ready for use, when it will displace the present system of autocracy, that is another question. The most ardent advocates of liberalization do not favor an immediate change. First, because it is unwise, they think, to swap horses while crossing a stream; and second, because the democratization of the country now would be hailed by the Allies as a victory they had won, and that thought does not help the cause of German progress.

How cogent this second reason will be remains to be seen. This time element—holding the reform until after the war—is not immutable. Talks with the big men of the country gave the impression that the change might easily come during the struggle, and so end it, and the naming, in November, 1916, of Alfred Zimmermann, a man of the people, to succeed von Jagow, the aristocrat, as head of the Foreign Office, seems to be a step in this direction. As I have already pointed out, the German intellectuals believe

that the liberalization of the empire is a likely "way out," one of the four possible avenues to peace.

When the change comes it will popularize the Government. It will mean the end of rule by divine right. It will make the Government responsible to the people, and not, except indirectly, responsible to the crown, which, under present conditions, as laid down by the Kaiser himself, is responsible only to God.

The plans are fixed and definite. They are to be realized through evolution rather than revolution. They are not pointing toward a dynastic overthrow. I did not hear one word to the effect that the Hohenzollern rule must end, and there is not, as certain highly placed officials in England believe, a readiness to remove the imperial crown from the Prussian house and give it to that of Bavaria, Saxony, or Württemberg. They are not for a swing away from a monarchy. The monarchic idea is too deeply implanted in the German mind, which regards it as the most efficient type of government; they mean, as in England and France, the participation of the people in their Government through the Reichs-

tag, which is to exercise real governing functions instead of being a mere debating society, as it is now contemptuously but truthfully called.

This move toward and certainty of political liberalization is the most astounding fact an observer in the empire meets, excepting only the spirit of determination against being conquered. And it was no less astounding to hear the change discussed and advocated by the man next in importance to the Chancellor in the present Government, Excellenz Zimmermann, who, because of his experience and ability, of his character and popularity, may advance still further when the reform proceeds.

When Colonel E. M. House visited Europe for the President in the spring of 1916, he came away from Germany convinced that Zimmermann, as he put it, "is one of the biggest men in the empire." That is the impression generally held by those with whom the secretary comes into contact. He is a big, upstanding man, with strongly marked features, his face scarred by his university duels, and, for a German diplomat, unusually direct and straightforward in thought

and speech. His directness of mind is more American than German, for the Berlin diplomacy still maintains as its model the circuitous and subtle processes usually associated with Metternich.

I saw Zimmermann frequently during my stay in Germany, and found him to be possessed of a more liberal attitude and a deeper understanding of America and American ideals than any of the other leaders in his country.

"It would be useless and dangerous to deny," said Herr Zimmermann on a day in late September of 1916, sitting at his desk in the Foreign Office, "that the trend of political thought in Germany to-day is toward liberalization. Useless, because it is true that the trend exists, and dangerous because a denial would indicate opposition to the consummation of this thought.

"I do not mean to say that the plans now being formulated are not meeting with antagonism, for the Conservatives and certain other political divisions are strong in their opposition; but I am sure that the bulk of the best thought in Germany to-day is in favor of effectuating the political changes that liberalization postulates, and I



Mr. Herbert Bayard Swope

Zur freundlichen Erinnerung

Berlin, den 25. IX. 1916

Zimmermann.

feel quite sure that these changes are certain to come.

"It is possible that a certain measure of reform will be put into practice before the war has reached an end, but I should say that the real body of the reformation will not be taken up until after peace. My belief on this point is due to the fact that under the conditions now existing we are doing very well; perhaps better with a concentration of power than would be the case if the power were scattered. Further, the fact that our enemies are talking of forcing internal reforms upon us would make it seem as if such reforms would be a price of peace, and while we are anxious for the changes to come, we want them to come at our will and not under duress or coercion.

"The vast changes that Germany has undergone since the Franco-Prussian War have been due in no small measure to the form of government under which she has lived. It may be doubted if any other structure would have been successful in bringing her to the position of world power which she now occupies. With her giant's growth has come a change in her political

philosophy. By easy stages her people have fitted themselves for an active participation in the affairs of government greater than was assigned to them at the refoundation of the empire, when, naturally, her form of government was in a state of flux. The old Kaiser and Bismarck adopted that type which in their opinion was best suited for the purpose Germany had. How well they builded is now a matter of history. The country has outgrown its political swaddling-clothes and is ready to have its political responsibility divided among the many instead of the few."

I asked Herr Zimmermann just what the change would be.

"Along just what lines this change will come," he replied, "is still a matter of discussion. There are, however, certain elemental considerations the acceptance of which is understood. In this class are included the reforms of the suffrage in Prussia, which still employs the plural voting system, and in some of the smaller German states, where the form of government is still autocratic.

"The important feature of the change will be the erection of direct responsibility of the Gov-

ernment to the people through their representatives in the Reichstag. Under the present system there is actually no such responsibility. The Chancellor is at the head of the political government. He owes his responsibility to the Kaiser, by whom he is created. The various secretaries are not actually ministers of the cabinet in the common understanding of that term. They are merely bureau chiefs of the Chancellor, who is not only nominally, but actually, their chief, and to whom their responsibility is alone due.

"This condition was reaffirmed by the Chancellor in his speech in the Zabern affair, when he pointed out that the Government was not answerable to the Reichstag for the course it pursued, but was answerable alone to the emperor.

"There is a definite belief in Germany to-day, and a belief that may not be far from realization, that the Government should be answerable to the Reichstag, thus making it responsive to the popular voice. Perhaps the most effective way of bringing this change about would be to amend the constitution of the confederated empire, with the permission and approval of the Kaiser and

the various ruling kings and heads of the confederated states by whom the constitution was granted.

"In creating the responsibility of the Chancellor to the people, it would likewise be necessary to organize a cabinet, the members of which would have powers similar in their nature to those held by the cabinet officials of America, France, and England. The creation of such a form would obviate the present charge that Germany does not possess a popular government, and would give opportunity for the effective participation of many minds, which now are lacking a mode of expression.

"Up to this point I am in sympathy with the outline of the reforms that I have sketched; but my approval stops short of accepting a plan that would involve the downfall of the Government every time the Reichstag passed a vote of lack of confidence.

"It must be borne in mind that there are in Germany to-day something like twenty-five separate political organizations. This number is unwieldy and dangerous to successful execution of governmental projects because of the facility

with which opposition could be welded together on one pretext or another to overthrow the ministry. Therefore, since Germany does not possess the two-party system found in England and America, and as the German political issues are largely internal rather than foreign, it is my idea that in the creation of the new form of governmental responsibility there should be given to the Government a fixed tenure of office similar to that which America possesses, where the cabinet is emplaced for four years.

"Perhaps the plan would work out in such a way as to give the members of the Reichstag a definite term of service and make the service of the ministry coincident with that period. I would, however, depart from the practice now in vogue in America, and give the members of the ministry seats in the Reichstag, as is the system in other countries to-day. Through this plan they would be in position to explain and defend their official acts and, as executives of the people's will, have the opportunity of setting forth their plans and policies to the representatives of the people."

Herr Zimmermann went further, but the rest

was said under the seal of confidence. He is known as a stanch Liberal in politics and a man of high ideals, but this was the first time that he had permitted himself to be quoted on a question that is deep in the minds of all Germans today.

His friends—and his enemies, too—agree that when the change comes the secretary will have to be reckoned with, because he is accounted one of the ablest parliamentarians in Germany today, and is possessed of an alert, keen, lucid, and widely informed mind.

Bethmann-Hollweg is said by those closest to him to be heartily in favor of the purposed reform, although it fell to his lot to enunciate the Zabern doctrine—that is, the responsibility of the Chancellor to the Kaiser alone. He made the pronouncement because it was true, and because under the existing conditions it was necessary, but he is counted among those who are anxious to see the basic conditions changed. Dr. Helfferich and Dr. Solf are two more members of the present Government who are set down as favoring the reform. Jagow is not being committed by his friends, but he is generally re-

garded as among those who prefer the retention of the present system.

Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the unusually able German minister to Denmark, who wields considerable power in the politics of his country, though an aristocrat by birth and breeding, is a supporter of the movement, and so is his cousin, Count Johann von Bernstorff, the German ambassador to America. The supporters and antagonists of the reform are not divided by class distinctions, for against these aristocrats who favor the change stand representatives of the National Liberal party, such as Bassermann and Stresemann, who are devoted to the present régime. The National Liberal party, with its high-sounding title, is as standpat and as reactionary as the Conservatives and Agrarians are. The party is primarily representative of the big industrial elements of Germany's commercial life, and its leaders have much in common with the sturdy, stiff-necked, high-protection Republicanism of the "Uncle Joe" Cannon, McKinley, Penrose, and Smoot type.

Under the present system of governmental operation in Germany the Reichstag possesses

virtually only that elemental right—the primary power the people have under even the most limited form of representative government—of withholding taxes from purposes that are not approved. The exercise of this right has been often threatened, but rarely used.

So out of the seething caldron of the war it is almost certain that a new and finer form of government will come to Germany. This is one of the few prospects left to cheer the German mind, which has otherwise a rather black prospect; for despite their remarkable military triumphs, the Germans do not delude themselves that they can win a complete victory, and without some hope of internal betterment their future would be dark indeed.

CHAPTER V

THE SPIRIT OF THE BELEAGUERED EMPIRE

Germany sobered to-day—Calls herself a "beleaguered fortress" and establishes "Burgfriede"—Junkerthum violates the political truce—Dream of German super-state forgotten—Necessity of the war doubted—Some conservatives prefer destruction of Germany to its democratization—Kaiser's prestige great—Censorship used to burke criticism—Germany's "reptile press" and her belief in the venality of foreign papers—The Jewish question—The women—Spread of autocratic Socialism—The strain of life in Germany to-day.

THE bitterness of the struggle and the desperate conditions they are facing are reflexed in the spirit of the Germans to-day. There is little or no blitheness in Germany. She takes her pleasures sadly and takes them only because recreation is held to be a duty, so that her sons and daughters may be better fitted for the work that they are doing for the fatherland. For each individual in the fatherland to-day is doing his or her share for the cause. They have settled down to the situation in the belief that they are now undergoing the last phases of the war, real-

izing that the lines along which the war, both politically and economically, is now being fought are the lines along which the end will come.

This must not be taken to mean that the Germans believe they are doomed to defeat; if any one of them believes that, the belief is well hidden. It means simply that the conditions Germany is now facing will be, without material change, those she will face when peace relieves the fearful strain that she is undergoing, under which, although her military spirit has remained unbroken and her armies continue successful, there are to be seen evidences of the beginning of a political and spiritual disintegration. Such evidences are inevitable concomitants of the reaction from the certainty of victory to a fear of defeat, but they may be rather a means to bring about an even greater determination not to be beaten than an indication that national decomposition is under way.

Germany to-day calls herself a "beleaguered fortress," and that is what she is in actuality. An iron ring engirdles her. Therefore it was fitting that a *Burgfriede* should be decreed at the beginning of the war. *Burgfriede* means,

broadly, "civic peace"; it is a principle handed down from olden days, when the various separate free cities and states were engaged in war. Such cities or states would by agreement forget all internal dissensions, so that they could present united fronts against common foes.

The *Burgfriede* of Germany was agreed to by all the parties at the outbreak of this war, and for a time it was religiously maintained. But now the friends of the Chancellor are accusing those opposing him, most of them members of the Conservative or affiliated parties, of having broken the truce. The Social Democrats, who have been loyal in their support of the Government, say that the *Junkerthum* in its open antagonism to the governmental policies, has been guilty of an act almost as bad as treachery.

The teaching of force as an element of government, as laid down in the precepts of Nietzsche, Treitschke, Clausewitz, Frobenius, and Bernhardi, which had permeated the entire moral, scholastic, and political fabric of the German Empire, is beginning to wear off. It is not rare for an observer to hear the question asked if there be no middle course between World Power and

Downfall, if there be not one making, if less for power, then more for happiness.

It is readily observable that the war has changed the German idea and the national impulse. The fond dream of a great world superstate, which was only another name for a Germanized world, has dissipated, and with few exceptions the leaders of thought in Germany are well contented with any plan in which their present is assured and their legitimate future expansion safeguarded. That expansion lies toward the south and east; that is why the Germans feel they have a deep and vital interest in the Balkans. It is through that region that the lines of their development must go as long as England holds the seas.

There are those in Germany who are even beginning to wonder if the war was not escapable. "No one wanted it, least of all ourselves," they say; "so was n't there a way by which the war could have been avoided, even without the added power that a victory promised?" This is one of the questions that will be asked when the accounting is made and responsibility for the cataclysm is allocated.

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KAISER WILHELM

These doubters, who do not let their theories interfere with facing the conditions which exist, feel that they have grounds for their doubt as to the virtue of the war in the former success of the policy of "pacific penetration." They point out that under this system Germany had gained great strength, if not commercial dominance, in Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Roumania, and even in Serbia, despite the waning power of Austria there. And above all they point out that Italy was rapidly becoming an exclusive German field of effort. Now, they ask themselves, what have they left? Only Turkey and Bulgaria, while the others of the list are lost to German influence, if not forever, at least for years to come. These views are in direct opposition to the old spirit of force under which Germany was to be the super-nation; the specially chosen of "the good old God," the spirit that made Force equal Right. It was a creed that formed a political doctrine, a scholastic formula, and a religious faith. Those Germans upon whom the hold of this spirit is weakening are weakening only in their belief in this spirit; their changed philosophy has not weakened their devotion to national existence

and their determination to preserve it at any cost.

The advocates of greater ruthlessness in the war are also those most determined in their opposition to the coming liberalization. They are largely recruited from the Conservatives and the officers of the army and navy. Some observers read into the opposition a decision upon the part of the *Junkerthum* to preserve the military domination, and with it the class privileges it enjoys; for it fears, with reason, that one immediate effect of liberalization will be to end the condition in which the nation exists for the support of the army, and substitute a condition where the army exists only for the protection of the nation.

Some of the conservative elements in Germany who are advocating the "wide-open" program of warfare in the face of its certainty to involve America would rather see Germany destroyed than see it democratized. Naturally this is a point upon which few are willing to talk with any freedom.

It must not be inferred that the Kaiser is deriving his sole support from the ranks of the Conservatives. The country is thoroughly unified

in adherence to the emperor. The Cologne "Gazette," one of the most influential papers of Germany, printed an editorial late in September which was republished throughout the empire and met with great favor. The paper said that it was as sensible for Germany to demand the deposition of the English king as for the Allies to expect the enforced abdication of the Kaiser, "whose prestige and general veneration have only increased during this period of war, and who is to-day stronger in the hearts and minds of the Germans than he ever was before. . . . Moreover, we Germans are so completely informed from trustworthy sources about all the facts and motives that produced this war that it is utterly impossible that we should reverse our judgment."

The spirit of patriotism and nationality is as strong in Germany to-day as ever it was, despite grave errors in policy, none of which seems more serious than the rigid political censorship now enforced in the empire. This censorship is used more often to burke criticism than to keep information from the enemy. This policy is probably the cause of the Allies' belief that the German Government is entirely on the defensive against

its own people. Such an unqualified statement is far from being true. But the belief in its truth is understandable when the instance of the "Berliner Tageblatt" is recalled—one of Germany's big papers that was suppressed for seven days during the summer of 1916, and no one yet knows the cause. Obviously, the outside assumption is that the step was taken to prevent the spread of rot in public opinion.

The newspapers of Germany are bound to play a big part in the imminent liberalization of the German Empire. The governmental attitude is still largely that of Bismarck toward the "reptile press." The German belief in the venality of the press, which is the regular theory of operation, was shown recently when a story emanating from Holland, ascribed to reliable sources in Berlin, said that something like $50,000,000 had been spent by Germany in two years for the subsidization of public opinion in neutral countries, and it was added that something like $10,000,000 had been spent in this country. If that is true, it would account for the readiness with which the Germans believe that all the newspapers in America not friendly

to their cause are bought by "British gold," in which class they place the New York *Times* and New York *Tribune,* and also *The World,* whenever its editorials or news columns say anything unfriendly from the German point of view.

Early in the war Zimmermann said that, among other things, it would settle one interesting point, and that was whether it was better to be a "journalistically ruled nation like America and England, or a non-journalistic nation like Germany." I asked him when I left Berlin in the autumn of 1916 if he had reached a decision on this point. He smiled and said, "Well, perhaps a little more journalistic participation in the affairs of the Government might be a good thing for Germany, after all."

When the liberalization comes, the Jewish question will reassert itself. It is forgotten now, in the *Sturm und Drang* of the war. There have been a few modifications of the Jewish disabilities, but nothing of any substantial nature has been done.

Another question that will arise will be that of the women. As they win a greater economic independence, they will demand greater political

recognition, which is now given virtually no serious thought in the empire.

The spread of autocratic Socialism, to coin a phrase that describes precisely the enforced social coöperation and combination prevalent in Germany to-day, is welcomed by the liberal minds as making it easier to democratize the nation, when the time shall come. It is an official recognition of the people's part in the work of the country, opposed to the old way of regarding the mass of inhabitants as merely an inferior lot who are accorded the privilege of being ruled.

Life in Germany is not pleasant to-day. There is a hopeless, prison atmosphere about it that causes men to crack under the strain. The effect is peculiarly noticeable upon the neutrals. They grow fretted and nerve-racked. Several attachés of the embassy, and some of the American correspondents, have suffered nervous prostration. Berlin, more than any other German city, has become a nest of intrigue and gossip. A motive is looked for behind every man's act. This creates an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion.

Germany's place in the sun may be remote,

and the sun may be growing cloudy, but German's spirit does not waver; her courage still answers every test; her soldiers are still untouched in their bravery and skill; and every sacrifice that she asks is being met willingly, almost gladly.

CHAPTER VI

GERMAN HATRED OF AMERICA: ITS CAUSES

German hate for England expressed in fighting; that for America has no outlet—America held to blame for German reverses—Grounds for German hate: (1) Export of munitions; (2) British blockade, not stopped by America; (3) Interference with mails; (4) Commercial blacklist; (5) President Wilson's submarine doctrine—"American neutrality toward Germany is of the head; that toward the Allies is of the heart," says Jagow—Belief in loyalty of German-Americans to the Kaiser—American attachés barred from the front—Ambassador Gerard's retort to an official—Commercial hostility.

THROUGHOUT Germany to-day the hatred for America is bitter and deep. It is palpable and weighs you down. All the resentment, all the blind fury, Germany once reserved for England alone have been expanded to include us, and have been accentuated in the expansion.

The Germans have an outlet for their feelings against England. They express themselves on the battle-fields and through the Zeppelins and submarines; but against America they lack a method of registering their enmity. And so this

bitterness cannot be poured out, has struck in and saturated the whole empire.

The chagrin and humiliation of their failure to end the war through victory before now is visited upon America. The failure gave birth to hatred. Throughout the length and breadth of Germany the belief is certain and unqualified that had it not been for American moral and physical help to the Allies the war would long since have been over. With magnificent disregard of the checks and reverses, both military and economic, that Germany has suffered at the hands of the Allies, her sons, from top to bottom, say that only America is to blame for the fact that the war is now well into its third year, and for the more pertinent fact that as time goes on the German chances are bound to grow less.

It is a common thing to hear in Germany that America has a secret alliance with England under which she is now operating; is even more of a commonplace to be told that America is deliberately seeking to prolong the war and circumvent peace for the "bloody-money" she is making out of the struggle. Germany's fear of defeat and loss of prestige are laid at our door;

we are made the sacrificial goat offered on the altar of self-glory.

Hate may have no boundaries, but it has beginnings, and it is not hard to classify the grounds from which the German hatred of America springs. There are five, possibly six. They are, as the Germans put them:

First, the supply of munitions to the Allies.

Second, the illegal blockade for which we are held responsible since we have not stopped it.

Third, the interference with neutral mails.

Fourth, the Allies' world-wide commercial blacklist.

Fifth, the submarine doctrine we have compelled Germany to accept.

And the sixth is one which may be a considerable factor—that America is out of the war and prospering; for what is more usual than for envy to breed hate? Perhaps this sixth cause of German hatred might with equal truth be applied to the resentment said to exist against us in the other countries at war, for surely Germany is not the only one that resents our peace and prosperity.

Our interpretation of neutrality is made the

object of bitter recrimination in Germany, and it is a subject on which even those placed in the highest positions speak with the utmost candor.

Jagow, until November, 1916, chief secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Zimmermann, his chief under-secretary, who succeeded him, in discussing the American attitude, phrased the sentiments of their country when they said:

> The American neutrality toward Germany is one of the head; toward the Allies it is one of the heart. What America does for the Allies she does voluntarily and gladly; what she does for Germany she does because she must.

This is a mild view compared to the popular idea. The resentment against America has been cumulative in its growth, while that against England is perhaps less to-day than it was at the beginning. Because her military activity is against the English, it has wrought at least a measure of satisfaction. But the very fact that America has been out of reach of a concrete demonstration of German hatred has made more bitter the feeling toward America, to such a degree that it has become actually menacing. The form it takes is the widespread and highly popular agita-

tion for the resumption of the ruthless *Lusitania* type of U-boat warfare.

Throughout Germany the agitation for this plan grows stronger day by day. The Chancellor is holding out against it, but how long he can restrain it no one can say. I left Germany convinced that only peace could prevent its resumption. And the same opinion is held by every German with whom I spoke, and it is held also by Ambassador Gerard. The possibility was so menacing that the principal cause of the ambassador's return to America in October was that he might report to Washington. The point was set out in press despatches at that time.

But while the plan of returning to the *Lusitania* type of submarine warfare is made more popular by the fact that it would be a blow at America, since America struck this weapon from German hands, it must not be thought that the advocates of the resumption view it merely as an offering to hate; they insist that it is an instrument of great military value, and they pretend to believe that its use will tend to shorten the war. However, the most ardent disciples of this plan can give no logical reasons for their belief, while

those supporting the Chancellor in his opposition are able to demonstrate the soundness of their attitude. In normal circumstances this alinement of reason against unreason would be a guarantee against the success of the "ruthless" advocates, but when a nation has its back against the wall, fighting for existence, reason gives way to fury, and fury stops at nothing.

Germany is not confining her methods of showing her resentment toward America to this country. She is making demonstrations within her own borders. General Hindenburg sent word through his chief of staff, Ludendorff, to Colonel Kuhn, our military attaché, and Commander Gherardi our naval attaché, that neither would be permitted to go to the front or have opportunities for observation, although these privileges are being regularly extended to the observers of all other neutral countries. This was made the basis of representations, through our embassy to Washington, and Colonel Kuhn was finally recalled from his Berlin post.

Another instance: the League of Truth, a so-called German-American society, which sympathized with St. John Gaffney, former American

consul at Munich, in his pro-Germanism and opposition to the administration's interpretation of neutrality, laid at the foot of the statue of Frederick the Great in Berlin, a big wreath with the American flag, draped in mourning to indicate its desecration, and added a legend to the effect, "Wilson does not represent America." The flag thus draped remained at the foot of the statue for weeks by the tacit permission of the military authorities. It was not removed until Ambassador Gerard, who had been ill, told the police that if they did not take it down, he would do so himself.

How strong Germany believes herself to be in America can be seen in any of the political maps issued by the Pan-German League, on which a great blob of pink indicates the residence in America of the nine millions of German birth or parentage. Those making up this number are claimed as indirect members of the league, who are, or ought to be, as the pan-Germans see it, ready at all times to do Germany's bidding. It is the belief of these pan-Germans that through their far-flung membership some day German *Kultur* will dominate the world.

Not only does Germany believe that her political strength in this country is great enough to make the American Government take it into consideration, if not to make it actually subservient to the Wilhelmstrasse, but the belief goes further. One prominent member of the Government told the ambassador he had been informed that America would not risk a war with Germany, because "there were five hundred thousand trained Germans ready to bear arms in the United States against the American Government."

"There may be," was Gerard's quick response, "but there are five hundred thousand lamp-posts in America ready to string them up on if they ever try it."

Thereafter the ambassador made it a point to correct this false impression that the naturalized Germans in America, whatever their politics, would actually go so far as to arm against their own country. In this effort he was supported by Dr. M. E. Egan, American minister to Denmark, who worked through Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the very intelligent German minister in Copenhagen, who finally came to this view and

helped eradicate the mistaken one that had been held in Berlin.

It is a commonplace to talk of insults to those speaking English in the streets of Germany. Whenever the explanation is made that the speaker is American, the answer comes, "The Americans are the worst of all." There can be no doubt of the depth of this feeling; it even invades business. Two enterprising, well-connected young New-Yorkers, who had gone to Germany on business, were about to have an important commercial contract signed in Chemnitz, in November, 1916, only to have the German merchant tear up the papers before them because he got word that day that a friend of his had been killed "by an American shell." If one is to believe the stories one hears in Germany, every German soldier killed so far has been killed by American ammunition. Major Griesel, chief of the war press bureau in Berlin, keeps three American shells on his desk by way of welcoming the American correspondents, and then to make them feel at home he adds that he was wounded by one of them.

CHAPTER VII

THE MENACE OF THE U-BOAT

Export of munitions declared legally right but morally wrong—Success of the German submarines—The internal crisis hinging on the submarine issue—Resumption of ruthless U-boat war inevitable unless peace comes soon—Strength of the opposition—What a diplomatic break would mean—The lesson of the U-53—Estrangement heightened by difficulties of communication—The Paris Conference plans directed against the U. S.?—Will the hatred be permanent?

Of the five points on which the German hatred crystallizes,[1] the first and the fifth—munitions and submarines—are easy to answer, but the other three are more difficult. Lacking though they may be in reason, the grievances lie deep in German hearts. Even Jagow said, when I called on him one afternoon, that Germany had the right to feel injured through our munition shipments. When I replied that it was Germany herself that had prevented The Hague Conference from prohibiting the sale of armament to belligerents, and that therefore it was Germany that had created the right under which

[1] See page 72.

America was operating, he replied that "juristically, America might have the right, but morally she was committing a great wrong." When such an attitude is assumed by those in high places, the belief of the mass of the people can readily be imagined.

The point about the blockade is one on which the argument is not so clear-cut. The Germans say that the English are bringing the war to the non-combatant; they are seeking to starve women and children. The points about the interference with the mails and the blacklists are also difficult for an American in Germany to answer, except to point out that grave protests have been made by Washington against them both.

"Yes," said Excellenz Zimmermann in response, "but the protests to us are ones that we must listen to, while apparently England can disregard those you send to her." When they heard in Germany that America was sending her mail to the far East in army transports, the question was at once raised as to why the same method was not employed with mail intended for neutral European countries.

The German attitude on our submarine doctrine seems to have the least basis in fact of all the contributory causes to the hatred of America. Despite the restrictions imposed by President Wilson on the use of the U-boats, despite the claim that Germans make that America struck "the mightiest weapon" from Germany's hand, the German admiralty reports that the operations of the submarines reached the high-water mark in August, 1916. Dr. Roediger, one of the divisional chiefs of the Foreign Office, whose efficiency is winning him a high reputation, is responsible for the following record of the work of the U-boats in 1916. In reading the list it must be borne in mind that up to June the Germans were still operating on a wide-open program, not having accepted the terms of our *Sussex* note until toward the end of May. The table follows:

	No. ships sunk	*Tons* [1]
January and February	120	288,500
March	80	207,000
April	96	225,000

[1] German metric tons are about two per cent. larger than tons reckoned under our system.

	No. ships sunk	*Tons*
May	56	118,500
June	61	101,000
July	75	103,000
August	161	208,349
8 months	649	1,251,349

The advocates of the ruthless type of the U-boat warfare say that sinking without warning is the only course left open to them because of England's action in ordering all her ships to be armed and to ram submarines on sight. This is the view of the military advocates. The question has become a factor in Germany's internal politics, since it is being urged by the Conservatives and the National Liberals, representatives of the reactionary element, and opposed by the Social Democrats and the Radicals and other liberal bodies. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg is determined in his opposition to the plan, on the ground that it is suicide for Germany to adopt it. In this view he has been supported by Zimmermann, Helfferich and Dr. Solf, and nominally by Jagow. But the pressure upon

VON JAGOW, LATE GERMAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

them is becoming greater through the insistence of the people, who see in the unrestricted U-boat campaign first of all a chance of multiplying the costs of the war to England, and, second, a chance to offend and injure America. So the people's hearts are in the demand for the resumption unless peace comes.

The immediacy of the demand lessened with the succession of military victories in the autumn of 1916, which acted as a sop to the desire for ruthlessness. But even the most hopeful in Germany, such as Scheidemann, Suedekum, David, and others of the Social Democratic group, and Naumann of the Radicals, admit that resumption must come within a few months unless peace comes first. Bassermann, Stresemann, and Count Westarp of the opposition frankly want to begin the campaign at once. This view was held, surprisingly enough, by Herbert Guttmann, president of the powerful Dresdner bank, whose relations with America would have justified the belief that he would be in opposition to such plans.

How deeply grounded is the resentment occasioned by the failure to use any effective means

of war was shown when the Chancellor, before the opening of the Reichstag in the summer of 1916, was under the necessity of having Count Zeppelin write him a public letter acquitting him of the charge that he had opposed the use of "Zeps" in raids over England. Only with this clean bill of health could the Chancellor make his speech at the reconvening of the Reichstag, in which he said "any German statesman who opposed an effective means of shortening the war should be hanged." The ambiguity of the statement gave room for the advocates of the *rücksichtlose Krieg* to hope that the Chancellor would eventually shift to their point of view.

They frankly say that they have nothing to gain from America, and so they think war might as well come. They think that America at war with Germany would be less harmful to her than America at peace, because they believe that if war came, America would keep all her munitions at home. Official Washington regards the German belief on this point as wholly wrong. Our share of the war's burden would be borne by supplying even greater quantities of munitions to the Allies.

Then, too, there is a question in Germany as to whether a diplomatic break with this country would actually mean war. It is believed at Washington that a break would mean war, and the German Government has itself so stated. Ambassador Bernstorff has made his position clear on this point, which was first raised in the celebrated pamphlet by "Junius Alter," issued recently, in which an astoundingly bitter attack was made upon the Chancellor and his secretaries. The writer, who is a prominent member of the Conservative party, expresses doubt as to "whether any one in Berlin ever tried to measure the exact consequences of a clash with America," and adds:

> People with knowledge of the internal politics of the United States, and of its fleet and army, among them a well-known diplomatist, have declared that armed interference by America is absolutely out of the question. The only practical consequence of a break in diplomatic relations would be the confiscation of the merchant ships now lying in American ports.

This pamphlet had a wide-spread circulation and great popularity in Germany.

Among others who are supporting the agita-

tion for the resumption is said to be General Mackensen, who is a notorious *Amerikaner-fresser* (American-eater), as the Americano-phobes are called. It is a subject of common talk in army circles that Hindenburg's so-called opposition to the "ruthless war" is merely a political position assumed for the time being. Never once has the general in chief been quoted directly as standing against it.

Count Bernstorff is opposed to the plan, and feels certain it will never be put into execution; but Count Rantzau, a few days after he had paid a visit to the Kaiser and the great general staff, told me frankly that he feared the plan was rapidly becoming unavoidable.

Our embassy in Berlin expected just such a demonstration as was given by the U-53 in October when she sank six vessels off Nantucket, as a lesson of what Germany could do in our waters if war came. In the minds of all well-informed Germans the visit of the U-53 had no other object.

One cause of the growing estrangement of the two countries is found in the difficulty of communication. Post and cable intercourse have

virtually ceased, and only the limited service by wireless remains. The American public, through the American papers, gets much more and truer news of Germany than Germany does of America. Most of the big American papers maintain men in Germany who get their news across, but few, perhaps not more than two or three, German papers, have staff members in America. As a result, German news of America comes from Rotterdam, after being picked out of the English papers in London. The English papers get their reports from New York, and frequently the English despatches on the American end of German situations have been garbled and misleading, and the republication in Germany does not serve to increase the friendliness of feeling.

In those calmer moments when the dislike of America is forgotten, the Germans point out how unwise a course America is pursuing in not allying herself against England, who, the Germans say, is guided always by its traditional policy of smashing her most dangerous competitor. That is the work she is engaged in now, the German reasoning continues, and if Germany is de-

stroyed, it will be America's turn next to face the British greed for world supremacy. In support of this view, the Paris Economic Conference is pointed to as the binding together of Britain's allies for the war that is to be made against us. Nor is this view without supporters highly placed in this country, even though they may not agree that this contingency can be averted by an immediate alliance with Germany.

While the war goes on, German resentment grows, and the new generation is being raised in hatred of America, and this sentiment will prove a barrier between the two countries for a long time to come unless America is fortunate enough to be able to exorcise it through the olive-branch of peace.

CHAPTER VIII

GERMANY AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT

Wilson personifies America to Germany, so hate centers on him—Ambassador Gerard shares the hostility though officials respect him—Yet Germany willing to accept Wilson as mediator—Germans favored Hughes because they wanted to punish Wilson—Harden the only German to praise Wilson.

If it be impossible to indict a nation, it appears to be equally difficult to hate a whole nation without centering the hatred upon some one point or man. In the case of Germany, President Wilson personifies America, and so the German hatred is centered on Wilson. Further, because President Wilson is represented by Ambassador Gerard, that official is loaded down with responsibility for all the shortcomings the Germans are able to perceive in our attitude toward them.

It is a difficult thing for a neutral to be neutral in Germany to-day. The best friends of Germany must admit that her demands on one's sentiments are rather harsh. In Berlin any one

who is not outspokenly an advocate of German supremacy is gazed upon with coldness and suspicion.

Ambassador Gerard, seeking to interpret the principles of the President of the country he represents, has been neither pro-Ally nor pro-German, but merely pro-American, and for this he has been attacked, although the attacks have been cloaked under various and specious causes.

The Berlin Government thinks well of Mr. Gerard, but the people view him solely as the American ambassador, and the adjective before his title is enough to damn him. To a considerable extent the censors are responsible for feeding this sentiment in the articles they have permitted to be printed. They even resent the ambassador's efforts to inform his own country of the depth of the German feeling against it. They say, if he were "truly friendly," he would say nothing which might increase the tension, even though the Germans themselves, through some of their spokesmen, have deliberately sought to bring about a strained relation.

A striking illustration of this was afforded in the Tirpitz manifesto, in which the grand admiral

called upon all his followers to prepare for the certain struggle that was to come between Germany and the *Anglo-Amerikanerthum*. While this utterance was given circulation in Germany, the censors declined to permit it to be sent out of the country until America learned of it through the embassy, after which it was permitted to be put upon the cables, since a continued suppression would have made the effect even more serious than it was.

Not long ago it might well have been doubted if Germany would have been willing to accept intermediation at the hands of the President. Now they would be happy to have it come from him, although they will not admit that either he or his ambassador has been sincerely working to bring about peace among the belligerents.

Germany has been eager to have the President take some steps toward arranging, if nothing else, an armistice. But she has not yet shown a willingness to authorize such a proceeding officially. She wants the peace proposals brought to her; she will not go after them, not even to the extent of requesting the preliminary good offices of America. It is safe to say that no mat-

ter what indirect efforts she may employ in this connection, Washington will do nothing until a formal request has been made.

The campaign for the ruthless U-boat warfare is regarded by one man in this country, who speaks with the highest German authority, as being in the nature of a threat intended to accelerate and force upon us a movement toward peace. Ambassador Gerard had his attention drawn to this just before he left Berlin, but he declined to accept the interpretation.

America's failure to effect a peace has been more of a crime in German eyes than her own failure to force one through military conquests. That is another count in the indictment lodged against Wilson. That is another reason why Wilson's defeat on Election day would have been regarded as a gigantic German triumph. Every one I spoke to in Germany believed this.

It would have been treated as a victory not because the Germans felt certain that Hughes was the man they wanted but because they were certain that Wilson was the man that they did not want. There was an apparent and admitted motive of satisfying the German passion for

reprisal—of punishing those standing against her.

On all sides I heard that Wilson must be humbled; that Wilson and his country must be taught a lesson. This was stated unequivocally, in so many words, by many Germans—officers, soldiers, government officials, bankers, merchants, and by none of these classes was it stated more emphatically than by the women. All believed that the defeat of Wilson would be in the nature of a rebuke and a warning to this country for the attitude it had assumed toward the empire.

One distinguished member of the Foreign Office in Wilhelmstrasse, who is himself rather favorably disposed toward America and the administration, interpreted the feeling of his nation in these words:

> If Germany was certain Hughes would be her enemy, still would she seek Wilson's destruction. "Let us smash Wilson now," the people say, "and then if Hughes proves another Wilson, we will smash him too in another four years."

Because our anti-submarine attitude is so big a matter to them, they think it also of primary importance here, and many believed that it was

an actual factor in the election. The choice of Hughes in German eyes would have been regarded as an actual repudiation of Wilson's prohibition of the unrestricted use of the U-boats.

In all my intercourse with representatives of the various strata that make up life in Germany —soldiers, sailors, laborers, politicians, clergymen, professors, newspaper men, business men, farmers—I did not hear one voice raised for Wilson except that of Maximilian Harden, the famous journalist, whose series on "If I were Mr. Wilson" touched and pleased the President deeply, but met scant favor in Germany. Not even Dr. Helfferich, secretary of state for the interior, and a vital factor in keeping the peace between the two countries, could see in the President's utterances any friendliness toward Germany. He, in common with the others, sought to differentiate between the President and the American public, which, they believe, wishes a greater friendliness to Germany and German methods than Wilson has shown.

CHAPTER IX

AMERICA THROUGH GERMAN EYES

How a pamphlet of enormous circulation treats of Americans—"In spirit genuine Englishmen"—"America fears Germany; that is why she hates her"—"America will be in economically advantageous position after the war"—"Puritanically hypocritical"—"Obsequious to English Lords"—How an American writer did *not* get his name—"Monroe Doctrine has been despised by all the great powers except Germany"—How Germans view our "Anglo-Saxon morality"—Why "republics must always fail"—"A tyranny of dollars"—"A history which tells of nothing but the lust for gain."

"We used to think of the Yankee as a long, lean, tobacco-chewing sly-boots with a goatee. As a greedy money-chaser without ideals, he lived for money alone, and to make money he would sell his soul to the devil or plant radishes on the grave of his parents.

"In 1898 we took that picture off the wall and hung up a new one. It dripped with virtue. We gazed with astonishment upon the Americans as 'the people of the future' in 'the land of unlimited possibilities' until we felt the hellish effects of American shells."

These are two paragraphs from the first page of a little German booklet called "American Neutrality," one of the stories of *Schützengrabenbücher*—trench books—made to fit in the pocket of a German soldier when he goes to the front. It is a fair sample of the sort of mental fodder that is being fed the German people in these days. This booklet has attained an enormous circulation, and helps to account for the feeling against America.

It presents an interesting side-light on German-American relations. The views the writer expresses are unquestionably the reactions of a large part of the Kaiser's people. They do not like us, but, unlike the celebrated apostrophe to old Dr. Fell, they have their reasons, and in this pamphlet we find some of them.

Americans will regard the work as a libelous caricature, but it is veracious in its rendition of the skepticism the Germans feel as to our idealism, of their scorn of our character, of their contempt for our motives, of their belief in our hypocrisy and lack of sentiment, and of their conviction that we have a mean and sordid interest

in prolonging the war. It is not a pleasing portrait that has been painted, but it is a portrait that types us to the average German, and so it is well for us to look at it.

With true German thoroughness, the author, Otto von Gottberg, starts in on his second page to discover the causes of our "unfriendly neutrality" by "observing the American people from its hour of birth to the present day through German eyes." On his forty-third page, having conscientiously completed this task, he turns to the supposed subject of the book, American neutrality, and, after discussing it for five pages, closes.

Germany, he says, has always viewed the United States through British eyes. England hated us up to 1898; then flattered us, according to his view of history, and the Germans aped the British. But the British flattered us merely because we were looming up as a world power, and they hoped to secure American help in "the war which they had already planned against the growing world power of Germany." And the Germans made a mistake in not perceiving that

we were still, as always, "in spirit, if not in blood, genuine English," a people "whose history tells of nothing but the lust of profit."

Why is America pro-Ally to-day? In part, Gottberg tells the men in the trenches and the burghers at home, because our leaders are at heart Englishmen; more, "because more American capital is invested in British than in German undertakings." And further, "while America scorns England because she has defeated her in the past, she fears Germany. The Americans look with hostile and suspicious respect upon the skill, industry, and success of German business men, engineers, soldiers, and sailors."

But he does not fear our entry into the war. He thinks we can help the Allies more by staying out. He has small respect for either our army or our navy. He charges that in the Spanish War our "commanders, among them Colonel Roosevelt, demanded their return in a memorial to the secretary of war, to which they cautiously signed their names in a circle, so that none of them should appear to be the ringleader."

However, he does not despise our economic forces, and in view of statements which were made

in the Presidential campaign, this view of a German is interesting.

"The United States have been and are an economic opponent to us. Whether they preserve their neutrality or not, they will at the end of a war which is exhausting Europe be our strongest economic competitor. . . . Spared by the war, indeed enriched by it, the Americans will, after the treaty of peace, be better armed than we for competitive struggle, and will bring a simply overpowering commercial supremacy to bear unless we gather and organize all our economic forces and put them in the service of the development of our industries."

It is interesting, and sometimes a little disconcerting, to view American history through the eyes of this German. He knows us too thoroughly and dislikes us too completely to make it very comfortable. He discusses Puritan hypocrisy in America; the manner in which we pass prohibition laws, and then take our whisky behind the blinds, and tolerate "speak-easies"; then he suddenly turns to other fields. "This hypocrisy is not confined to drinking. Never seeing the mote in his own eye, the American scolds

about supposed German atrocities in Belgium, but lynches negroes and murders Mexicans."

Even the Revolution did not change our respect for things English, our German historian tells us.

"Nowhere is the English lord received with more obsequiousness than in America. For decades American society knocked at the doors of the British aristocracy, which scornfully threw the beggars into the street. The American Crœsus rubbed his aching bones, but his admiration for the lords grew. He sacrificed millions to secure entry to their homes."

The Germans use the French word for Governor—*Gouverneur*. Hence this explanation:

"The American still loves to decorate his children with the names of the English nobility. An American father bore the name of Morris, which happened to be the name of a royal governor in the days of English rule. So he named his son Gouverneur. To-day the boy, a grown man, writes under the name of Gouverneur Morris." Gottberg does not seem to know that the father's name, too, was Gouverneur and that he was the grandson of a Gouverneur Morris who helped to

throw the British out of the country some years ago.

It is interesting to learn that the reason the British blockaded the coast of Europe from the Elbe to Brest in the Napoleonic wars was "to destroy American commerce." One had thought that a certain desire to isolate Napoleon had had something to do with it. The Monroe Doctrine, we learn, has been "on occasion despised by every great power of Europe with the single exception of Germany. But against no country has the Monroe Doctrine been quoted so often and so arrogantly as against Germany. Here again is revealed the Anglo-Saxon custom of showing friendly courtesy to the bold and giving kicks to the modest."

The North opposed slavery in the Civil War simply because the North was unable to compete economically with slave labor, the booklet says, and it says further, the transcontinental railroads were built not to open up the continent, or to reach the gold of California, but to open the way to the domination of the Pacific. The Spanish War was an "unmitigated war of conquest." "As the Anglo-Saxon is accustomed to announce

to the world that he fights only for freedom and the rights of humanity, supposed Spanish misconduct had to pass for the cause of the war. In fact, it was again simply the lust for gain which led America to go to war. . . . Rich Cuba, with her tobacco fields and sugar plantations, became free in name only, and Porto Rico and the Philippines became American provinces.

"Then, this Government which is to-day preaching morality to the world, did not hesitate to rob a peaceful neighboring country of the Isthmus of Panama. A revolution, whose outbreak American politicians and publicists have assured us was paid for in dollars, served as a transparent excuse."

Gottberg has small faith in republics. "At first glance," he says, "the fact that these free states have lived on more than a century is disconcerting. Nature must have one ruler. We can see that in the beehive, in a pack of wolves, or in the hen-coop. Even the sheep is wise enough to know that only one can lead the flock. The unnatural rule of the many usually arises only by the violent overthrow of one ruler and his loyal followers. A few adherents of monarchy

always survive the bloodiest battles of revolution as the nucleus of a new upheaval, which will in turn destroy the republic.

"That is why our French neighbors eternally vacillate between monarchy and republic. Every time Madame la France steps out of bed with the left foot first, she knocks her house of state, with all its furniture, to pieces. The present French republic has lasted over forty years because a revolution is hard to organize in a time of universal military service. At this very hour the lawyers who are rather ruining France than ruling her are trembling again for fear of the general whom a victorious army could make a monarch. Poincaré would like to see Joffre win once, but he would not care to see too great a victory." And this belief in a monarchic restoration in France is by no means confined to our author!

How a nation can get along when the President cannot appoint an official without the consent of the senate is a mystery to this German, accustomed to an autocratic Kaiser.

"The President has not even the right to present drafts of laws to Congress," he says. And "when a law is passed, any citizen or group of

citizens can suggest that it is contrary to the Constitution and demand the decision of the Supreme Court. But the judges in the nation, as in the State, are politicians, or owe their appointment to a party, which can leave them hungry, and in the course of history American judges have often shown themselves susceptible to bribery. Hence the power of the courts in the United States can create a rule, yes a tyranny, of dollars. The little man must subject himself to every new law, while the big merchants and stock companies have the power to fight uncomfortable laws."

Small comfort, according to this authority, is to be found in the anti-trust fights. He says:

"Theodore Roosevelt, when President, was one of the loudest and most impressive in his attacks against the 'criminal rich,' the 'bandits of the Stock Exchange,' and the 'swindlers of widows and orphans.' In one of his public speeches he called the railroad magnate Harriman 'the worst of all the bandits.' But when the President asked the 'bandits' for money for his next campaign, he invited even Harriman to talk with him. 'My dear Mr. Harriman, you and I are

practical men. Before I write my message I shall get you to come down to discuss certain Government matters,' he wrote to the man he had denounced."

Strange lessons are drawn from our past. "Early in their history," we are told, "the Americans learned that a nation could not live without a strong navy. Nothing would be more mistaken than to believe that an alliance stretching from Berlin to Bagdad would make it possible for us to turn our backs to the sea and get on as a Continental power without a strong fleet of battle-ships. The United States can supply their every need from their own soil, and yet they suffered in the wars of foreign powers. A people like our own, which imports indispensable things from foreign countries, would suffer still more without a strong navy."

"It would be a wonder," Gottberg concludes, "if a people with a history which tells of nothing but the lust for gain did not, even amid the fiercest bloodshed of all history, seek profit and profit alone."

Not a word of the feeding of Belgium, not a word of the cleansing of Serbia, not a word of

Poland or Armenia, not a word of the struggle for neutral rights when human lives were set high above dollars and cents, and the ruthless U-boats curbed. Our history "tells of nothing but the lust for gain," and in the midst of the Great War we have been seeking "profit and profit alone."

Of this book, written since Pershing's army entered Mexico, to which the author calls attention, 150,000 copies have been sold in Germany alone. That tells something of the German feeling toward America. To-day it takes a German superman to see anything that is good in America or anything that is fine in the work of the President of the United States.

CHAPTER X

BARRING THE SPIES FROM THE EMPIRE

Doors locked against travelers—Strangers closely observed—Investigations before Americans leave United States, on arrival in neutral country, and at the border—The search at the frontier—The eleven steps in procuring a passport to leave—The remarkably educated waiters in the foreigners' hotels—The telephone operator who took a taxi to the races—Spies watch Germany's allies too—German agents on the transatlantic liners—German mails via submarines to Spain; thence out uncensored.

GERMANY to-day is a giant fortress completely ringed by besiegers. Every man, woman, and child, all the beasts of burden and food, are checked and located. The doors have been locked against travelers seeking to enter and those seeking to depart. Only in exceptional cases are visitors received, and in rarer instances are natives permitted to leave.

The police are able at all times to account for every one of the population, passport issuance has been made extremely difficult, the ordeal of search and inquest at the frontier is severe and thorough, interior travel has been sharply re-

stricted, every foot of the border is guarded against illegal entry, obstacles have been put in the way of mail and telegraph communications, the espionage system has been multiplied in efficiency and extent—all for the safety of the empire. And because this is the underlying reason for them, the Germans have submitted to the restrictions willingly, and, instead of rebelling, aid them.

The spy mania that swept over war-ridden Europe two years ago has lessened in its visible intensity in Germany, but the precaution against spies has been increased. The people have confidence in the safeguards against espionage, and so suspicion has been quieted. How well this confidence is justified can be attested by any one who has been inside the empire in the second year of the war.

A stranger is under observation from the time he enters until he has left. The watchfulness is not obtrusive, it is rarely evident; but it is always thorough. Within twelve hours of a visitor's arrival he must report in person at the nearest police station, and every time he makes a railroad journey this operation must be repeated.

When an American undertakes a voyage to Germany, the wheels of the imperial Government begin to revolve immediately upon the first application for a visé to his passport being made in this country. The first question to be answered concerns the applicant's character, so that Germany may feel sure he does not purpose to aid or abet her enemies; and the second, the actual need of the business that causes him to make the trip. Obtaining a passport from the American Government is attended by many formalities, and these are renewed when the German consul-generals are asked to approve.

Germany insists that a fortnight intervene between the application for a visé and the beginning of the trip. This is to enable her officials to make the necessary investigations, and then to communicate the facts to Berlin and to the traveler's port of arrival.

All travel between America and Germany is through Copenhagen, Stockholm, or Rotterdam. From Copenhagen the traveler enters Germany through Warnemunde; from Stockholm he enters through Sassnitz; and from Rotterdam through Bentheim. Upon his arrival at one of

the three neutral cities he must begin the proceedings afresh.

The method employed in Copenhagen is typical of all. Armed with his passport and such letters of reference as he may have, the traveler visits the pass bureau of the consul-general. As that official's office hours are limited, and as there is always a crowd demanding attention, he probably has a wait of two days before his turn is reached. When his number is finally called he is cross-examined in detail to make certain that he is entitled to the papers in his possession, and after presenting six recent photographs of himself he is told to return in three days for instructions as to when he may proceed. This delay is to permit the consul to communicate with Berlin to learn if any objection has arisen to the entrance of the traveler. If none exists, he is told he may take the train at the expiration of another five days, the extra time being used to forward the duplicate passports and photographs and other records to Warnemunde, the port of entry, on the Baltic Sea.

There are embargoes in Denmark, as well as in Sweden and Holland, on what a traveler to

Germany may take with him. But these are not enforced with great strictness against America. However pleasant this laxity may be before arrival on German soil, it becomes doubly so in contrast to the severity with which every minute regulation is put into force by the Kaiser's officers,

Upon arrival at Warnemunde (the methods throughout the empire are standardized, and are the same at every other entrance point) the travelers are shunted into a long low wooden shed, carrying their hand baggage, having previously surrendered the checks for their heavier luggage. Upon entering the place they are given numbers, and in return surrender their passports to brisk, keen-eyed, non-commissioned officers, whose efficiency has been increased by long practice.

Once in the room, the travelers are not permitted to leave except through one door, and that they pass only when their numbers are called. Barred windows and armed sentries prevent any trifling with this system. The numbers are called one by one except in the case of husbands and wives, who are permitted to go through together—and when this is reached, the traveler passes through into a second office, where he is

questioned as to his identity and the photographs on the passports are verified.

While he is undergoing this questioning he is being overheard and carefully watched by numbers of the *geheim-Polizei* (secret police), some of whom are in uniform and others of whom masquerade in civilian attire as new arrivals. If there is any error in his papers it is developed at this point, and he is at once turned about and sent back to Copenhagen. But if it is a case of *alles in Ordnung* (everything in order), it is so reported, and he is ushered into another room, where, having passed the first two inquisitorial chambers, he is submitted to the grand ordeal, that of search.

And what a search it is! Unless one's credentials are exceptionally strong, one is stripped and one's mouth, ears, nose, and other parts of the body examined. One's fountain pen is emptied, every piece of paper taken away, including visiting-cards, and even match-boxes are confiscated. Finger rings, umbrellas, and canes are inspected. If bandages are worn, these must be stripped off, too. No distinction is drawn between men and

women beyond the fact that women are of course examined before female inspectors.

The bodily search having been completed, that of the clothing is begun. Every article of apparel is felt over carefully and exposed to a strong light for fear there may be writing on the lining. If there is the slightest reason for suspicion, the travelers are given a sponge bath of water with a large admixture of citric acid, which has the effect of making apparent any writing on the body that may have been done with invisible ink. The Germans say that these precautions have been necessitated by the ingenious ruses employed by spies, whose entrance into the country is considered a greater menace than is their departure, since in entering they bring with them instructions to their confederates already within the empire awaiting orders.

The next step is the examination of the baggage, and this is done in a manner to make the American customs inspection seem childish. The interior and exterior measurements of the trunks are taken to guard against false sides, tops, and bottoms, and then one by one every article the

trunks contain is put through a separate inspection.

All foods that are brought in are seized and turned in to the governmental depot, from which they are distributed for later use. Until September, 1916, it was permitted to import food from neutral countries, but this was eventually made taboo on the ground that it gave the wealthy an unfair advantage and violated the principle of the German food laws, which are predicated upon equitable distribution.

Every sort of liquid is confiscated. The perfumes of the women are poured into a big tub, and such liquors as the men may be carrying are treated in a similar manner. The contents of travelers' alcohol or spirit lamps are carefully emptied into air-tight containers for later use. The reason for the drastic regulation against taking any liquid, however small the quantity, into Germany was the danger of the fact that high explosives such as nitroglycerine can be carried in small vessels. On several occasions, the Germans say, railroads and bridges have been blown up by the enemy travelers who carried the means of destruction in this way. In this connection

the additional precaution is taken by the authorities of prohibiting all travelers from putting their heads out the windows of the coupés while crossing bridges.

All written or printed matter, such as books, newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, is taken away. Upon request the traveler may have these forwarded to his point of destination after they have been censored and deleted. As every point on the German border is carefully guarded, it is virtually impossible for any one to enter the country except at stated points. All the roads are closed, and the border fields are carefully patrolled.

Upon his arrival in Berlin, or wherever he may be bound, the traveler must present himself in person at the nearest police station. There his passport is again viséd, and he is given official permission to remain for a given period. But every time he makes a trip he must report himself going and coming.

The interior regulations are identical for both stranger and resident. Every possible difficulty is thrown in the way of travel for the purpose of discouraging it. The object of this is to save

the people money and to prevent miscalculations in the food supply of the various districts into which the country is divided. At the same time the danger of espionage is reduced.

This method of making travel difficult has been reduced to a scientific formula. There are precisely eleven separate operations required before one can obtain a passport carrying with it permission to leave the country. And a minimum of at least ten days must elapse between the time one makes his initial application and the time one is permitted to board the train. Of this period from three to four days are necessary to unwind the red tape preliminary to obtaining the passport, the rest of the time being required to forward the necessary information to the point by which one leaves the empire.

The first step taken on the road of departure is to visit the police precinct, where, after watching the issuance to the precinct dwellers of meat- and bread-cards, of special permission to buy restricted merchandise, of state health insurance and employment insurance books being stamped, you finally get the chance to explain the purpose of your call. Then you are given a card and told

to present it at the police presidency building. After wandering through a maze of corridors and being referred to different offices, you finally reach a barred window where one man is leisurely attending to the wants of three or four hundred people. If you are lucky, you get into personal communication with the gentleman behind the wicket after a wait of four or five hours.

After he learns that you are planning to go away, he takes your name and address, looks at your passport,—nothing is really official in Germany to-day unless your passport is called into action with every question,—and closes the interview by giving you a formidable-looking three-page application blank, not printed, but written in German script and then manifolded, which makes it doubly difficult to read.

The first form is translated on page 120.

Having filled out the questionnaire, the next step is to pay another call upon your friend the police sergeant at the precinct, whom you visit in company of those who can vouch for your identity. In solemn and impressive manner, always slow and dignified, a record is made of the examination-slip, and you are handed another which

Visé No..... For Pass No.....

QUESTION SHEET

For the preparation of visés for passports to foreign countries.

Name of applicant .....
When and where born .....
Occupation .....
Residence (name of street and number of house).....
Nationality (present and past).....
Resident in Berlin since .....
(Suburbs excluded.)
Goal of journey .....
Purpose of journey .....
(Also of residence here.)
Length of journey .....
What frontier station will be used—
(a) In going? .....
(b) In coming? .....
When will the frontier be crossed—
(a) In going? .....
(b) In coming? .....
When was the applicant last abroad—and where?.....
(The last pass should be inclosed.)
When first here? .....
What written material have you which will prove the necessity of the journey? .....
(Original papers should be inclosed.)
I declare the above statements to be true.
Berlin .....
Full name .....
Residence .....

This question sheet is to be transmitted to the passport bureau by the competent residential police precinct.

must be filled out, and then, armed with these two documents, you make your second assault upon the *Polizei-Praesidium.* This is the beginning of an attack that requires from two to four days to execute successfully, and involves visits to no fewer than seven different offices, each separate from the others by long miles of halls devoid of signs to discourage or encourage you by telling how near or how far you are from the offices you seek, and endless flights of stairs, narrow and hard to climb, for such modernities as elevators are scorned.

Leg-weary and shoe-worn, you are finally finished with the various recorders who have passed upon your right to a passport, and concealing the precious paper securely about your person, you are now ready to make your trip—ready except for the last, final, and ultimate (or so you think) proceeding, which consists of *"abmeldung"* (announcing departure) to your friend at the precinct station, whom you are surprised to find has not become a veteran with a long gray beard in the seeming ages that have passed since you were first compelled to make his acquaintance.

And even now you are not through, for as you pass the controls through which the train runs you are under the necessity of showing your passport to each of the inspectors. When you reach the point of departure from German territory, precisely the same method is followed in examination and inspection as you found upon entrance to the empire.

Five departments of the police are required to look after the spy-protection system. The regular police does the checking of the strangers, the secret police takes up their movements after they are within the limits of the country, the political secret service engages itself with the political activities of the visitors, and the ordinary military police and secret military agents take up such work as falls without the limits of the other three organizations.

In every hotel are to be met spies in the form of guests, waiters, chambermaids, telephone operators, and bartenders. In the early part of the war these last proved their worth often, for men otherwise cautious and reticent became outspoken under the influence of a few Scotches or

cock-tails, which are still in vogue in Germany despite their American origin.

At one of the biggest of the Berlin hotels it is a noticeable fact that all the floor waiters are young, active, highly intelligent men. When they are asked why they are not serving at the front all have excuses on the score of health. The truth is that they are all governmental agents whose duty it is to familiarize themselves with the details of every visitor's business. That they do well. Every stranger's papers are thoroughly investigated, no matter how securely they may be locked up, before he has been in the city two days, assuming he leaves them in his room. Two members of the American diplomatic corps who made short stays in Berlin can tell singular stories on this point.

The chief of the floor waiters at this hotel—and it is illustrative of all the others—is a polished-mannered young fellow of about thirty-two who speaks English, French, Italian, Spanish, and Danish with the same facility that he reads them, and he reads them as well as he does his native German. I noticed the chief of the

telephone operators, who while discharging the duties of his lowly job wore livery, attending the races in an English sport-coat, with glasses strung over his shoulders, and he went to and from the course in a taxicab, the height of luxury in war-time Berlin. One would hardly credit his income solely to the measly wages he received from his work at the switch-board. He, too, as well as his assistants, was an accomplished linguist.

It must not be thought that espionage is confined to the Americans. On the contrary, even the subjects of Germany's allies receive this attention. Austrian, Bulgarian, or Turkish, it makes no difference; all are put under the scrutiny of the secret eyes and ears of the Kaiser. Almost it is more difficult to obtain a passport permitting one to travel to Austria than it is to obtain one for a journey to America, and the examination at the Austrian border is just as severe as at the frontier between Germany and Denmark.

German spies travel on all the transatlantic liners running from Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Holland to America, and back again.

They find out as much as they can about their fellow-travelers, so that the secret police may be forewarned as to whom and what they are to receive. These agents are rarely employed by the German Government for the secret transmission of mail; that is usually done by men of solid reputation, American or other neutrals who are persuaded to accept the task on the ground of a service to the empire. Obviously, they must be violently pro-German before they are asked to assume the undertaking.

The difficulty of communication is one of the severe hardships that the German Government and people suffer. Mails to and from the empire are seized by the Allies, and if delivered at all, are so belated as to make them valueless. Only such cables as the Allies choose to pass are permitted transmission. Male Germans are not permitted to travel on the seas. So German communication is restricted to the wireless, to supposedly neutral couriers, and to submarines, both of the commercial type as the *Deutschland,* and of the war type, which have been secretly conveying important German mail to Spanish waters, where it is loaded upon friendly neutral

vessels, which carry it into Spanish ports and thence forward it to America and other points. This last method has been a carefully guarded secret of the German Government. Mail sent out by Spain is not seized and censored by the Allies.

CHAPTER XI

THE HOBGOBLIN OF GERMAN DUMPING

Germany fosters combination—The necessity for internal economic readjustment—Prohibition of emigration—Alfred Lohmann, father of the commercial U-boats, says Germany is in no condition to seek foreign markets—American exports and imports to and from Germany—Shipbuilding only obvious preparation for future, but reports exaggerated for foreign effect—American firms in Germany doing well—Lack of raw materials in Germany—Impairment of German credit.

In the commercial world to-day Germany stands at the opposite pole from America. We enforce competition; she legalizes combinations. We restrict the participation of the Government in business; she demands a share in every one of her trades. We have taken a long step forward in the erection of a national trade commission to regulate competition; she has established bureaus that eliminate all competitive forms.

The empire's industrial and financial condition is of most interest to America in so far as we are actually affected by it. And the chief effect over which this country is concerned is the

matter of "dumping" that many believe will come after the war from all the belligerents. Mostly the fear is directed against Germany because of her organization ability and because of the very combinations she is now bringing about. "Dumping" means the throwing into our markets of enormous stocks of merchandise, sold below cost to win our markets away from home manufacturers.

If this plan is actually projected in Germany, it is effectually concealed from the visitor. They tell you in Germany—the leading industrialists of the country—that for ten, perhaps more, years to come Germany and the other belligerents, instead of being able to make goods for the outside world, will not be able to supply their own demands. She and the others, they say, will need America, and the fear is that Germany will have to fight for her domestic markets instead of reaching out for the markets of America.

It is evident that the empire to-day is far more concerned with the great difficulties of economic readjustment after the war than she is with plans for external trade conquests. Apart from

the financial troubles, her bankers and merchants say she will face a heavy scarcity of labor that not even the employment of women in work heretofore restricted to men will obviate. The high price labor will command is certain to restrict output, it is feared, and as one step toward remedying this condition, Germany and Austria-Hungary will pass laws restricting if not prohibiting, all emigration. These statements are made with authority, and thus another chimera of the pessimists who foresee a great influx of immigration is wiped out. It must be remembered that Germany now uses from one and a quarter to one and a half million prisoners in her labor. The supply will end with peace.

"Beyond what the empire and her allies actually need for immediate consumption," said Alfred Lohmann of Bremen, who conceived and executed the plan of sending the commercial U-boat *Deutschland* here and who is one of the big men in the German business world to-day, "our industries are at a standstill. We have no labor or money for extra production and no market, if we had these two necessaries. It is pure bosh to talk of Germany piling up great stores

of merchandise to unload after the war. It is obviously impossible. Where are we to get the raw material when we are hard put to it for material for our every-day necessities? And how can we afford to invest money in propositions that must be unproductive of profits for a long time to come, and which are actually costly in the loss of interest on the money so tied up?

"Germany is busy to-day, but her business is all for to-day. Her commerce now has a national service to render; it does not think of world development and trade expansion. And for a long time after the war we shall be busy binding up our own commercial wounds. We shall bind them up, never fear, but it is idle to talk of or fear Germany's immediate competition in your market or any of the other big selling places. We shall recover more rapidly than the other nations because our organization is better. When we have recovered, that is another story; but I do not believe that even after our recovery we shall be so much in competition with America as we were before. Our main markets will be found along the lines of our national development."



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DR. ALFRED LOHMANN

By that phrase Mr. Lohmann meant through the Balkans into Asia. He is one of the many Germans who believe that his country's future alliance will be with Russia. Although half English, being the son of an English mother, he fears that for many years to come Germany and England will be at swords' points.

America's trade with Germany shows one great feature, that we can more readily do without Germany than she without us. Our table of imports and exports since 1912 shows:

	Imports.	*Exports.*
1912	$186,042,644	$330,450,830
1913	184,211,352	351,930,541
1914	149,389,366	158,294,986
1915	44,953,285	11,788,852
1916 (Jan.–Apr.)	3,141,791	58,646

[The sharp decrease in trade noted in 1916 is due to the tightening British blockade and the blacklist.]

An analysis of our imports shows our biggest bill to have been for laces and embroideries. This ran about $7,000,000 a year, but even this had been decreasing in volume as our domestic manufactures increased. The same is true with most of the leading articles which the United

States imported from Germany. The other big items in our bill were coal-tar colors and dyes, about $6,000,000 a year; china and earthenware, nearly $4,000,000; raw furs, $5,000,000, and dressed furs, $2,500,000; calfskins, $5,000,000; crude india rubber, anywhere from $4,000,000 to $7,000,000; toys, about $7,000,000; wood pulp, about $2,500,000; woolens, $4,000,000; leather gloves, over $3,000,000; and still wines, $1,000,000 a year.

Cotton dominated our exports to Germany. In peace times Germany used to buy nearly $170,000,000 worth of cotton from us every year. Next came copper, from $40,000,000 to $50,000,000; lard, from $15,000,000 to $20,000,000; wheat, from $7,000,000 to $12,000,000, depending on the crops; with kerosene oil, rosin, corn, agricultural implements, lubricating oil, tobacco, and upper leather between $3,000,000 and $5,000,000 a year.

Of the three and a half million dollar imports from Germany into the port of New York during the first six months of 1916, it is interesting to note that knit underwear was the largest item.

The second in value was manufactured products of flax, and the third, miscellaneous chemicals. Other items on the list included sugar beet seed, cotton laces and embroideries, linen embroideries, china and earthenware, hops, textile machinery, leather gloves, lithographic paper, photographic paper, other paper stock, musical instruments, and toys.

There were no exports from New York to Germany in 1916 except the negligible sum of $58,-646.

The only obvious preparation for the future is the projected shipping program, but there is reason to believe that many of the announcements on this point have been made largely to cause foreign irritation. I was told authoritatively that almost every ship-yard in Germany is working on government commissions; but it is said, and the statement is credited in England, that the Hamburg-American line has laid down a colossal 50,000-ton steamer, the *Bismarck;* a 30,000-tonner to be known as the *Tirpitz,* and three 22,000-ton ships; that the North German Lloyd has laid down two sister-ships of 35,000

tons, two more of 16,000 each, and twelve of 42,000 tons each, and that other German lines are correspondingly active.

The American firms that do business in Germany selling shoes, type-writers, cash-registers, cameras, oils, machinery, metals, cotton and cotton goods, meat foods, tobacco, furs, and other manufactured goods, despite the fact that they are getting few shipments from this country, are doing well now. They have adapted themselves to conditions and are sometimes meeting the situation in a way that enables them to show profit even to-day. But their future prospects—advance orders booked—are strong. So it looks, with the national Government strengthening the hands of our export trade, as if Germany will face dumping from us rather than we from Germany.

One highly important factor in connection with the possibility of German dumping is to be found in the absence of raw materials within the empire. Before she can undertake any vast manufacturing enterprises with the purpose of invading foreign markets, she must be supplied with the raw stuffs. This will require enormous

credits in the external markets, and because of her staggering debts she is bound, in the first years following peace, to have difficulty in making the necessary arrangements.

Obviously, her credit will by no means be what it was before her enormous war commitments, which already approximate sixteen billion dollars and are growing, without including the national debt standing at the outset of the conflict, which was about five billion dollars. And the obstacles in the way of foreign extension to German credits will not be made smoother by the antagonistic influences of the British and French banking affiliations, which have already begun the construction of an *impasse* in the financial centers of the United States and South American countries.

CHAPTER XII

BUSINESS BEHIND THE BATTLE LINE

Central purchasing and distributing bureaus for food and other necessaries fundamental to Germany's present economic organization—The Imperial Transition Commission—Price dictation—No repudiation of debts expected—The German war loans and how they are floated—"The strategy of the checkbook"—Autocratic Socialism—Germany's national wealth and that of the Allies—Low rate of unemployment—Increased number of industrial laborers—Production of iron—Freight revenues greater than in time of peace—The gold reserve in the Reichsbank—Loans floated at home—The rate of exchange—The Reichsbank's watch on waste—The Labor Dictatorship and the civilian army of work—Operation of the "Man-Power" Act. The German idea of democracy—"Women to the front."

THE main point in Germany's present economic system is readiness to meet her immediate emergencies and those of an internal nature arising after the war. She has created state-controlled purchasing and distributing bureaus. There are *Central Einkauf-Büros* and distributing bureaus for grain, milk, eggs, butter, meat, fish, and other edibles, and for wool, cotton, metals, leather, oils, and the other great raw staples. The food bureaus will end with the end

of the war, but governmental buying of the raw stuffs, it is expected, will be continued for as long a time as the system proves efficient, which will be until the method threatens to stifle individual initiative. Every one with whom I spoke in Germany believes that at least some of the things in the present regulation will be continued because the benefits are so great.

These central purchasing bureaus of the empire are a thoroughgoing example of the highly organized conditions existing to-day. Every plant using any of the great raw staples is recorded in the district bureau, where the reason for the plant's existence must be given; it must be shown that the plant is engaged in manufactures needed for military or commercial purposes. The factories show their advance orders to the divisional chiefs and receive an allotment of the raw stuffs. The needs of the empire are lumped and the *Central Büro* in Berlin divides the supply according to these allotments. If the supply on hand is sufficient, no extra purchases are made, but if the immediate needs threaten to pull the reserves below a certain point, new purchases are made in accessible for-

eign markets; or if no supply is available, the distribution is curtailed on proportionate bases.

Many of the big industrialists of Germany believe that this system can be profitably continued after peace. They see in the method a means of regulating prices through their enormous purchasing power. For example, if all the copper, amounting to hundreds of millions of pounds, that Germany needs annually were to be bought by one bureau, the magnitude of the operation would be such as to enable it in effect to dictate the price it would be willing to pay. It may be noted that this system is substantially that employed by the Allies now, as was shown by the recent order of 500,000,000 pounds that was placed in the American market.

The question of continuing this method, and other economic questions that will arise after peace comes, are to be handled by an imperial transition commission. This commission will not only deal with the industrial and economic situation, but will also be required to solve the financial problems that Germany must face.

Although it is admitted that the heavy drain upon German capital and industry will leave

them somewhat crippled, bankers of the empire feel certain that there is no chance that the German debts will be repudiated. They feel confident also that England will be able to meet her obligations, but they are not so sure about France and Russia.

Germany's bankers pretend to have no fear of the present system of credit pyramiding. They make a virtue of the fact that virtually all of Germany's war money has been raised in Germany itself, and seem not to be worried by the fact that each new issue of war bonds is purchasable with bonds of the last issue, a method which has been described as being like a snake swallowing itself.

Germany's war loans now amount to 47,000,000,000 marks (nominally about $11,750,000,000), with a margin of 5,000,000,000 more marks "credit" voted by the Reichstag. With the new credit of 12,000,000,000 marks asked for in the summer of 1916, which will be obtained by another war loan to be floated in the spring of 1917, the total war credits voted will reach 64,000,000,000 marks (about $16,000,000,000). To the fifth loan, closed in September, 1916, which brought out 10,652,000,000 marks, over

4,000,000 people subscribed. They call that the "people's loan" in Germany.

In this connection it is interesting to note how the German Government has used clever press-agent methods in bringing out the loans. They are masters of the "strategy of the check-book" as well as of the battle-field.

The first loan was floated at the very beginning of the war amid scenes of wild enthusiasm, when von Kluck's army was marching on Paris, and the certainty of immediate victory swelled every German breast. The second came a few months later, coinciding with the complete subjection of northern France and Belgium, when the German battle-line had been flung from the Alps to the sea; the third followed close upon Hindenburg's steam-roller advance through Poland, when Russia seemed crushed and helpless; the titanic struggle at Verdun began as the fourth was offered, and the war loan grew as the outlying forts fell. The fifth came with the promotion of Hindenburg, the iron man of Germany, to the supreme command of all her armies.

The necessity of floating another big popular loan was said to be one of the reasons why Fal-

kenhayn was replaced in August by Hindenburg. That there was more than a little truth in the statement is shown by the fact that no sooner had Hindenburg taken hold than all the papers carried big signed statements from him commanding, cajoling, pleading that the people subscribe. And all the advertisements were written around Hindenburg. It was good pyschology, and the idolatry of Hindenburg was coined into billions of marks.

The sixth credit was authorized when the Allies' Somme offensive had failed to break through the German lines and when the Germans were beginning to overrun Roumania.

This new war loan was based upon the German reckoning that their daily war needs amount to about $13,000,000 a day. The Germans say that the Allies are spending more than twice as much.

The contention of the German bankers regarding their ability to meet at least a part of the increased demands that will be made upon Germany's financial resources is supported by the great increase of the savings-bank deposits, which in the first eight months of 1916 showed a

gain of 1,710,000,000 marks. Since the war began, about 400,000 new accounts have been opened, and in the first two years of the war the savings-banks showed almost $1,000,000,000 excess of deposits over withdrawals.

Figures are less interesting than the human factors behind them. Everybody in Germany saves. They save on automobiles; there are virtually no private cars left. They save on rent, food, clothes, and other life supplies held down by government regulation. They take pride in saving.

The autocratic Socialism typical of Germany to-day is helping toward this end. It has systematized German life; it has established purchasing and distribution bureaus for the necessaries of individual and national life; it regulates the labor supply; it puts a check on the rise in prices. The biggest silk house in Berlin was closed for a week in 1916 because it had been overcharging. Although it was closed and could receive no customers, all its regular expenses—rent, light, and wages—had to be paid.

Racing and playing the stock markets are still indulged in in Germany and Austria. Many



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DR. KARL HELFFERICH, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE INTERIOR

stocks are cheap, paying ten, fifteen, twenty, and thirty per cent. dividends, but no one knows how long it will be before the present small government share in the profits will be so much increased that it will virtually wipe out all but a narrow margin of gain.

Germany has paid almost all her war expenses through war loans. The taxes have not been heavily increased. The Prussian income-tax has been lifted, on an average, only seven to eleven per cent. This system merely defers payment to posterity, but against this load the German economists say that the regular increase in wealth in the empire will act as compensation.

German estimates of the national wealth of Germany, France, and Great Britain at the beginning of the war are as follows:

	Billion marks.
Germany	330–390
France	200–260
Great Britain and Ireland	300–360

The German national wealth was distributed thus:

	Billion marks.
Goods movable and immovable, insured against fire	200–240
Real property	70–100
Mines underground	5–6
Goods shipped, shipping, coin, and bullion	6
Public property (railways, &c.)	30–40
Investments abroad	20–25

These estimates are the averages made by three financial economists, Helfferich, Steinman-Bucher, and A. Hesse. One of the great things the war has done for Germany has been to make her virtually self-sufficient. To-day she depends on herself or her allies for all her food supplies and raw materials. She needs nickel and rubber, but there is no lack of copper. Iron and coal and zinc she produces within her own limits. The food stuffs that she raises, combined with the aid she gets from her allies, are made to do. The average rise in prices on food stuffs is put at about seventy per cent., which the Germans say is less than in England or France. It is high on cattle and hog meat, but low on vegetables and certain grains.

Regarding industrial conditions in Germany generally, I had an official statement prepared in the interior department and approved by Dr. Helfferich. The first part of the statement deals with food supplies, which are considered in the next chapter. It points out that the present "war of exhaustion" is not waged on the German food alone, but through the limitation of food, on the German health; and it shows that the number of sick persons drawing sick benefits from the State *Kranken-Kassen* (health insurance) is much lower than in times of peace, notwithstanding the great number of old persons who are now represented among the workers.

"On the 1st of January, 1916," the statement says, "one hundred per cent. of the members of the *Kranken-Kassen* were employed. [In theory, every worker in Germany is a member of the *Kranken-Kassen;* if the official statement is to be believed, it shows that there was absolutely no unemployment on January 1.] Since January 1, the percentage of employment has been slowly lowered, being 95.7 on July 1.

"The number of females employed throughout the empire has in the last two years been

greatly increased, although in 1916 it showed a smaller increment of increase than in 1915.

"The returns from 300 varied industrial undertakings show the number of workers in June, 1915, to have been 328,786, and in June, 1916, 386,565, an increase of seventeen and six-tenths per cent. The increase is uniform for male and female employees. In the machinery industry the increase in employment is twenty-six per cent. and in the iron and metal industry almost twenty-three per cent. There has been a heavy relapse recently in the textile and wood industry, but the last named is scarcely representative, since there are only five firms now in operation, and these firms are employing about 1000 workmen, so that the instance affords no real proof."

It is then stated that the actual number of unemployed in the empire to-day is two and five-tenths per cent., which is a very much smaller unemployment figure than was the case in June, 1914.

"The production of raw iron for the first half of the year 1916," the statement continues, "shows an increase of 17.5 per cent, and the cast

iron production an increase of 25 per cent. compared with the same period of 1915.

"The income of the Prussian-Hessian state railways from freight revenues exclusively was only 12.7 per cent., smaller than that in the corresponding months of peace times—the first six months of 1916 compared with the first six months of 1914. Since December, 1915, the freight revenues have been higher than in peace times. December, 1916, compared with December, 1913, shows an increase of 8 per cent.; January, 1916, compared with January, 1914, an increase of 10 per cent.; March, 1916, compared with March, 1914, 12 per cent.; May, 1916, with May, 1914, 10 per cent.; June, 1916, with June, 1914, 8 per cent. A six months' comparison between war and peace times shows an average increase of about 10 per cent., notwithstanding the fact that the tariff for transportation has been considerably lowered."

Regarding the German export of goods, the statement says that in six months from January to June, 1916, it exceeded by more than twenty-five per cent. the volume for the same period for 1915, About money it says:

"The low price of *Reichsmarks* in all neutral countries has been a cheap and common piece of parade for the international Franco-British slander-propaganda, and is still being made so despite its hollowness and lack of truth." It is pointed out that the note issue by the German *Reichsbank* is covered by more than a one-third reserve in gold, "whereas the gold cover of the Bank of France," the statement continues, "has decreased virtually 62 per cent. in ratio to note issue."

In conclusion it is said:

"Germany has, in round figures, paid seven-eighths of her war expenses with war loans that were placed within the empire through the broadest participation of the people. The interest on these loans has been covered in part by the 'interest debt notes,' and in a few months these floating notes will be transformed into regular loans. What other state can show its war expenditures as having been loaned by the home country alone?"

The reference made in the official statement to the depression of the *Reichsmark,* touches on a matter over which the *Reichsbank* is much concerned. Ignoring the rates of exchange quoted

on German money in other markets, the *Reichsbank* in Berlin every day announces the official exchange rate and compels acceptance of this rate by those buying German money. For example, at the end of September, 1916, I had occasion to cash a check on America in Berlin. I got for each dollar only five marks, forty pfennigs, while on the same day in Copenhagen I would have received five marks, sixty-five pfennigs for my American dollar. Had I had American gold to change into German money, I could have "shopped" for the best rate, which at that time was about five marks and eighty-seven pfennigs. In other words, there was a difference of about twelve per cent. between the gold exchange and the exchange received for the check.

Nothing is too big for German organization to attempt and nothing is so small as to be overlooked. The paternalism of the Government is nowhere so marked as in the *Reichsbank,* and this spirit is well illustrated in a little incident, for the accuracy of which I can vouch:

A wealthy manufacturer of Germany took a brief vacation at Marienbad in Austria. He felt the need of a little stimulation, and dropped into

a private club one evening to play baccarat. When he was through his session, he was about 200,000 marks the loser, and he gave a draft on his bank in Berlin to cover that amount. The draft was put through the Marienbad bank, and, as is now done with all foreign collections, was forwarded to the *Reichsbank* for adjustment. Instead of an acceptance being made, the drawer of the check and the bank through which it had been put received telegrams requesting that immediate explanation be given to the *Reichsbank* as to how the check happened to be drawn, and to what purposes the funds were to be put.

Rather embarrassed, the loser naïvely explained that he was making a private investment. After further correspondence, the *Reichsbank* finally approved the draft, and he was permitted to draw his own money. As this was so illustrative of the German efficiency I made it a point to ask why the draft had been questioned, and was told that the inspection department of the *Reichsbank* wished to be satisfied, first, that the large amount of money was not to be used for espionage purposes, and secondly, that the money thus taken out of Germany, would not be wasted.

It may be questioned if the *Reichsbank's* second purpose was fulfilled, but obviously such a watch over financial matters proves a deterrent to foolish expenditures.

But the most extreme example of German paternalism is her recent step in establishing universal compulsory labor for all able-bodied males behind the front. All men of military age who are unfit to bear arms, also all men over military age but under sixty, will be put in charge of a special new department of the War Office. They will be so apportioned and distributed in those industries the products of which are most needed for the very existence of the nation that hundreds of thousands of able-bodied workmen heretofore held back in the munitions factories will be released for military service.

This so-called "civil service" based on a "man-power" law, has not yet been extended to the women, but the project is being seriously discussed, and a vigorous campaign is being waged to induce the women, whom public opinion will not yet permit to be sent to the front, to substitute wherever possible for able-bodied men who can shoulder arms.

The Germans are proud of this new service that will compel every man to "do his bit," and point to it as proof of their genuine democracy. The fact that this measure of compulsion is applied indiscriminately to all classes, to rich and poor, to landed aristocracy and meatless proletariat alike, is to the German mind convincing evidence of its inherent democracy. To the Germans democracy means rather equality of sacrifice than self-government.

The new organization for war work is under the direction of General von Gröner, whose work in the Prussian ministry of Railways won him a high reputation. His personal description of the new program runs thus:—

"The new War Office represents Germany as a colossal firm which includes all production of every kind, and is indifferent to the kind of coat, civil or military, which its employees wear. The new measures are intended to mobilize all effective labor, whereas up to the present we have only mobilized the Army and industry. The whole war is becoming more and more a question of labor, and in order to give the Army a firm basis for its operations the domestic army must

also be mobilized. All the labor, women's as well as men's, must be extracted from the population, so far as possible voluntarily. But if voluntary enlistment does not suffice we shall not be able to avoid the use of compulsion."

The whole organization is in the hands of the new office for war (Kriegsamt). Following the English precedent large Berlin hotels are being taken over for offices of various departments. The Hotel Cumberland has already been adapted for its new functions.

General von Gröner has two chiefs of staff, one a military chief, who will control such matters as concern the freeing of men for actual service with the colors and also urgent and immediate requirements of strictly military character. Equal in rank with him is General Gröner's new invention, the "technical chief of staff." The latter is not an officer, but a German industrial magnate—namely, Dr. Kurt Sorge, director of the Gruson works at Magdeburg. Under Dr. Sorge come subordinate groups dealing with different departments, including mines, iron and steel works, chemical works, powder factories, agriculture, and labor.

The actual munitions department, which comes under the military section, has been given a new chief in General Coupette. His office is known as "Wumba," from the first letters of its full official title, Waffenund-Munitions-Beschaffungsamt. Parallel with "Wumba" is war labor and labor substitute department under Colonel Marquardt, hitherto chief of the general staff of one of the Western armies.

The war labor department in turn includes two departments—namely, labor and substitutes. A further subsection is the raw material department, with a division for import and export, under Lieutenant-Colonel Häusler, and another division for popular economic questions under Colonel Wilke. The subsections are already working, dealing with a number of individual features, such as industries, various branches of agriculture, &c.

This central office for war will have provincial officers in various industrial districts, and will have representatives attached to every army staff in the field, and also a large number of travelers. There will also be representatives attached to the staff of every inland army corps district. There

will be special provincial branches of the office for war at Düsseldorf and at Metz, in view of the importance of the industrial provinces of the Rhineland, Westphalia, and Alsace-Lorraine.

The travelers will be entrusted with the examination of such questions as to whether, in this factory or in that, productioin can be increased or better methods employed. They will include both practical experts and professional students. Thus students of the technical high schools will be employed as travelers, as sub-directors in industrial factories, and in other ways for which their studies have specially qualified them. By arrangement with the Ministry of Education and the universities this practical experience will be counted as student work and will qualify for routine public examinations, degrees, &c.

[In von Gröner's department will be a special bureau to handle the feeding of the population engaged in governmentally-directed work. Von Batocki, the so-called "Food Dictator" is henceforth to concentrate his attentions on general supply sources and reserve stock. He is to handle distribution only among those classes not affected by the military or new labor laws—the

old and the young, the sick and the non-working mothers. Those affected by the compulsory labor are to have special allowances made to them in their food rations.]

Everywhere one turns one sees women doing the work of men. "Women to the front" is the industrial cry in Germany to-day, and the women are responding with the same great alacrity that the men are showing in their military duties.

There are women conductors, women "cabbies," women teamsters, women chauffeurs, women ditch-diggers, women mail-carriers, women messengers, women bakers, women plumbers, women butchers, women telegraph linemen, women "motormen," women plowers, women munition-workers, women gardeners, women electricians—women everything. In fact it is the boast of Germany that there is now not one field of effort formerly consecrated to man that has not been entered by woman. How this scheme of labor will be readjusted when the soldiers are released again to their commercial labors is a serious problem.

Germany is continuing all her social undertakings, her insurance against accident, unem-

ployment, and sickness; her medical attention for those insured,—26,000,000 of them,—her old-age pensions, and the remarkably developed chain of labor-employment bureaus whereby a daily bulletin service brings the man and the job together even when they are at the opposite ends of the empire. The state social funds, based on individual taxation, are bigger than ever.

CHAPTER XIII

GERMANY'S PANTRY: FEEDING SEVENTY MILLIONS

Germany not starving—Organized to secure sufficient and equitable distribution—Prepared even if war last a decade—Present rations based on worst crop in twenty years—Easier to buy luxuries than necessaries—What is scarce—Living on the card system—The Central Purchasing Bureaus—Women and prisoners at work on the farms—The supply of meat—Present prices—Food in the hotels and restaurants—The crop of 1916—Possibility of starvation past—The soup kitchens.

GERMANY is not starving, and she does not intend to starve. She is further away from that danger-point to-day than she has been at any time since the British blockade tightened about her. Her food supplies are not varied and they are not abundant, but she has enough to provide for actual needs and still leave a margin of reserve.

Nor is the empire suffering from a serious lack of the necessaries of life apart from food, such as clothing, housing materials, paper, chemicals, coal, wood, and the other essentials of every-day

existence. Many things that make for comfort are not to be had; but while their presence might tend to make life pleasanter, their absence does not threaten its continuance.

Through the marvelous organization that has been perfected in all of Germany, her supplies have been reservoired and regulated in such manner as to insure sufficient, equitable, and level-priced distribution, and through the remarkable success of her scientists, substitutes have been found for many of the articles cut off by Britain from her markets. But for man power, with all her guns and other engines, she has yet to find a substitute.

Every one in Germany, from the highest to the lowest, lives by a system instituted by the Government and carried out with a fidelity that is characteristic of the law-abiding inhabitants. Every one lives by cards that regulate the supply of foods and clothing—every one but the soldiers in the fields and the invalids in the hospitals. They are given the best to be had, with no other limitation than that imposed by the supply.

The very system that is enabling Germany to live was the cause of the once widely believed re-

port that the empire was starving. It was not because she was starving that the new methods were introduced; it was because she was determined not to be starved that they were instituted.

Germany's preparation in the way of conserving her supplies is not a preparation for to-day, to-morrow, or next week; it is a successful preparation for conditions that may extend over five, ten, or even twenty years, in fact, for an indefinite period.

The secret is not hard to find. She has taught herself not only to be self-supporting, but to live within the means she produces. She has found that the nation can live on home-produced supplies, plus those she receives from her allies and so she has gone about seeing that it does so.

The rations to-day allotted in Germany are based upon the crop and produce of 1915, the worst harvest the empire had had in twenty years, and the allotment is based upon a total less than the actual total of that lean year. So it will be seen that even the worst harvest, if repeated, would still leave a small margin for reserve.

Germany is reënacting the story of Joseph and

the Pharaoh of Egypt. She is storing up her supplies and doling out enough to allow for reasonable living. The state, in seizing the necessaries, make certain that the armies will be supplied and that no monopoly will be permitted the wealthy. Rich and poor fare alike. All get the same quantity and get it at the same time and at the same price. This price restriction applies to the bigger staples, such as bread, fish, certain sorts of meat, and clothing. With money it is possible to buy the finer grades of flour, poultry, cattle and hog meats, and attire, for there are no restraints put about luxuries. The regulations apply only to the necessities. For example, one can buy silk socks in Berlin to-day in such quantities and prices as one wishes, but one must have a police permit, with a careful inquiry preceding its issuance, to buy woolen socks. The same is true of the cheaper grades of clothing, the prices of which have not been much increased.

The head of the department of war food supply (literally translated "War Nourishment"), who is commonly called the food dictator, Batocki, declares that the average increase in the

cost of living between the beginning of the war and the autumn of 1916 ranged between sixty and seventy-five per cent., and from the superficial investigation I made this estimate seems reasonably accurate. The prices are heavily increased on some things, while on others the increment is slight.

The greatest scarcity is in the supplies of butter, cheese, sugar, cocoa and chocolate, fats, oils, pork, coffee, tea, fruits such as oranges, lemons and bananas, and eggs. There are others, but these are things the average German is accustomed to in plenty, and the lack of that plenty has caused him inconvenience, although not to the extent of threatening his health.

Vegetables are to be had in plenty, and so are fruits of the sort that Germany raises or that she can draw from her Southern allies, such as apples, melons, pears, grapes, and the like.

Every great staple of life is to be obtained only by a card. One must have cards for bread, butter, meat, fruits, potatoes, fats, sugar, and recently the system has been extended to include milk, cream, and eggs.

One may have meat only five times a week,

butter or fats only twice a week, and in the beginning of October the empire went on a one-egg-a-person-per-week basis. This was for the purpose of building up a reserve stock of eggs, which up to that time had been purchasable without restriction. Bread, vegetables, and fish were to be had every day.

The methods of obtaining food for those living in hotels and those keeping house differ. In the official report recently issued by the British Government it was said that foreigners in Germany, particularly newspaper correspondents, were treated exceptionally in that no restrictions were placed upon their food. I can bear personal testimony to the falsity of this information.

Upon my arrival at the Hotel Adlon in Berlin I was provided with meat- and bread-cards. The bread-cards had little tabs on them, each calling for twenty-five grams of *Kriegsbrot* (war bread made of a mixture of wheat flour, corn flour, and potato meal, looking and tasting like our ordinary rye bread). Each tab was good for a slice of bread. A roll required two tabs, or fifty grams. The meat-cards entitled one to a slice and a half, or seventy-five grams daily. The

meatless days are Tuesdays and Fridays. In compensation the days upon which one can obtain butter are also Tuesdays and Fridays. Fats for frying can be had on Mondays and Thursdays.

In the hotels and restaurants sugar and cream are not served. In place of sugar, little particles of saccharin are given, and in place of cream a thin skimmed milk. The cream and sugar are kept for hospital use. While it is possible to regulate the service of meats and butters in a restaurant, it is not so easy to do so in households, and so the system for the householders is changed.

Every family is given a card calling for the quantity to which its size entitles it, and then these cards are used on stated days at the various markets. Every family has a regular day on which it buys its meat supplies for the week. This is to prevent the butcher being loaded down with an unnecessarily great supply. He stocks just the amounts he knows his various customers will require and for which they present their cards, which he in turn presents to the central

governmental supply station on renewing his stock.

The bakers, too, sell by weekly arrangements. Each consumer is entitled to 1900 grams of baked bread or 1700 grams of bread and 250 grams of meal or flour. At the beginning of the regulations the loaves used to be baked in 2000-gram loaves (about four pounds), but it was found the wastage in this was heavy, so now they are made in 1000-gram loaves.

Every consumer is entitled to 60 grams of butter and 30 grams of oleomargarine, or vegetable fat. Every person has the right to draw nine pounds of potatoes a week. There is no restriction as to how these supplies shall be used in private families. If a household wanted to, it could use all its card rations in one day. Then for the rest of the week it would have to live on the things the purchase of which is still unrestricted.

Virtually all the food supplies of Germany are commandeered by the Government. Through the *Centralgetreide und Ernährungsbüros* the farmers and stock-raisers of each district must

turn over at a fixed price all their produce. The supplies are stored and reshipped to those points where they are needed. At the outset of Batocki's régime there were many instances reported of efforts made on the part of food-raisers to hold out for higher prices by concealing their stocks, but heavy fines and imprisonment soon broke up this plan and now the system works smoothly. Amony the offenders were many of the members of the rich agrarian classes, who were not above turning a penny at the expense of the needs of their fellow-countrymen. Not only do these central bureaus take all the farmers raise beyond what is actually needed for immediate home consumption, but they take it at a price that is fixed by the Government, which allows a fair margin of profit, and they insist that the farmers' output shall be never less than a fixed minimum. In fact, all sorts of newly developed methods are applied to agriculture in order that the output may be increased.

The question of farm labor has been partly solved by the employment of women and of a million and a half war prisoners, but these prisoners are a liability as well as an asset, since their

presence increases heavily the number of mouths to feed. Eventually, after peace has been concluded, the cost of the maintenance of the prisoners of war, less a certain amount allowed for the work they do, will be paid by the native governments of the prisoners.

The restriction of meats has brought the supply of live cattle in Germany to-day back almost to the figure that existed in January, 1914. It is considerably larger than it was a year ago. The supply of hogs is to-day almost thirty per cent. greater than it was six months ago, but it is still twenty per cent. less than it was at this time in 1915, and that in turn was almost twenty per cent. smaller than at the beginning of the war. The diminution of about 40 per cent. in the supply of swine was due to the enormous quantities slaughtered in the first year for the maintenance of the army, which has always had a great liking for sausage. At the beginning of the war Germany claimed one-third more cattle than France possessed and twice as many as England possessed, and four times as many hogs as France and eight times as many as England.

In discussing the prices of food supplies in

Germany, the economists point out that all that is paid goes into the pockets of home-raisers, whereas, they say, England and France must spend their money with outsiders.

In addition to fixing the price at which the Government commandeers the food supplies, the food dictatorship also fixes the price at which it shall be sold. These prices are subject to fluctuations within a narrow range, according to the effect of temporary supplies and demands. The following table gives an accurate price-list of food staples in Berlin, in the closing months of 1916, the prices in the various qualities being averaged: [1]

Milk, per quart	$ .08
Rich milk, per quart	.20
Cocoa, per pound	2.00
Tea, per pound	2.00
Coffee, per pound	1.00
Rice, per pound	.12½
Beet sugar, per pound	.08
Cornmeal, per pound	.06
Salt, per pound	.05
Eggs, each	.10½

[1] The German pound is one tenth larger than the American pound. The parity in American money has been given on the basis of four marks to a dollar.

Jams, per pound	.42
Butter, per pound	.39
Noodles, per pound	.35
Bread, per pound loaf	.09
Veal, per pound	.85
Rump steak, per pound	.72
Ham, per pound	1.75
Bacon, per pound	1.75
Potatoes, per pound	.01½
White cabbage, per pound	.05
Red cabbage, per pound	.06
Cauliflower, per head	.25
Kohlrabi, per pound	.03
Turnips, per pound	.05
Beans, per pound	.15
Peas, per pound	.60
Herring, each	.25
Apples, per pound	.15
Pears, per pound	.30
Flour, per pound	.11
Onions, per pound	.08
Mutton, per pound	.65
Chicken, per pound	.75
Goose, per pound	.90

How the plans work out can best be illustrated by taking the case of the Adlon. The regular "luncheon breakfast" there now costs 5½ marks.

It used to cost 3½ marks, and was then more bountiful than it is now. For 5½ marks today one is given, on the meat day, a vegetable soup, a fish, one sort of meat, two sorts of vegetables, and a salad. Sweets that used to be included are now charged for, and, as was always the case in Europe, coffee is an extra charge. The dinner that formerly cost 5 marks now costs 7 marks. On a meat day it consists of a soup, a fish, one sort of meat, two vegetables, and a sweet. On a meatless day eggs or an extra service of fish are given.

In all the restaurants the old *à la carte menus* have disappeared. One lives on the *table d'hôte* plan entirely. It is a case of getting what they have to give you, not what you want to get.

In the popular-price restaurants the tariffs are less than one would expect. At the same time the portions are smaller. At the famous Café Bauer you pay forty cents for pot roasts, or for *Wiener Schnitzel.* For a thin "steak minute" you pay seventy-five cents. The various sandwiches run about fifteen cents apiece.

The official statement of existing conditions made for me by the food bureau reads:

It can be demonstrated that there has been a complete failure of the starvation and exhaustion war waged against us. The crop of 1915 was unfavorable beyond record. A smaller yield of the German fields than that of last year is not to be expected even under the most unfavorable conditions.

Despite the heavily reduced harvest, several million tons below our usual average, we have managed; and out of it, in addition to supporting our own demands, we have sent considerable quantities to the occupied districts in the east, to take the place of the crops destroyed by the Russians when they were swept back. This territory will in the present autumn maintain its wealth and, after covering its own needs, will perhaps even be able to add to our reserve.

The crop of 1916, which is now being garnered, forms a good average harvest; it will give us several million tons more than the last one. We have been relieved of all worry as to our vegetable food, and we will be able to use a considerable portion for animal nourishment, and thus be able to establish a certain equilibrium in our cattle stock.

We are cropping a brilliant fodder harvest. In barley alone we have over a million tons more than we had last spring. Further, through the success of experiments we have just been completing, we will be in possession of several hundred thousand tons of valuable nutritious food obtained from substances which were formerly regarded as worthless.

If the starvation war against the Germans is to be successful, it would have demonstrated itself within the last year, when our need was poignant and our wants such as might have become dangerous to health and vital power had they not been supplied. If we were able to pass the crisis in the most unfavorable harvest we have had for many years, it is extremely unlikely that we shall be again in a critical position. . . .

In a number of towns mass-feeding places have been established where for a little money nourishing meals have been obtained. As a general rule it has been noted that the number of participants at these joint dinners have been very small. In the big towns, such as Berlin, Cologne, Düsseldorf, and Essen, only from two to three thousand persons participated each week. It is true that prejudice and distrust may have played a part in keeping the figures down, but no amount of prejudice could have kept the people away if a real need had existed.

The meals in these central kitchens cost about fifteen cents. The portions are not particularly large, and there is marked celerity in service. Tomatoes and macaroni, groats and stewed fruits, were the principal ingredients in each day's bill of fare, with meat on meat days and fish on the meatless days.

Just as Britain had to prepare militarily after

the war began, so Germany has had to prepare economically. She did not expect so long a war, and her planning was not predicated upon so sharp a decline in her supplies. But she has passed the danger-point and she is certain she cannot starve.

CHAPTER XIV

GERMANY'S BACKBONE: HER ARMY

German belief in the invincibility of her armies—Grounds for German confidence—Military secrecy—Over half a million new soldiers every year—Her gross military strength—The German losses, temporary and permanent—The number of prisoners in Germany—Territory occupied—General Freytag-Loringhoven on the Somme campaign—French soldiers better than the English, he says—The *impassé* in the west—German desire for a *"Bewegungs-krieg."*

THERE are grumblings in Germany to-day over the matter of food, there are misgivings as to the economic outlook, there are questionings over the political conditions; but throughout the empire there is a complete union in one sentiment —that of pride, confidence, and security in her soldiers and in her military situation.

The Germans believe their armies to be invincible, and in that belief lies the national conviction that they will never be conquered. Their dream of an overwhelming triumph has been dissipated by the bitter knowledge that the military factor is not the only one employed in the calculus of victory; there are economic and spiritual

battles to be won as well as those in the fields and on the water. Solely from the military point of view the Teutons say they may claim victory now, and in proof of this they point to the record of their arms. Their work, they add, is a matter of actual accomplishment, while the Allies base their claims on what they hope to do.

But since Germany has discovered that the fight is not one of limited rounds, but to a finish, her people realize that no "decision on points" is to be awarded, so they face the situation without delusions. They realize that their first great project—to seize Paris and crush France—has failed, and with the failure they have passed from offensive warfare to a fight for existence. Germany is forgetting the bitterness of this disappointment the more readily in the faith she has that her armies, unable to achieve the task of wiping out the Allies, are nevertheless able to prevent the Allies from destroying her.

Why she is so supremely confident—what grounds she has for her assurance, what significance she attaches to the rise and fall of the tides of war, what her preparations for its continuance are, what her actual condition is, how she is pay-

ing the toll—these are questions to which I sought answers in Germany.

The military situation as such is pretty well understood throughout the world through the official reports of the belligerents, which are generally fair and accurate. The technicalities of strategy and tactics are expounded daily—and differingly—by the experts, but the underlying meanings of the moves and counter-moves, the effect upon the countries engaged, the interpretation in terms of easy comprehension, do not appear in the communiqués. As I visualized the situation in Germany, listening to the claims made by German leaders, notably Lieutenant-General Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven, formerly chief of staff to Falkenhayn, now chief of the supplemental great general staff, a renowned strategist and military writer, and by other generals actually in the field, the confidence in the fatherland is firm—

Because of the great amount of territory Germany and her allies hold in Belgium, France, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Roumania;

Because all the battles are being fought on enemy soil;

Because of the great number of prisoners she holds;

Because of the better organization of her forces and the bravery of her soldiers and the ability of her leaders;

Because of the lesser number of casualties she sustains compared with her enemies;

Because of her greater success in the re-service of the wounded;

Because her reserves are sufficient to enable a war of attrition to be fought for years to come;

Because of the spirit of nationalism that animates her people, soldiers and civilians alike.

There are other grounds assigned, but, like the majority of statements made for neutral consumption, they lapse into generalities and vague predictions. What is hardest to learn is not *what* the German leaders think, but *why* they think as they do.

To get into Germany in these days is hard enough, but to get through the wall of secrecy that is built around every phase of military life (excepting visits to the front, which are now made by correspondents freely and with few restrictions upon what they may see) is much harder. It took four

weeks to get certain questions answered, and to others I could get no answers. Ordinary precaution, coupled with the spy-fear that is still strong in the empire, makes for suspicion every time one seeks replies to even harmless queries.

Through the coöperation of Colonel von Haften, formerly personal aide to Hindenburg, now official representative of the great general staff at the Foreign Office, I obtained from the *Kriegsministerium* (war ministry) certain data, among the most important being that Germany counts on calling to the colors every year a minimum of 550,000 men reaching the military age —nineteen years.

The assertion is made that this is sufficient to repair her wastage, but this claim is manifestly unsound. Her permanent losses through death, serious wounds, and capture are estimated to have reached a minimum of more than a million men. The difference between these two figures represents the annual decline in German man power, although the officials say that by counting the lists of the *Zurückgestellte* (those not compelled to serve when their service age arrives), the figure of depreciation is reduced.

The claim of more than 500,000 recruits yearly would give Germany, roughly, a total available man power, not counting her battle losses, of twenty-six times that figure, since the service age runs from nineteen through forty-five. That would be more than 13,000,000, but allowing for increasing mortality with increasing age, the net figure for Germany's gross military strength becomes about 11,000,000. As her population is 70,000,000, that would be a ratio of a little less than sixteen arm-bearers out of every 100 of population, which, statisticians say, is too high by at least twenty per cent., although Germany has always claimed this footing.

From figures derived from various sources and carefully checked off, it was found that the Germans have reduced their ratio of casualties in every hundred men to this table:

Unhurt	40
Killed outright	11
Taken prisoner	6
Died from wounds	2
Wounded and unserviceable	4
Wounded, but serving again	37
Total	100

It will be observed that forty-three per cent. of all men are wounded, and that of these, thirty-seven per cent. are able to fight again, or eighty-six per cent. of the total wounded. The number of wounded who die is claimed to be less than five per cent. of that total, and the number who are no longer fitted for service is about nine per cent.

Germany has put into the field of action, in round numbers, 4,500,000 men. If the formula is carried out, it will be found, ignoring recruits called to the colors, that of the total force she claims:

Total unhurt	1,800,000
Total casualties	2,700,000
The casualties are thus divided,	
Killed outright	495,000
Taken prisoner	270,000
Died from wounds	90,000
Wounded and unserviceable	180,000
Wounded, serving again	1,665,000
Total casualties	2,700,000

Of this number three classes—killed outright, prisoners, and dead from wounds, form the net loss, which is 1,035,000.

GENERAL VON HINDENBURG

Press despatches from London in November, 1916, gave the English compilation of the German losses in killed, prisoners, and wounded as 3,755,693 to November 1, of which 200,000 were in October. Subtracting this and a like amount for September, the British estimate exceeds the German by over fifteen per cent. The British declare that 910,234, or 24.2 per cent. of the total casualties, were killed. This figure is obviously too high. On the other hand the researches of the War Study Society of Copenhagen tend to show that the German figures are too low.

As to the number of men now under arms and her available reserves the German authorities would say nothing. They were, however, willing to give official figures as to the number of prisoners Germany had on September 15. The list follows:

French officers	6,158
French soldiers	355,545
Russian officers	8,945
Russian soldiers	1,183,989
Belgian officers	658
Belgian soldiers	41,738
British officers	1,000

British soldiers	30,787
Serbian officers	none
Serbian soldiers	25,879
Total	1,654,669

To this list Germany claims to have added 10,000 French, British, and Russians, and about 50,000 Roumanians, so her prisoners sum up about 1,700,000. To this figure must be added 81,897, civilians who are interned in the empire, British, French, Russians, Serbians, and Roumanians. Germany did not intern the Japanese within her limits. She is studiously polite to them.

Another official table that the war ministry prepared related to the enemy lands now in possession of the central powers. It reads:

	Square miles occupied.
In Belgium	11,180
In France	8,100
In Russia	112,000
In Serbia	34,800
In Montenegro	5,600
Total	171,680

To this total must be added the big mileage since won in Roumania, a few square miles of Italy held by the Austrians, and parts of Albania and Greece which are nominally not at war.

Against these figures the general staff admits that France holds about 400 square miles of Alsatian territory, and that Russia holds in Galicia and Bukowina about 8400 square miles. To this should be added the great African territories Germany has lost, with the exception of portions of German East Africa; large portions of Turkey held by Russia and England; and a small part of Austria held by the Italians.

To get the official view of the situation held by the officers of the general staff, I called on General von Freytag-Loringhoven at the general staff building in Berlin, where the great Moltke long presided. He received me in a room the distinguishing features of which were maps, not only showing the disposition of the German forces, but immense wall-sized ones on which were diagramed the present locations of the Allies, showing their number, their commanders (designated by name and location of headquarters),

with their relative ranks indicated by little parti-colored flags. I had just returned from the Somme, and as I saw how each of the French and British lines was clearly marked, I expressed my surprise.

The general smiled.

"Yes, our intelligence department is pretty thorough," he said, "but it is no better on the Somme than our enemy's is, for in France, where we stand on occupied soil, almost every civilian is an aid to the Allies.

"But despite that, despite all the French and English can do at the Somme," he went on, "they will never break through. There is no doubt but that the primary objective of the Somme offensive was to break through. They timed the movement well and took us at a place and time when we were weakest; but the worst has passed, and they have failed to gain their goal. Now it is impossible, for we have so strengthened our positions with new trenches, reserves, and guns that the operation has lost its significance beyond pounding away, which we can stand at the price they are paying.

"It is to be expected that we may lose a few more villages. The losses will be such as we can afford, since they will be of use in straightening our lines. But no place will be given up without making the Allies pay a high cost, as at this post.

"The offensive began on June 23. From that time to this [the end of September] the French and English have gained about three per cent. of the French ground we hold. At that rate it would take about eight years to drive us out of France, and with the new positions we have prepared, that ratio will not hold. And in Belgium we are untouched.

"The Germans are holding about 1700 miles of front alone. With our allies we are guarding something like 2900 miles, exclusive of sea-coasts. We are equal to the task, and new difficulties only hearten us the more for our work. Roumania is not to be taken seriously. [This was said just after Mackensen had begun his successful Dobrudja campaign.] Soon we shall have our men operating in that section free for other work.

"The great promised Salonica offensive—

where is it? I hear more talk of Sarrail being pushed into the sea than of pushing us back into our own borders."

I asked the general for his impressions of the French and British soldiers. He answered:

"The French are better soldiers. They are better schooled and drilled. They have been at it longer and they are enormously brave and sacrificing. But the British are proving their worth, too. They are all of them warlike and like to fight, but they don't know how as yet. You can't make a soldier in a few weeks or months; it takes time and patience.

"The French artillery is exceptional. The French artillery officers have always been of high repute. They are teaching much to the English and Russians, and these forces are showing a corresponding betterment.

"Because of their greater experience, I should say the French are better officered than the English. The Russian officers are a poor lot. There is no sympathy between them and their men. The men are brave enough, but are sheep-like in their lack of intelligence.

"We can hold out as long as the Allies can,

now that we have dug ourselves in on the west front. We were forced to this course by being so heavily outnumbered and outgunned because of our enormously extended fronts. Bear in mind that when we marched into France the French and English dug themselves in; but we unearthed them and drove them back. They cannot do the same with us. The situation is just this:

"On the west we have not the strength at this time to advance, but the Allies have not the strength to break through. It is an *impassé* for them and will continue so. They cannot and shall not pass. On the other hand, a decisive action elsewhere may have a big effect in our favor on the west. We have much to hope for if circumstances favor us."

His Excellency would not make clearer this rather cryptic utterance, which might have referred to the Roumanian campaign or to the possibility of a Russian peace, with the consequent freeing of great numbers of Germans from duty in the east.

"It is too early to draw any military lessons from the way the war has been fought. Of

course cavalry, as such, is not very effective on the west, except for escorts, but elsewhere it is still serviceable. Machine-guns and heavy artillery have proved the most effective factors in the west, but in the eastern campaigns the infantry and cavalry are still highly useful."

Freytag concluded with the sentiment that every German general utters: "It is too bad that circumstances have forced this *Stellungskrieg* [trench war]. In the open, with opportunity to use strategy and tactics, we could soon bring an end to the war."

The same opinion was expressed by General von Kirchbach, commanding one of the armies of Field-Marshal Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria at the Somme. He had lost Ginchy the day I saw him at the front, but he too was certain that "the Allies will never come through."

CHAPTER XV

ON THE SOMME: ORDEAL BY BATTLE

The soldiers in the front line—Courtesy among the aviators—"English have not won enough ground to bury their dead," says German general—German surprise at English acceptance of conscription—Drain on supplies—Pigeon posts—French villagers behind the front—"Their damned artillery makes it hell"—Von Papen, Boy-Ed, and Dernburg—Zeppelins and what their officers think of them—The German "American-eaters"—The English hope: that if they cannot break the German line they may break the German heart.

THE most interesting of the generals at the Somme was von Wenninger, commanding the First Division of the Guards, who held Thiepval for a long time in the face of continuous attacks. He told me that for twelve days previous to the loss of the village he had had no communication with his men in the first-line trenches, which had lost all semblance of trenches, being merely crater-holes, in the bottom of which the men burrowed and hid from artillery fire, popping up to repel attacks. No one knows what the men lived on while they were cut off except for the field mice and rats that they caught and ate.

With a party of correspondents and neutral army observers in September I stood in the general's field headquarters and watched the big guns drop shells all around the famous "windmill of Pozières" on the high ridge which had been taken by the British and was being used by their artillery observers, who gamely held on, although the position was anything but comfortable.

While we watched the bombardment a squadron of English fliers passed overhead. I ducked and made for the bomb-proof.

"Don't worry," said the general, "the fliers rarely bomb us. Our aviators generally leave their generals' headquarters alone, and they usually do the same by us. It is a sort of understood courtesy."

The Somme represents war raised to the *n*th power. At different times one can see and hear every phase of military activity—drum-fire, light field pieces, machine-guns, hand-grenades, mine-throwers, infantry attacks, mine explosions, liquid fire gas, observation balloons, anti-aircraft cannon, while aëroplane observation and flights are so common that they fail to stir up any ex-

citement even among visitors. I counted as many as sixty machines aloft in half an hour a few weeks ago. The large majority of them were French and English, for the German machines are heavily outnumbered, so much so that their value as observers is sharply curtailed.

Talking of the offensive, Wenninger said:

"The English have not won enough ground from us to bury their dead in single graves, and they won't. The English losses are terrific, but their soldiers fight well. The mortality of officers is very heavy among the English. We can tell that apart from the casualty lists by the few officers who are taken prisoners in comparison to the number of men we take."

Then Wenninger said what every military man in Germany thinks:

"The big surprise of the war is Britain's acceptance of conscription. It's the very thing we thought she was opposed to. We did not believe she would ever take it up, but she has, although it is inconsistent with her expressed principles."

The general gave it as his opinion that the first draft of the conscripts were not nearly as

good as the men in Kitchener's army. One of his divisions—the Third Bavarian—he told me, had been opposing the Fifteenth English Division for eleven months. Every time one division moved it would find itself facing the same opponents, who had moved too.

At the Somme the Germans have taken a leaf from the English book and emplaced many of their big naval cannon. We were permitted to see two of the great 42-centimeter howitzers opposite Pozières. They had just been brought up to the line. The 21-centimeters were common.

Where before a division covered about three miles front, the fighting is so intensive on the Somme that it now holds less than one mile. This is true on both sides.

In one day the Third Division, standing opposite the Courcelette-Martinpuich line, shot away 160 heavy truck-loads of ammunition. This is a fair example of the tremendous drain on supplies. The reserve men and supplies are brought up at night. That is why the roads on both sides are generously sprayed by cannon-fire after sunset.

Only the exceptionally fine roads permit a battle of the nature of that being fought on the Somme. In the east, the experts agreed, the outcome would have to depend upon infantry attacks, since the roads are so bad as to preclude supplies sufficient to permit any long-continued engagements.

The Germans have pushed the railroad construction right up to the firing lines to facilitate replenishment of supplies. It is rather incongruous to see locomotives puffing away, with harvesters at work on one side (the Germans till the ground right up to the volcano's edge) and heavy guns shooting on the other.

One of the proudest boasts the Germans make is that at the Hohenzollern redoubt their hand-grenade men outthrew in distance and accuracy the English, who should have excelled through their cricket practice. Some English prisoners admitted this claim. "We did n't know how to handle the things at first, and they did, but you ought to see us now."

Pigeon-posts are much used at the Somme. The birds are taken into the front lines, and when communications are broken, they are re-

leased, two at a time, each carrying the same message, and they fly back to headquarters,

As you pass through the villages in the line of fire you notice that every house has a sign on it indicating how many soldiers can find place in the cellar when bombardment begins.

Bapaume, one of the great objectives of the British just now, is under almost constant fire, yet many French villagers still stay there. They no longer live in the houses; they live entirely in the cellars, and the improvised chimneys stick up along the street in weird manner.

In going down the roads and across fields under fire, the reserves go single file and several paces apart. So do the correspondents, and the precaution is not calculated to heighten one's feeling of safety, especially when fountains of earth are kicked up by exploding nine-inch shells only eighty or one hundred yards away. One finds himself thinking that if the gunner had deflected only two points, well—as Bennett of the Chicago "Tribune" and I were leaving a 21-centimeter position opposite Pozières a shot scythed through a tree not ten yards from us. A new world's record for the 880-yard run was made

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GENERAL VON MACKENSEN

from then and there. Bennett is fat, so I beat him, but I could have beaten a real champion under the same conditions.

The English are doing much mining along the Somme. The Germans say the Welsh miners are brought over for this purpose. It usually takes two or three weeks to dig the tunnels. Some are ninety feet long. This shows why the progress is so slow.

While I stood in his observation-point with Wenninger an iron-gray quartermaster sergeant passed. He had been in the east against the Russians as well as in the west. In reply to my question as to his opinion of the schools of fighting, he answered:

"I 'd rather face twenty infantry attacks from the Russians than bring up food to the first lines here. Their damned artillery makes it hell."

At the Somme I met Captain von Papen, the former German military attaché, who was sent home by America. After six weeks on the firing line he was made chief of staff to General Count Schweinitz, commanding the Fourth Guard Division and holding the Grevillers-War-

lencourt-Ligny line. He has proved himself an efficient officer.

Captain Boy-Ed, the naval attaché, who was sent back to Germany at the same time, is now chief intelligence officer at the admiralty in Berlin. He is very bitter toward America, while von Papen is friendly. Dr. Dernburg, the other propagandist who was returned to the fatherland, is philosophical as regards his work in America, and is without rancor over his treatment. He is living in Berlin, working on housing plans for the poor, but he has lost the confidence of his Government.

Many German officers who have lived in London or in other parts of England are being drafted into the Zeppelin service. Some are much distressed by their new task, but to them duty leaves no choice.

Many of the soldiers excused for munition work in the plants at Essen and elsewhere are coming back to the colors, their places being taken by women, and the old and wounded, who can serve no more, but can run machines.

In the German mind the use of the Zeppelins is justified, first, because it is regarded as an

effective military instrument, and second, because the Germans actually believe they are being used as reprisals against the English and French. In an official communication in which the use of airships is explained it is said that "Germany has hitherto restricted herself, in accordance with international law, to fortified defended sites serving military ends. She has also given instructions to spare churches, monuments, and museums, etc., in these localities. The evils of war are not to be unnecessarily increased. This policy has been maintained by the German command despite French and English attacks on open towns like Karlsruhe, Stuttgart, Müllheim, and Ludwigshafen. Now the German Government can no longer show its original consideration for the life and health of peaceful inhabitants of bombarded towns. England has forced her to take reprisals."

Although Germany still regards the Jutland battle as a "moral victory," one does not hear much in these days of a willingness to try conclusions again with the British Grand Fleet. Neutral experts say that the use of fog bombs was a great factor in enabling the Germans to

escape after Jellicoe reached the scene of the last battle. The bombs are ingeniously made so that upon striking the water they dissolve into a thick white-gray fog, which, added to the smudge of the smoke stream made by the oil-burning craft, makes a thick and opaque cloud-cloak.

With the officers and soldiers, Americans are as little popular as they are with the civilians. At the last visit our military observers made to the front, now more than a year ago, they were shown no courtesies whatever. In the summer of 1916 the general staff passed an order that no American observers are to be permitted to go with the armies, although the privilege is accorded other neutrals.

Mackensen and Ludendorff are regarded as anti-American. They do not like our country. They constitute two reasons why the American observers do not go to the front. The Germans justify their attitude on the ground that the German naval and military attachés were sent away from the United States. As they have no observers in this country, we are entitled to none in theirs. Our attachés in Vienna fare no better.

While the Germans do not talk much of the general military ability of their Austrian allies, they are quick to give credit for the remarkable success of the Austrian artillery, which, as has been often said, has had a large part in the military successes of the central powers.

The German general staff possesses good psychologists. Almost every day in the official reports there is to be seen a play upon the pride of the various German tribes, by describing the work of the Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons, Württembergers, Badeners, Brandenburgers, Pomeranians, Westphalians, and others.

The reports that Hindenburg might shorten his line in the west by retiring from his present position grew out of a proposition in which many of the German generals believe. They are so confident of their superiority to the enemy in a *Bewegungs-Krieg* (mobile battle, in contradistinction to trench war), the type Napoleon used, that they seriously suggested a retirement from the Somme to a position forty or sixty miles in the rear, where a decisive action could be fought in the open. Hindenburg had more than half a mind to consider the plan were it not

for the evil effect upon the morale of his country in the event of a retiring movement.

The high light one carries away from the front in the west is that it is more than a battle-field of physical forces. It is a fight of spirit, not how many dead can be counted, but how many of the living can be disheartened. The Germans realize this, and that is why their leaders make every effort secondary to the supreme one of lifting up the morale of the troops and preserving their courage and confidence. They believe that the English have abandoned the original plan of trying to break through and are now pounding away in the hope that, if they cannot break the German line, they may be able to break the German heart.

CHAPTER XVI

LUDENDORFF: THE MYSTERY MAN

Hindenburg's right hand man—Ludendorff plans and Hindenburg decides—His inscrutability—Has never been interviewed—His fame in Germany—Simple origin—Predestined to be a soldier—Reserved as a child—Rapid advance in the army—His troops first to enter Liège—Called to aid Hindenburg—The battles in the Masurian swamps—The steam roller in Poland—Second to Hindenburg in command of all the German armies—German confidence in him.

"HINDENBURG and Ludendorff."

Never the one name without the other, never the one man without the other. The two are unified in action. Hindenburg's dynamics are animated by Ludendorff's thought current. Hindenburg's executions are largely Ludendorff's conceptions.

All the world knows Hindenburg. Germany's Iron Man, the hero of the Masurian Swamps, a colossal wooden statue of whom stands opposite the Reichstag in the Sieges-allee, the Avenue of Victory, in Berlin's Tiergarten. But who is Ludendorff?

Ludendorff is Germany's man of mystery, the grim, inscrutable, silent man whose picture is on sale in every shop, whose name is in every mouth, but whose real personality is hidden even from his own countrymen.

Ludendorff is Hindenburg's indispensable right-hand man. When Hindenburg took command on the east front in mid-August, 1914, Ludendorff was rushed from Liège, where he had led the first brigade to enter the conquered city, in a special train all the way across Luxemburg and the Rhineland, across Hanover and the Mark of Brandenburg, to Hindenburg's headquarters on the eastern frontier. He became Hindenburg's *Generalstabschef*—chief of his general staff.

Since then the two have been inseparable. When Hindenburg became chief of the great general staff, commanding all the armies of Germany—and as things stand to-day that comes near to meaning commanding all the combined German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish armies—in September, Ludendorff went with him. He succeeded General von Freytag-Loringhoven as first quartermaster

general, Freytag succeeding Moltke, the former chief of the grand general staff, who died recently, as chief of the supplementary general staff.

There are those who say that Ludendorff is Hindenburg's brain, and that Hindenburg's greatest successes have been planned by his silent, retiring assistant. Hindenburg, when in the mood, becomes very talkative and chatty, and at such times he often attributes his success to his assistant. There is a perfect harmony between the two; Ludendorff plans and Hindenburg decides.

It is Ludendorff who prepares the official army announcements, and the innovation of naming the commanders on the west front in the daily communiqués has been attributed to him; but beyond these bare, impersonal statements of what others have done, which he never signs, he says nothing for publication.

No newspaper man has ever interviewed Ludendorff. Sometimes, when Hindenburg is being interviewed, he sits beside his chief and occasionally interjects a remark. They are the remarks of a soldier, short, crisp, determined, and

to the point. "We do not think of peace," he once said. "No way but war leads to peace."

He does not fear superior numbers, but has implicit confidence in the German ability to surmount all obstacles. "There is no blind fate," he says. "Numerical superiority and danger exist only for the weak. A firm will commands fate."

Yet, despite his reticence, this man, even in his own country almost unknown when the war began, whose name is just becoming familiar to American ears, is the recipient of extraordinary honors in Germany to-day.

In the grand hall of Königsberg, the capital of East Prussia, stands a full length marble statue of Ludendorff, known with Hindenburg as the savior of that Province. He is an honorary citizen of two towns in East Prussia. The universities of Breslau and Königsberg have conferred honorary doctor's degrees upon him. On state occasions he wears upon his breast medals granted him by the kings of Saxony and Bavaria and the grand duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, as well as by the two kaisers of Germany and Austria-Hungary. After the great

winter battle of the Masurian Swamps Kaiser Wilhelm personally decorated him with the order Pour le Mérite.

Ludendorff comes of a very simple north German merchant family. He was not born *von* Ludendorff; that came with his later honors. His father was superintending a large farm in Posen, not many miles from Hindenburg's birthplace, when Erich, his second son, was born. Later he moved to Pomerania. On his mother's side he traces his descent to Frederick the Great's royal apothecary. One of Ludendorff's superpatriotic biographers, after patient study, unearthed the "fact" that his hero's grandmother was a direct descendant of a "left-handed" daughter of Erich XIV., King of Sweden from 1560 to 1569. But Kracke's attempt to attribute Ludendorff's success to a strain of left-handed royal blood, diluted by three centuries of mediocre bourgeoisie, will hardly persuade any one who has not swallowed whole the Kaiser's idea of divine right. Ludendorff came of good, solid, not at all remarkable middle-class stock.

He was predestined to be a soldier. His father, always regretting that he had left the

army after the war of 1870, nourished unfulfilled martial ambitions all his life, and passed them on to his son.

Erich Ludendorff was no wonder-child. Even his deepest admirers can unearth no extraordinary evidences of precocity. Until his aunt came to teach him and his brothers he showed no liking for his studies, and was, if anything, rather backward.

This aunt, Fraulein von Tempelhoff, says of him:

"His most striking characteristic was his reserve with other children. While the two brothers nearest his age were glad to play with the peasant and village children, he held himself aloof from them. Obviously," adds the loyal aunt, "this was not due to pride,—there was no hint of pride in him,—but rather to an inborn fineness, which made him aware of every contact with rough manners and uncleanliness as something uncomfortable, contrary to his nature.

"He always kept himself faultlessly clean, although he took part like a true boy in the games of his brothers, as well as in their rat and mouse hunts in the stables and fields."

GENERAL VON LUDENDORFF

Later, she says, he became so interested in his studies that he insisted on being the first of the children to be waked in the morning, and flew into a rage if he found one of his sisters ahead of him in the school-room.

When he entered the military cadet school at the age of twelve he passed the examination and entered a class two years ahead of that of most boys of his age. In 1879 he shifted to the academy at Gross-Lichterfelde, a suburb of Berlin, and three years later, just six days past his seventeenth birthday, he entered the army as an *Offizier-Aspirant.*

His advance was rapid. In 1887 he was called to the military *Turnanstalt* in Berlin; shortly after he was assigned to the marine infantry. In 1890 he entered the military academy at Berlin, and spent three years there, making Russian his major study. In 1894 he went to Russia for a year of travel and study, in the course of which he studied some of the ground over which he was later to send the German armies.

In 1895 he became a captain in the great general staff, and for the first time wore the broad red stripes which are the ambition of every Ger-

man officer. A year later he was assigned to the general command of the Fourth Army Corps at Magdeburg; in 1902 he became Major Ludendorff; two years later he was recalled to the great general staff; and the year following became an instructor in the military academy, teaching tactics and military history. In 1911 he was made a colonel. Previously, General von Moltke, at that time chief of the great general staff, had made him chief of an important division of his staff.

Just before the war he was given the title of general major, and put in command of the Eighty-fifth Infantry Brigade in Strasburg. In the first days of August he was transferred to the Belgian front.

In 1909 he had married Margarethe Pernet, a wealthy widow, daughter of a Berlin factory owner. Her four sons by her first marriage are all officers in the aviation corps.

When, on the fourth of August, 1914, the German army crossed the Belgian frontier, Ludendorff was in its foremost ranks. On the night of August 5, as the Germans pressed in under the guns of the forts of Liège, the com-

mander of his brigade fell. Ludendorff took over the command, and led his troops through bitter hand-to-hand fights to the hills just east of Liège.

All of the forts were still holding out. Through the cold night of August 6, Ludendorff's brigade huddled together on the hillside, uncertain where their fellow-brigades were, every minute half expecting an attack.

The next morning a decision had to be made. Ludendorff had received no orders. He supposed other brigades must mave moved forward and taken the citadel of the city. He ordered the troops to advance, and led his troops into the city. The citadel was still in the hands of the Belgians.

To General von Emmich, Ludendorff's superior officer, fell the credit for taking Liège; but Ludendorff's troops were the first to enter the city.

Ludendorff left Liège on the night of August 7, carrying important despatches to the army headquarters at Aachen. There he was greeted as one returned from the dead. He had been with the first brigade under fire for three days.

After the fall of Liège, he continued with the army advancing through Belgium up to August 22. Early that morning, as he was preparing to lead his troops against Namur, came the word that he had been appointed chief of the general staff of the east. A special train would meet him at the border.

What did the solitary man think as he sat poring over his maps, while the train shot across Germany to Hindenburg and the Masurian Swamps? The Russians were pressing into East Prussia, and already vague rumors of whole villages dispossessed and of atrocities and cruelties not second to those in Belgium were creeping across Germany.

Ludendorff as a strategist was a disciple of Count Schlieffen, whose motto always was, "Annihilate the enemy!" He also sympathizes with his chief, Hindenburg. "You can't make war sentimentally," says Hindenburg. "The more mercilessly you make war, the more merciful you are in reality, for so you end the war the sooner. The most humane method of waging war is and remains that which brings peace most quickly."

With his chief, Ludendorff is officially reck-

oned among those opposed to the resumption of ruthless U-boat warfare. He once wrote a letter to be read at a meeting of National Liberals, asking that the German people stand united behind the Government without risking the demoralization of the army by useless controversies over the expediency of ways and means to success.

But Ludendorff is a soldier. He knows not only how to command, but how to obey. Those most likely to know the real truth believe that this position is assumed merely as a matter of diplomacy, and that if his real views were known, they would be as rabid as those of the *Amerikanerfresser* Mackensen. Ludendorff is a soldier from the soles of his army boots to the tip of his *Pickelhaube,* and it is unlikely that his views are radically different from those known to be general among army officers. Most army men feel that every effort must be bent and every available instrument used to hurt Germany's enemies, and that nothing would come closer to England's vitals than a ruthless submarine campaign.

But that August night, as Ludendorff's special slid through one after another of the little

red-roofed towns that line the German railroads, it was of East Prussia and Russia that Ludendorff was thinking. And whatever the plans revolving in his head that night and whatever be the just division of the credit between Hindenburg and his chief of staff, the Russian invasion of East Prussia stopped short before they had been in charge a week.

On August 28 it was announced that the Russians were fleeing across the border. The news grew. Five army corps and three cavalry divisions had been annihilated. More than ninety thousand prisoners were taken. Tannenberg, one of the greatest victories of the war, had changed the whole face of affairs in the east.

There have been bigger battles and longer battles, and there have been battles of more significance in the history of the war, but there has been no other battle in which the result has been so overwhelming and complete a victory for either side.

Just what happened at Tannenberg and in the Masurian Swamps is still a secret. There have been stories that a hundred thousand men were drowned in the swamps. There have been tales

of dikes released and men swept away in a swirl of rushing waters. All that is known certainly is that a Russian army disappeared.

Two weeks later not a Russian soldier, except for 140,000 prisoners of war, stood on German soil. The second Russian army, advancing along the River Niemen, had been driven back with a loss of 50,000 prisoners and 150 guns.

Then followed the long campaigns for Poland, when the German armies, advancing almost to the gates of Warsaw, were forced to retire, and did so with the loss of hardly a man. Another Russian army crossed the East Prussian frontier. As the winter wore on and the snow settled deep on the bleak flatlands of East Prussia, it seemed inevitable that it would remain until spring.

But there was no such word as "inevitable" in the vocabulary of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. They marched their troops through biting snow-storms. Whole army corps were brought from the west front.

The first of February saw the beginning of the "winter battle of the Masurian Swamps." Two weeks later a hundred thousand prisoners, among

them seven Russian generals, remained in Germany. The rest of the great army had fled in disorder into the province of Suwalki. Hindenburg and Ludendorff had won their third great battle. East Prussia was finally cleared.

Hindenburg's steam roller started in the spring. As certainly as the northward march of spring, the German armies moved eastward into Russia. Warsaw, Novogeorgiewsk, Ivangorod, Brest Litovsk, Grodno, Vilna, Pinsk—one after another the supposed impregnable Russian fortresses were taken and left behind. All Poland fell into German hands.

Outside of Germany the fame has been Hindenburg's, at home his is the name which commands the applause of the crowds; but those who know do not speak of one without the other. "Hindenburg and Ludendorff," they say. No man knows what share of the glory belongs to the silent, hard-working strategist who pores over the maps and orders by day and night and what to the big man of action.

All Germany breathed freer when, on August 29, 1916, it was announced that Hindenburg would succeed Falkenhayn as chief of the great

general staff, and that Ludendorff would be his quartermaster-general. And with the German armies advancing on Bucharest and the Roumanian king appealing to the Allies to save his kingdom from extinction, with the west front still holding after months of bloody fighting at the Somme, the German *Hausfrau* mingles the names of Hindenburg and Ludendorff in her prayers for the Kaiser.

CHAPTER XVII

BOELCKE, KNIGHT OF THE AIR

A hero among the Allies and among his own people—Brought down thirty-eight enemy machines before he was killed in collision with a German machine—Aërial chivalry—English take air-war as sport; Germans and French seriously—Boelcke never in America—The fighting detachment of the aeroplane corps—German team-work—Boelcke's fighting technique—British say German fliers hang back—How a war correspondent saved two lives—How a captured British flier viewed his confinement.

It is given to few men in this war of bitterness and hatred to achieve popularity both among their own people and the enemy, and it is rarer among the Germans, who generally scorn the arts leading to it. Hindenburg, Mackensen, Muller of the *Emden,* Weddigen of the U-9 are four Germans who have attained this goal in their own country and in England and France, and to this list must be added the name of Captain Boelcke of the German Flying Corps, who shot down thirty-eight enemy aëroplanes before he was killed by a collision with a German machine behind his own lines in late October.

The day that Boelcke scored his twentieth victory I talked with him for an hour. It was early in October, near Bapaume, and the drumfire of the Somme Battle, which had been raging since June 23, rolled and crashed about us, a thing alive and monstrous. The air was fairly dotted with skymen, while he, the chief of them all, sat quietly under a hangar and let me learn why he was held in such high esteem by friend and foe. For his charm and modesty commanded respect and affection apart from his ability as a fighting flier, and in that capacity he was the greatest the war has produced. He made his record in the face of the English dominance of the air, for that, apart from Zeppelins, the English surely possess. And in building his fame he built a technique of war aviation that is a standard for all tacticians of the clouds. So the story of Boelcke is the story of a man and a master. When he "went," the English and French fliers threw flowers behind the German lines in his memory, and his casket, when he was buried, bore a great wreath from British prisoners in the empire. Only among the aviators of the fighting armies is one certain to find that

chivalry which once was never dissociated from war. Theirs is the special heritage of preserving the knightly tradition. The extraordinary bitterness of the other arms of the service makes the contrast all the sharper.

I came into contact with something like thirty or forty German fliers and several English and French airmen along the Somme front, and Boelcke was a fair representative of the lot. His twentieth "bag," made just before I saw him, illustrates the regard the English have for him. Captain Wilson of the Royal Flying Corps, attached to a station near Pozières, was flying over the German lines when Boelcke rose to meet him. Boelcke outguessed, out manœuvered, and outshot the Englishman, who dropped safely to the ground after having a wing broken. Boelcke landed near him, and in surrendering, the Englishman asked the name of his captor.

"Boelcke," replied the German.

The chagrin and humiliation of defeat and capture were forgotten for a moment as the Englishman put out his hand and, as Boelcke shook it, said:

"If I had to be shot down, I am glad it was by so good a man."

Wilson was sent back to Cambrai. The next day Boelcke invited him to lunch with the officers at the flying park, where the captured flier expressed appreciation of the exceptional treatment he had received and told of the high regard in which the English held the German fliers. That night he was sent to a German prison camp.

When I talked with Boelcke, through the courtesy of the German general staff, which usually makes a rule against personal exploitation, I found him to be a good-looking young chap, twenty-five years old, of the thin, wiry, quick, and graceful type usually associated with airmen. His manner of thought was simple and direct, and his conversation modest and responsive.

We met at his station at an old château only a few kilometers from the heaviest fighting, in which he was daily engaged; but his appearance was neat, as is that of all the German officers, his face newly shaved, his uniform clean, and ornamented only with the Iron Cross of the first class.

In talking of his work he made it plain that he held it to be a duty, not a sport, as do most of the Englishmen, to the bewilderment of the Germans.

"How many of the twenty that you shot down lived after the fight?" I asked him after congratulating him on his skill and courage and telling him of America's interest in his heroism.

"Only two, unfortunately," he replied with feeling. "All fought so well that I was sorry luck was against them. I think most of the eighteen were killed by bullets from my machine or died in the fall, a few meeting death when they smashed to the ground. One Englishman, Wilson, and a French officer remained alive. The others died for their country."

When I asked for a comparison between the English and the French fliers Boelcke hesitated, and then said he had noticed no great difference. Both, he said, were courageous and skilful, with perhaps a distinction to be observed in the spirit animating them, the English never lacking the spirit of sport, so inexplicable to the German mind, while the French took it fatalistically and with grim earnestness.

Boelcke
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Boelcke stood about five feet seven, clean-shaven and red-cheeked, with gray-blue eyes that never left the questioner. He had a thin Roman nose, a soft voice, and rather quick enunciation. He carried a cane of necessity because of a recent wound. He had been wounded several times, but never seriously.

He wore the field-gray uniform of an infantry captain, with propellers on the shoulder straps as insignia of the service. Before the war he was attached to the infantry, and in common with other flying officers, he clung to the old regimental uniform because of the traditions behind it. Only those younger men who have joined the fliers since the war began wear a distinctive flying-corps uniform. All the others wear their old outfit.

Before we talked of his work he said half jestingly:

"Since you will write for America, you might straighten out one point. The London papers credit me with having lived in America and been a lift-boy there, getting my flying experience in that way. I was never in America, and never happened to be a lift-boy. Just before the war

began I lived in Dessau, and did some flying there. I liked the work, and when I was called out to join the Prussian forces I went into the flying branch. I hope to visit America for the first time after the war."

When Boelcke went into flying he was first an observer and later a pilot; then he was shifted because of his steady eye, sure nerves, and splendid courage, into the fighting detachment, where he did nothing but fight off hostile aëroplanes scouting over the German lines or go to the relief of his own people attacked while on observation duty.

He always flew alone. There was an observer's seat in his machine, but he never used it. In fact, most of the German fighting fliers travel alone. This is to minimize the risk, and, by engaging the enemy, give the observation machines a chance to get back with information.

"The English say that no German fighters and few observers cross their lines; but that they fly over their own troops," I said to Boelcke.

"That isn't true as regards the observers," he answered earnestly. "They have done much good work over the enemy's forces. It used to

be true in part about the fighters. That was at first, because there were several parts of our new Fokkers that we wanted to keep secret; and second, because it was important that we remain on guard in our own territory to prevent the enemy's observers gaining information. Lately circumstances have changed, and we fly everywhere. Obviously, it is the best tactics to bring your man down behind your own lines, so he can be made a prisoner if alive and his machine kept from the chance of the enemy repairing it. Each of us follows the fight through now, no matter where it takes us."

Boelcke's modesty kept him from saying that five of his quarries were shot down inside their own lines. His brother officers, by whom he was much liked, said that the English always tried to seek out the neighborhood in which he was supposed to be, in the hope of having a go with him. But he held to the strictest duty, and never went into action unless directed to do so. In other words, he held to the spirit that is a striking characteristic of the whole German army—teamwork. That is what made Boelcke so well liked.

Boelcke paid a high tribute to Lieutenant Im-

melmann, who had been killed shortly before, after making his twelfth score, and added that what he and Immelmann had done was possible with equal luck for all the other flying officers. But that there is more to Boelcke's record than mere luck was shown the day after he shot down his twentieth prize, when two of his companions, Rosencrantz and Falbusch, were shot down in trying to stop an English raiding party of eight aëroplanes bombing railroad stations. The courage with which they took on a fight with so superior a force was typical of the German fliers.

When I asked Boelcke about the methods he used in his big-game hunting, he replied:

"I use no special formula except to try to get my man before he gets me. Almost all fighting aëroplanes are similarly rigged, with a machine-gun fixed in front of the pilot. As the gun is stationary, to get it into position I must manœuver my machine, and this is done best by outflying the enemy and coming into him from the rear. I am violating no military secrets in saying this because air fighting, regardless of nationality, is almost always conducted on similar lines. I do not try to outclimb my adversary and come down

on him, shooting as I come, but rather to outspeed and outsteer him, gaining the rearward position, where my shots go home while he has nothing to shoot at. I turn as he does, for if he made a quicker or shorter bank than I, he would be able to rake me. To gain speed, we Germans fly light, and as speed is essential in the fighting end, the fighting fliers usually fly alone."

Boelcke had had five machines smashed under him, but always volplaned to earth successfully until the fatal trip late in October, 1916. His favorite machine had the lines of a bird. Even close at hand it looked tiny, being much smaller than the French and British planes.

He used a specially cooled machine-gun, firing ordinary rifle ammunition. The gun had a pistol grip and trigger, and he fired it with one hand, steering with his feet and balancing with the free hand on the wheel. Boelcke and the other German fliers declined to use anything but regular rifle ammunition fed by the usual web belt, and shooting at a speed that is greater than that of the ordinary automatic pistol, sometimes exceeding five hundred shots a minute.

It was a matter of ammunition that, after two

years of chivalry among the knights of the air, threatened to lead to great bitterness. The Germans accused the English fliers of using incendiary bullets in their machine-guns. These cartridges, slightly larger than the usual rifle-shell, carry an explosive chamber that ignites in flight and inflames the substance against which it is shot. As aëroplane wings are oil-coated, they are highly combustible, and several disasters overtook German fliers in this way. The German military authorities resented the new tactics, and talked of making an example of captured Englishmen who had employed what Germany held to be an unfair and illegal method. Rosencrantz and Falbusch were shot down in this way.

It was in this connection that it became my good fortune to be of service in possibly saving the lives of two young English flying officers. They had just been captured and when the prison-yard commandant at Cambrai gave me permission to speak to them, he added that I might tell them that they were to be court-martialed, and probably shot, on the ground that they had been using the so-called illegal ammu-

nition. I was unwilling to be the bearer of such unhappy news, and I did not tell them. Instead, as I had not been placed under any confidence by the German officers, I informed Ambassador Gerard of their danger, when I returned to Berlin, as he is charged with the British interests in Germany. Through the Foreign Office the ambassador immediately requested permission to have the Englishmen represented by counsel at their trial. This permission was granted, although it had been declined in the case of Captain Fryatt. Before I left Germany, I was given to understand that even if the two men were court-martialed, it was highly improbable that they would be executed. They were Ronald Walker, first lieutenant of the Royal Flying Corps, of March Rectory, Cambridgeshire, and Lieutenant C. Smith of Cemetery Road, York. When I spoke with them their first request was to notify their families, and their second for chocolate and cigarettes.

Another Englishman whom I met in the Cambrai prison gave me an English view of the German fliers. He was Captain H. G. Salmond of Bedford, England, whose heavy flying-gog-

gles had been cracked, but not splintered, by a bullet just before he was captured.

"All of us think the German fliers are very good," he said, "and that this chap Boelcke is top hole, but I 'm bound to say it 's jolly hard to get fight out of them. We have to hang over their parks for hours at a time before we can tempt them to come up and have a go. I 've never seen a German machine over our lines; they always wait for us to bring the fight to them.

"The officers here at the prison are decent fellows as far as they can be, but it is rotten to be here without a single change of togs, without a chance for a shave except a hack that a Tommy does for me by renting a razor from a German soldier, and without a sou of money. Naturally, I flew without money, and now I find that my prisoner's pay does n't start until I 'm shifted to Germany.

"I hope they 'll hurry up. Here I can't even keep my windows open at night. I had some ripping bad luck in being bagged, though I must say my man was a game one. One of his shots glanced and broke my wind frame. I almost keeled over, but righted, and managed to

get down without hurting myself much except for the wound and the bruises I got in landing."

The captain, too, next to having word sent to his family of his safety, wanted most of all chocolate and cigarettes.

The Germans call their anti-aircraft guns *"flak,"* deriving the nickname from *Flieger-abschuss-kanonen.* Every park has its own equipment of protective armament, and every series of observation balloons has at a central strategical point a *"flak"* battery. The abbreviation style they lifted from the British "Anzac"—Australian-New Zealand Army Corps.

"I hope to see you again in happier times," said Boelcke in parting. "We Germans don't want to fight, but so long as we are forced to, you may be sure we will, and fight so that we shall never be beaten." And with a wave of his hand Boelcke turned to his quarters to climb into flying-clothes. Three weeks later they dressed him in his shroud.

CHAPTER XVIII

CAPTIVE BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE

Iron heel of conqueror not crushing people—German desire to make country self-supporting—Belgians passive but French pride unbroken—The C. R. B.—Belgian unwillingness to work—More food in Belgium to-day than in Germany—Germans pay cash of national coinage—Hatred of the German in Lille awesome—But hatred cannot be kept at razor-edge everywhere—"The Ostend-Dover route—cheapest and quickest route to England"—Germans reducing Belgian illiteracy—German officers fear effects of retention of Belgium.

THE German flag floats over 20,000 square miles of Belgian and French soil, a region almost as large as the combined areas of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont. All of Belgium except for a piece less than two hundred square miles in size is tributary to the Kaiser, and one twenty-fifth of all France is in his hands.

With the German flag there has come the German rule, severe, suspicious, ruthless at times, and permitting no deviations from the course it prescribes for the subject peoples. But in the rule there is to be perceived a sense of responsibility,

the recognition of which is a matter of fairness on the part of any neutral observer.

The iron heel of the conqueror, as some partizans have pictured it, is not crushing the life out of the people by deliberate starvation, nor is it depriving them of all privileges. The yoke of the conqueror sits heavy upon the Belgians and the French, and they are not happy under it. But their businesses are permitted to continue, they are urged and helped to till their fields, their schools and churches are open, their clubs and gathering-places are freely used, and while the display of no other flag than that of Germany is tolerated, it is a common thing to see displayed in Belgium pictures of King Albert and his family, and in France photographs of President Poincaré and of French generals.

The reaction I carried away from a visit to the occupied territories was certainly not that which the Allies seek to produce, nor was it that which official Germany tries to create. A military occupancy at best is a source of unhappiness to the people whose lands are thus seized, but it is not in Belgium and northern France characterized by the cruelty and viciousness often described.

There is a good, substantial reason for this. Not that the Germans are so kindly and considerate as to make any other attitude abhorrent to them, but because, under German methods, it is hoped to make each region self-supporting, and that can be done only by encouraging the people to work and fostering their industries; otherwise the burden of their support would be an added liability to the conquering forces, which are responsible for the welfare of the subject civilians.

My visit to Belgium was not made under the usual conditions that the Foreign Office in Berlin throws about the tours made by neutral observers. They are sent to the conquered country in the care of officers who are particularly instructed as to what their charges shall and shall not see. My trip to Belgium was a by-product of my visit to the Somme battle-front. We stopped in Belgium on our way there and on the way back, and on both occasions I was given unusual opportunity to wander about, seeing and hearing the things I wanted to see and hear rather than things carefully picked for me by others.

I did not find Belgium the scene of vast desolation, the dreary, stricken, hopeless land that I

had been led to believe I would find; on the contrary, instead of coming away with my sympathies for the unfortunate country accentuated, I found their edge rather dulled. In the French area I found the conditions different, and there my sentiments were quickened into a passion of pity and admiration.

It was the difference in the spirit of the two peoples that produced these two different impressions.

In Belgium the people, including many young men, are passive in their opposition to the circumstances which the Germans have so harshly forced upon them; their spirit is one of a Micawber-like sitting by, waiting for something to turn up.

In captive France, there are no young men, and the opposition of the people to their subjugation, though unspoken and unacted, is a flame, and I felt its strength and depth. The spirit of the French is one of unbroken pride; there is no bending of the neck, no passivity, no yielding to their temporary fate. And this spirit becomes the more remarkable in that the conditions of the French are much worse than those of the Bel-

gians, because of the nearness of the war and the attendant difficulties of supporting life.

Through the efficient organization of the Commission for Relief in Belgium (it is unfortunate that the title does not include France, where it operates, too, and where its work just now is of greater importance), with the coöperation of the German administration, much has been done for the stricken country; but it is evident that there is justice in the German assertion that Belgium would be better off if she would do more for herself.

In the cities of Belgium, such as Brussels, Antwerp, Liège, and Louvain, many of the men who worked at first later refused to work. They said they were engaged in a passive strike and that they would do nothing likely to advance the interests of their German rulers; but in this refusal they declined also to advance their own interests, even to the extent of refusing to support themselves.

In the cities of "German France" the old men and the women—all of them—work. They tend their flocks, they till their fields, they open their shops, and with that thrift which characterizes

the French they make all the money they can so that later they may help their country recuperate from the ravages of the war, and help her in the economic struggle that is to follow after this one of arms. In contradistinction to Belgium, there are no young men—they are all fighting for the motherland.

In both the countries, while the administration has been taken over by the German military, the native police are still at work, and the inferior courts are still open and doing business. If one did not have advance knowledge of the fact, one would not know in walking the streets of Brussels that it was a captive city, save for the presence of the German field-gray uniform and the black, white and red flag. Theaters are open, museums are visited, and most of the restaurants do a flourishing business.

There is more food in Belgium to-day than in Germany, as regards variety. Fruits and meats are to be found in abundance in the Belgian shops and eating-places, but of course the prices have gone up. It is a common practice to those Germons visiting Belgium on business to take back with them meat; and the run on ham, bacon, and

sausage is so great that on every street one finds three or four shops given up to supplying the demand. German soldiers returning to their homes on furlough are permitted to take with them just as much meat as they can carry and pay for. I saw many of these fellows coming from the front staggering under as much as 120 pounds of meat for their families in the "old country." The greater abundance of food in Belgium has created a feeling of resentment in Germany, and when I was in Brussels toward the end of September Governor-General von Bissing found it necessary to give out an official statement assuring his countrymen that Belgium was not the land of milk and honey, or, rather, fats and meats, that she had been pictured.

I was assured that the Germans are not using any of the food products of the Belgians except those that are bought in the usual way out of the surplus of the various farms. The Germans, however, are running many of the farms themselves, and their consumption of the product of these farms naturally decreases the amount available for the rest of the country.

In the various subdivisions where the *Etappen*

Kommandants (military district commanders) dispensed the low, the middle, and the high justice for the country-side, every officer in command seeks to make a record among the people under him in keeping them contented and at work. Apart from increasing the officers' reputation for administrative efficiency, this system preserves the peace and enables the people the more easily to pay the war tribute laid upon them by the conquerors.

If Great Britain carries out the threat she made of denying the right of shipment of relief supplies to Belgium on the ground that the native harvests are being used by the Germans, the Germans will commandeer all the Belgian supplies and put Belgium on a war footing, which means that the German army will be taken care of first, on the principle that it has the right to subsistence while on enemy soil, and what is left will be eked out with such supplies as Germany can send for the use of the Belgian population, the country being put upon a ration basis similar to that employed in the German Empire.

Under present conditions both in Belgium and in France, everything that the officers and soldiers

get from the natives outside of such things as are officially commandeered are paid for not only in cash, but in the national coinage. And the prices are fixed by the shopkeepers themselves. The German money is not permitted to be used, in order to avoid constant disputes over exchange. The Germans must go to army banking offices, where they are given French or Belgian money in exchange for their German currency, and then they can spend this money only at certain stores and restaurants. These have large signs on them, saying that officers and soldiers may patronize them.

This restriction is to prevent the Germans from overrunning all the restaurants and from using all the supplies of the stores. On the other hand, certain stores in all the occupied towns are supplied directly by the German army with materials needed by officers, and on such articles the sale is restricted exclusively to the officers. In other words, the stores are made into a sort of auxiliary army canteens.

In the French towns all the men I saw were at work. In Belgium I saw many idle, although later the Germans instituted a system whereby

GENERAL VON BISSING, GOVERNOR GENERAL OF BELGIUM

this class is penalized if it does not go to work. The industrial plants in France were almost all idle, except the mines, which are being worked by the Germans. They cannot get supplies, but, of more importance, they have no labor. In Belgium the same difficulty exists about supplies and about the labor, too, though from another cause: in France there is none to work, and in Belgium there are those who won't work. At the close of 1916 the Germans began a system of deportation to Germany of those Belgians accused of refusing to work. The step brought protest from the Washington State Department, but Berlin declared the method adopted was the only solution of the problem it faced. The Allied Governments denounced it as "slavery." The neutral countries were much exercised by the new example of German ruthlessness.

Travel between Belgium and Germany is virtually limited to troop movements, although those in either country having actual business in the other may, after a great deal of trouble, obtain passports. This does not hold good regarding France, in which no travel of any sort is per-

mitted the natives. Around Bissing's palace in Brussels there is a cordon of guards by which one is stopped two blocks away, and unless one can show a highly particularized pass with countless indorsements thereon one is turned back most unceremoniously.

In Lille, where the booming of the big guns is to be heard all day and night, the hatred of the German is something that awes you. Not that it is given vocal expression; it would be better if it were. It is in the actions of the people that you read it. You see women step off the pavements when German officers come near, or stop dead and turn their faces away. You see little children quiet their play, and the men go by with eyes straight ahead. In the shops the officers are waited on, but never an unnecessary word is wasted on them.

It must be said that the Germans have not quarreled with this condition. Many of them told me frankly that they understood it, and instead of resentment, they felt a sympathy. It weighed so heavily upon me, being usually in the company of German officers, that I pinned a little American flag upon my campaign coat, and that

always made a difference. More of a difference, I found, in Belgium, where the Americans are helping largely to feed the people, than in France, where they seem to feel that America was derelict in not fighting with the Allies.

Lille gave the name to lisle, the silk-white cotton thread that was first made there. This industry still continues in a half-hearted sort of way, and so do the lace and embroidery works, the employees being virtually all women.

Nearer the front at Cambrai, where cambric linen was first made and named, the hatred was even more pronounced. Cambrai is the headquarters of Field-Marshal Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, who commands the group of three armies now fighting at the Somme. In occupied France the German officers and soldiers all wear covers over their regimental insignia. This is to keep information as to the disposition of the troops from the natives, most of whom act as spies, and, despite every effort of the Germans, succeed in maintaining communication with the armies of their beloved France.

When I was in Lille it was announced that the 20,000 or so young men and women who had

been expatriated by the Germans were to be returned to their French homes. The announcement was received with great joy. The German explanation of the seizure of these people was that they had been needed for field work in other parts of France and Belgium, and that only those had been taken who would not work or were of dubious reputation.

It is hard, no matter how deep the feeling, to keep hatred at a razor edge, and among the poorer classes a sort of camaraderie has sprung up between them and the German soldiers billeted in their houses. One family at Cambrai was tearfully distressed over the serious wounding of two of the Germans who had been their "guests."

The efficiency of the Germans shows itself in the manner in which the trains are operated through Belgium and France right up to the very battle-line itself. I took a sleeping-car in Berlin—used only by officers, ordinary soldiers and civilians going in day-cars—and rode through to Cambrai. The railroad continues from there to Péronne, but this stretch is being used for ammunition and supply shipments.

The trains and tracks are guarded by soldiers

who are stationed about every five hundred yards apart, with special guards on the bridges. All through Belgium and France pathetic reminders of peace days are to be found in the signs in English in the railroad stations, reading, "Take the Ostend-Dover route—cheapest and quickest to England."

In France, at the reserve points, the German officers get meat only once a day. Their early breakfast consisted of a frightful mess called coffee, and bread and jam. Eggs were not to be had.

With that love of home characteristic of the Frenchman, many of the people, in the villages along the front, even those directly under fire, have not fled, but are living in their cellars, which they improvise into bomb-proofs, with long stove-pipes used as chimneys sticking though holes knocked in the sidewalks.

As soon as the Germans took possession of the smaller places in Belgium and France they ordered that the schools continue, and frequently detailed men and officers to this work if regular schoolmasters were not to be found. It is the proud boast of the Germans in Belgium that they

have greatly increased school attendance, and they declare that if they remain much longer in that country its present high figure of illiteracy will be lowered.

Wherever they go the Germans establish central stations for the collection of old bottles, old paper, and odds and ends of rubber, leather and metal. But the first thing they do is to test all drinking water and placard the polluted streams. Whenever these are found, neither villagers nor soldiers are permitted to drink from them under penalty of court-martial, every household being compelled to boil a certain quantity of water every day.

Recently the *Reichsbank* recalled all the German money in circulation in Belgium and replaced it with Belgian money issued against Belgian security. The change was welcomed by the Belgians as being in a small way a recognition of their entity. Most of the Brussels papers are still being published, though in emasculated form. The Government supports two papers there, the "Belgische Kurier" and the "Bruesseller Tageszeitung."

The Belgians are not fond of the Germans,

but neither do the Germans like the Belgians. There is a marked difference to be seen in the attitude of the Germans toward the French. With the Belgians they are curt and severe and with the French they are almost sympathetic. Every German believes that France is being "bled white," as they say, by England, who, they add, purposes reducing France to such a condition that she will always be a vassal state.

Because Germany has thus far declined to give any official assurance regarding the reëstablishment of Belgium into a separate state, there is a fear in the minds of the Belgians as to what is to happen to them. Perhaps this uncertainty has been an added depression to the Belgian spirit in comparison to that of France, where, no matter how much they may be suffering now, they feel certain that they will soon be reunited to their brothers.

But most of the Germans in Belgium think that Belgium is unnecessarily alarmed as to her future. They feel that Germany has learned a lesson in the danger of breeding hatred through her possession of Alsace-Lorraine, and they think that she has small wish to add to that heritage.

The officers and soldiers in Belgium and France are the most outspoken opponents of the plan, sometimes urged to hold Belgium and a part of the occupied French territory. "No more of that, for God's sake!" said one distinguished officer. "We see what Alsace-Lorraine brought us, so in our own interest let us give Belgium and France back their conquered territory rather than make certain, as it would, another war."

CHAPTER XIX

BLEEDING POLAND AND HER NEIGHBORS

Poland a no-man's land, left to die—Difficulties of relief work—The Jewish question—The child who spilled the family's soup—The work of the Rockefeller Relief Commission—Preserving the manhood of the prisoners—The menace of tuberculosis—Jewish destitution—Children too weak to learn to walk—German resentment against Americans hampers relief work—The Allies' refusal to aid relief on conditions acceptable to Germany—The new Polish Kingdom, the Polish army, and what they mean.

NOWHERE in bleeding Europe has war's horror displayed itself so terribly as in Poland, Lithuania, and Galicia. Nowhere have the blows fallen so hard, nowhere is the after-suffering of the civilians so great, and nowhere are they so helpless to aid themselves. For they have no food, no clothes, no money, and little hope. The rise and fall of the tides of war in the east have left their marks on the millions stranded in the places they once called, and still do call, home. What the Russians left in their advance they destroyed in their retreat rather than let the Ger-

mans benefit by it. Everything burnable was put to the torch. All that are left are the graves of the dead, the emaciated bodies of the living, and the shell-scarred land, denuded of almost every trace of vegetation.

This great section is a no-man's land. The nations have been so busied bandaging their own wounds that this portion has been left to die. And the efforts to help have been, if not completely frustrated, seriously hindered by the Allies' refusal to let Red Cross work go on as in Belgium. Even the President's personal appeal that the belligerents agree upon some method that would systematize the relief-work along lines followed in other areas failed because of the sharp restrictions that the Allies believed themselves justified in imposing upon any supplies that might be sent to the stricken region.

The only way that life has been maintained at all has been through the giant work of the Jewish relief and the Polish and the Lithuanian associations, aided by the Rockefeller commission, which has been doing work of a remarkable nature here and elsewhere.

Germany has undertaken to aid and systema-

tize the work. But Russia has not participated. On the contrary, she has declined, and has even refused permission to cross her frontiers to the official representatives of the Jewish Relief Associations of America, which have raised more than five million dollars for their work. Rabbi Magnes of New York, who was their special agent, was denied the privilege of entering the Czar's domains when he went to Stockholm at the beginning of September, although before he left this country he had been assured by Russia's representatives that all courtesy would be shown him. The refusal further handicapped the organization of the relief-work.

Other agencies were likewise refused permission because their missions were under suspicion, and so efficient coöperation through Russian centers has thus far failed.

Several of the leaders of this work in Germany say that many of the inhabitants who actually are in direct want are refusing the proffered aid because of a fear, perhaps groundless, but nevertheless wide-spread, that if they did, Russia would punish them when she regains control of this region, if she does. These unfortunates, in

whom the fright is very real, believe that if they take aid that comes through German sources they will later be charged with being German spies and with having "maintained illicit communication with the enemy."

The situation is made more acute because of the great number of Jews in this region.

Russia, Germany, and Austria have their Jewish question, and they fear the added complication if unrestricted emigration were permitted from the affected area. Also they want to keep the people there to rebuild the land.

How great a hardship this "hands off" method is working can be seen from conditions in parts of Poland. There the general hunger is relieved by central kitchens the supplies of which are so limited that as a general rule only one pail of a liquid they call soup is allowed to each person daily. Rabbi Magnes tells of a family of four young children, the eldest a girl of twelve, their mother dead, their father killed, living with aged grandparents and a blind aunt. Two of the children were in the habit of going to the kitchen every day for the seven pails of soup on which the family lived. One day the eldest girl slipped,

and falling, spilled the contents of the five pails she carried on a stick. She went back to the kitchen in the hope of getting more, but the last drop had been licked out of the pot by the desperately hungry ones, some of whom had not even got their regular allotment because the supply was limited. So that day these seven unfortunates tried to keep bodies and souls together with two small cupfuls divided among them. This is not an exaggerated case. In many of the outlying districts where no kitchens have as yet been established there have been weeks in which no prepared food of any kind had been given to the people.

The situation is complicated still further by the difficulty of money transmission; but that problem is being partly solved by perfecting the method of wireless transfer of funds between America and Germany.

The political future of Poland attracts much attention, but before politics can be played, the people must be saved; less attention is needed on their future government and more on their present necessities. Before there can be a government there must be a people; if haste is not made

the question of government will solve itself: none will be left to be governed.

Because the conditions are so shocking and immediate the Rockefeller War Relief Commission has begun an active participation in the rescue-work. This special organization of the Rockefeller Foundation was sent to Europe some time ago for the purpose of studying the charitable needs there and of suggesting and administering the work which the Rockefeller philanthropy was to undertake.

Its chief purpose was to find a way to spend money. It is in the charge of Warwick Greene, for several years commissioner of public works in the Philippines, and a man with remarkable organization ability; and Reginald Foster, a former Harvard athlete, is the secretary.

This Rockefeller relief, in a quiet way, has participated heavily, to the extent of millions, in the European war charities, working alone and through the famous "C. R. B." (Commission for Relief in Belgium and France). Its operation is along hard-headed, practical lines, and every dollar of the three or four millions that have been expended has produced actual results. Be-

fore this commission spends any of its unlimited funds it must be shown that a need actually exists.

Apart from its aid to the C. R. B., and its co-operation in the Polish-Lithuanian-Galician relief, the commission has engaged in an interesting and valuable work—that of seeking to protect and elevate the condition of the vast number of war prisoners to be found in every one of the belligerent countries.

On the theory that the fearful destruction of this war makes manhood one of the rare commodities of the world, the Rockefeller commission is setting itself a definite task of preserving manhood, in numbers and in health, for the benefit of posterity.

The best way of stopping the flow of this stream of destruction would be to stop the war; but as this seems a task rather beyond its ability, the commission is taking the next best course—that of keeping alive, both in spirit and in body, those whom the war has spared.

It is calculated that there are 4,000,000 and more prisoners of war in Europe to-day, and it is the objective of the Rockefeller relief to save

them to the human race, and to save them in mind as well as body. Funds are being made available to change the prisoners from mere caged animals, a circumstance not infrequently found, back to thinking human beings.

The philosophy of this Rockefeller relief is like that animating the various other work of the Rockefeller Foundation, which has given hundreds of millions to charity, but always in so practical a way that the charge has been made that it "lacks heart impulse." If the actual results of the work in Europe are a fair criterion of the value of this "lack," then it is not difficult to believe they lack a virtue.

The Rockefeller work aims not only at the development of methods to keep down the death-rate of the prison camps, but to keep the men in such condition that when they are released to their homes they may repopulate the lands where millions of lives have paid one of the costs of war with strong and healthy children.

The chief menace that the relief work faces in the devastated areas and in the prisons is the fearful spread of tuberculosis due to malnutrition. Accordingly, the relief is conducted along

lines best calculated to offset this danger. Prison life, even under the most favorable conditions, leaves its taint upon the subject. Sooner or later the restriction of liberty breaks a man spiritually and mentally; and to this fate now is being added tubercular ravages.

With most of the eight millions and more in the Polish, Lithuanian, and Galician districts—perhaps half of them Jews—both the spiritual and physical degeneration are ever-present dangers. These millions have nothing to do, nothing wherewith to work, nothing to wear, and nothing to eat. The relief work has been torn by international dissensions and by internal jealousies. It was to effect a system of administration that the Rev. Dr. Magnes was sent abroad. It was hoped that he might be able to evolve a method whereby the opposition of many of the Jews in this country to contributing to funds that were to be expended by Germans would be overcome, for the members of this religion are as widely separated in their war sentiments as are those of other sects.

Felix Warburg, a banker, is one of the chief heads of the Jewish Joint Distribution Commit-

tee in this country, and he said recently that if the relief work does not become immediately effective, in two more years the Jewish populations of West Prussia, Poland, Galicia, and Lithuania are doomed to destruction. Proper relief work in Poland and Lithuania alone requires more than $5,000,000 expenditure annually. In 1915 the American Jews raised something less than this sum, and plans are now under way to raise forthwith another sum equal in amount.

The Polish Relief Organization, in which Ignace Paderewski is a leading figure, has taken a heavy share in this rescue work, and so has the Lithuanian Relief Committee, which has its headquarters in New York. The funds of these organizations have been in part distributed through the Archbishop of Posen. One of the fearful conditions in Poland is that hundreds of thousands of new-born children, through inanition, do not learn how to walk, or, if they learn, forget how to use their legs. They are all rachitic, and the disease is progressive. There are districts where not a single child under five years of age is still alive. They starve to death while the

nations are debating the terms on which relief may be sent.

It should be said that the relief work of the Jews and others in this region is non-sectarian. In fact, this is a condition enforced by the laws of Germany which prohibits sectarian relief, and to guard against the violation of this ordinance the Government prefers to handle the funds itself.

The situation in Warsaw and the immediately contiguous districts is good in comparison with the conditions existing in Wilna, Courland, Lithuanian Wilna, Suwalki-Grodno, the Bielostok region, and along the entire eastern front from Riga to the territories held by the Bug armies. Most of the affected area lies in the Ober-Ost Government, and a strong prohibition exists against moneys being sent out of one district into another. In other words, the funds must go direct to the points of distribution.

Because of the bitter resentment against America and the Americans, which even affected relief work and prejudiced the Germans against the American efforts, it has been found best to handle the situation through the erection of a strong

German committee, which deals with the Government direct instead of having the Americans act as distributors. Ambassador Gerard advised this course, realizing that if it were not adopted the work would be seriously hindered.

The refusal of the Allies to permit supplies to go through their lines to be used for relief work is based upon their inability to obtain from Germany a satisfactory assurance as to the disposition that is to be made of these supplies. The proposals made by Germany were rejected by the Allies, and then in turn Germany rejected the conditions suggested by her enemies. The negotiations were finally taken up personally by President Wilson, who had to announce that his various proposals had been spurned by the belligerents, and that his plan to have this country act officially in the suffering of Poland had come to naught.

Germany's attitude to-day, as formally defined by Herr Zimmermann, is that the empire cannot go beyond her last proposal, wherein she expressed her willingness to reserve the harvest and supplies that might be sent in to the civilian in-

habitants, and to the soldiers and policing forces of the army of occupation as distinct from the other armies. On the ground that the occupying forces had the right of subsistence from the soil that they hold, Germany declined to exclude them from participation.

While her peoples are starving, the discussion as to what government they shall have goes on. Many of the temporary passports issued to the subjects of the occupied areas called them citizens of the "Kingdom of Poland," in the summer of 1916, but there was a well-defined understanding that "German interests should be first" in any political reconstruction to be brought about.

There is talk of one of the younger sons of the Kaiser being given the throne, or, failing that, one of the members of the royal house of Austria, possibly as a sop to their feelings in the event of Austria undergoing a remaking. Another plan suggested is the selection of one of the Princes of the Bavarian, Saxon, or Württemberg houses.

Finally in November it was announced by Germany and Austria that Poland was to be reëstablished as a separate kingdom under the pro-

tection of the two allies. But no definition of boundaries was made, and no ruler was named, so the announcement so far is merely a form.

The only actual step taken was to grant the "right" to the new Poland to have an army. The assumption is general that this army, when it is raised, which will probably be done through conscription, will find it expedient to fight on the side of the central powers.

In the meantime the German military remain as the actual rulers of the occupied land.

While the German rule of the occupied districts has been marked by the free use of the Polish and Lithuanian languages in the courts, the schools, and the theaters, the German-imposed taxes have been very heavy. But apart from physical considerations, the Poles, always sentimental, have a high regard for Panslavism. The majority of the Poles and Lithuanians incline toward a reëstablished kingdom, with guaranteed rights that shall be sealed by Russia and the Allies. On the other hand, the majority of the Jews in the region favor the German protectorate.

And while the talk of "free" Poland goes on,

and effective action is deferred to await the moment most advantageous to the bargainers, the unfortunate pawns in this game of barter are dying miserably by the thousands.

CHAPTER XX

GERMANY'S BACK DOOR—AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

The *Balkanzug* from Berlin to Constantinople—Belief that war's decision will come in east—Polyglot Austria a millstone around Germany's neck—Hungarian strength a surprise—Bohemians accused of treachery—Viennese gaiety superficial—No parliament in Austria since the war began—The partition of Austria as predicted by a German—Nothing for Turkey—Francis Joseph's death and its significance—The new Emperor, Charles I—Austrian plans to prohibit further emigration and to force the return of emigrants now in the United States—Austria necessary to Germany—Strong men of the Dual Empire are Hungarians—No love lost between the two realms—Hungary has borne brunt of the war—Serbian conditions are bettered.

WITH Germany's front door on the sea locked by the British navy, she has fought bitterly and well to keep her back door open. No consideration of the empire in the war is complete without an examination into the conditions surrounding her ways to the south and east; for it is along these lines that her destiny lies, according to the belief of her students of politics.

While Germany has tightened up the screws of her great machine and is thus far not seriously

shaken, she has been forced to go beyond the territories lying immediately at her hand to protect her field of future expansion through Austria, the Balkans, and Turkey into Asia. The situation in this region, therefore, has a direct bearing upon the fortunes of Germany apart from the merely military features of the war.

Germany's activities have followed the tracks of the *Balkanzug,* which, to the German mind, is one of the real triumphs of the war. The former "Orient Express," which started from Paris and Antwerp, now has its main source in Berlin, and direct sleeping-cars run from there through Prague, Vienna, Budapest, and Belgrade into Constantinople. Each of these cities marks a point in the story of the battle of the central powers; each mile the train makes takes one through the varying changes that run the gamut from Western to Eastern civilization, from the densely populated centers of industry through the sparsely settled farm and herd regions until the human hive of Constantinople is reached.

In this vast region to the south and east the Kaiser claims three allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Against him stand Rou-

mania, Serbia, Montenegro, and, to a certain extent, Albania; while Greece also, it seems probable, will be compelled by the Allies to aline herself against him.

There are many scholars who believe that the war's decision will be found in the East; that as these seven Balkan nations and the dual monarchy swing, so will swing victory or defeat. That is why the Germans lay such great store on the reduction of Serbia, the overrunning of Montenegro and Albania, the checking of General Sarrail's offensive from Salonica, and the victories in Roumania.

Perhaps they grew in popular thought as Austria's weakness increased; perhaps they assumed greater significance as Russia advanced in Asiatic Turkey. The fires of public imagination must be stoked with pleasant fuel, otherwise they are apt to feed upon the morbid; and Austria, viewed alone, is best described by that word. Nor is Turkey altogether a source of comfort to the Kaiser's realm.

At the beginning of the war I was told by one of the commanding generals that Germany had entered the war with a millstone about her neck.

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KARL I, EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA

who is also entitled

KARL IV OF HUNGARY

He meant Austria. In 1916 this sentiment was tempered with a certain admiration for the remarkable recuperative powers Austria had shown, although the feeling was still strong that Germany's fight was more difficult because, in addition to fighting for herself, she was fighting for what many in Germany call the "existence of the House of Hapsburg."

Polyglot Austria, with fourteen different races theoretically "united" under one crown, but in reality each snapping at the others, has been the weak sister of the unified, homogeneous German Empire.

But few of the Austrian shortcomings can be laid at the door of the other partner of the dual monarchy, Hungary. It is fair to say that Hungary has been one of the great surprises of the war. She has risen to her needs with a fidelity, a single-minded purpose, a courage, and an ability that even her warmest friends did not expect.

While excuses may be made for Austria and lavish praise given Hungary, there is in Germany only contempt and censure for the Bohemian population of her southern ally. The Bohemians

are accused of being Panslavists and of looking to Russia as their natural protector. The secret belief in official Germany is that General Brusiloff's enormous quota of prisoners taken during his spring drive was due to the disaffection, not to say actual treachery, of the Bohemians, who are accused of having surrendered by brigades. This was one of the considerations that caused Germany to take over virtually all the commands of the Austrian army, although some of the Austrian leaders still retain the nominal titles.

Austria and Germany are both tired of the war, but Austria shows it more than Germany does. The pretenses of Vienna are easily punctured despite the fevered gaiety at night. Viennese gaiety is much more wide-spread than that of Berlin, although this may be because Vienna is more used to disappointment than is the younger capital.

The food conditions are less severe in Austria than in Germany, but while the supply may be greater, the failure of the Government to bring about a fair and equitable distribution has caused the prices to rise much higher than in the other empire. The rising prices have made the matter

of food a greater hardship for the poor. There is less of a middle class in Austria proper than can be found in Germany; the division between riches and poverty is as sharp and as wide as between the aristocracy and the common people.

There has been no session of the *Reichsrath* in Austria since the war began. The internal affairs of the country have been in the hands of the minister of national defense, who in many ways has the power of a dictator. The press is sharply circumscribed, and virtually nothing is permitted to go out over the wires; that is why we get so little news of Austria.

Germany is puzzled by the question of what is to happen to Austria. If the central powers are victorious, the answer is simple: force will enable the dual empire to endure a while longer. But if the central empires should be defeated, or if a compromise should be effected, then many in Germany believe the realm of the Hapsburgs will lose its present form.

One outline made by a clever German politician, who said it was one he had heard frequently discussed, had it that Austria proper was to become a grand duchy under Francis Joseph's suc-

cessor, and was to take its place as a member of the German Empire; that Hungary was to be made into a separate kingdom under the rulership either of one of the Haspburg heirs or of one of Kaiser Wilhelm's sons, the kingdom to be bound by the closest ties to Germany; that a royal prince of German blood was to be given the crown of Bohemia, which was to be renationalized and made into a separate kingdom affiliated with the Teutonic empire, and finally that Poland was to be similarly treated. The plan went on that Bulgaria was to be made supreme in the Balkans; that Serbia was to be divided between Bulgaria and Austria; Roumania to be split between Hungary and Bulgaria, and that in the event of Greece showing a continued friendliness, she was also to be rewarded; Montenegro and Albania were to be apportioned between Austria and Bulgaria.

Bulgaria, under the leadership of the astute Czar Ferdinand, called by the English "The Balkan Fox," never lets Germany forget her claims to a dominant position in Southeast Europe. He is a member of a German ducal family, but from his French mother—she was a

daughter of Louis Philippe of France—he gets his suavity and polish.

It will be noticed that this scheme provides nothing for Turkey. On the contrary, the believers in this disposition of territory contemplate the possibility of Bulgaria being rewarded with European Turkey. Further, it will be seen that this program is double in its possibilities of use: it can be made to fit Russia's continued hostility to the central powers, or by very slight changes, mostly affecting Poland and Roumania, it can be made to meet such conditions as would arise if Russia were to come over to the side of her present enemies.

Map-making is a favorite sport of the politicians in Europe in these days. It is by no means confined to Germany; in fact, it was the amateur cartographers in England who first set Germany the example.

Austria's susceptibility to political changes is made the greater through the fact that Francis Joseph, after sixty-eight years on the throne, died in November in his eighty-seventh year of life. Before that there were frequent secret reports in Austria and Germany of his death, but

these were scotched just when they became most vehement by having the old man show himself in public. Nothing but ocular demonstration to a large number could convince the people, for they were only too ready to suspect that some trick of substitution might be practised upon them.

The murders of Serajewo killed one Austrian emperor-who-was-to-be and crowned another. When Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the old emperor, was slain in the Bosnian town on June 28, 1914, the succession passed to his nephew, the Archduke Charles Francis Joseph, who, upon the death of the emperor on November 21, 1916, inherited the troubled throne of the dual monarchy.

Had Francis Ferdinand lived, there are many who believe that he would have succeeded in removing the disabilities in the way of his own children, who had been barred from the succession because their mother, Sophia of Hohenberg, had not been of royal birth. The sorrow that the assassination produced was tempered, to the Austrians, by a sense of relief, for they had feared the possibility of civil disturbance that would have been created by action that Francis Ferdinand might have taken in behalf of his offspring.

He had not been popular, and he had been feared; while his successor as crown prince, the present emperor, has always been liked for his simplicity, his youth, and his devotion to the traditions of his native land.

Charles Francis Joseph, who has styled himself Emperor Charles I of Austria and King Charles IV of Hungary, is 29 years old. He seems to be possessed of no sharply marked mental or physical characteristics; and unless he develops unexpected qualities, he will become a cog in the powerful governmental machine that succeeds in holding the heterogeneous empire together, although its break-up has been expected for many years.

Immediately upon becoming Crown Prince, he attached to his suite Count Berchtold, formerly Foreign Minister of the empire, who has been in charge of his political instruction. There is no good reason of any nature to give credence to the English reports that Charles is inclined toward a separate peace between Austria and the Allies. On the contrary there is every reason to believe that he is devoted to the task of strengthening the bonds that tie his country to Germany.

The Hapsburg rulers are bound by tradition, perhaps to a greater extent than any other of the royal houses of Europe, and Charles I is a creature of family precedent enshackled by ancient usages. As soon as it became certain that he would be the Austrian ruler, the usual steps were taken to create for him a popularity and a position of respect in the minds of his subjects. His name was used in connection with many of the more important Austrian military operations, and nominally he was in charge of all the Austrian armies on the East front, although these forces were actually in command of old Hindenburg.

He is the son of the half mad Archduke Otto who died in 1906. Otto was the son of Francis Joseph's brother, Archduke Louis, who was once declared "mentally irresponsible" by the Viennese courts. He was married five years ago to the Princess Zita of Bourbon-Parma, whose father Robert lost his dukedom when Italy became unified in 1859. The family of the new empress is really a branch of the Hapsburgs, and so the imperial pair are related, although not closely. The young empress—she is twenty-

four—has lived the greater part of her life in Vienna, always surrounded by the trappings of royalty but never accustomed to great luxury, for her family was poor. She is one of nineteen children, her father, Duke Robert, having had seven children by his first wife and twelve by the second, several of whom are mentally undeveloped.

Germany and Austria are both certain to restrict if not to prohibit emigration after the war. Austria has already put this into practical effect by throwing such difficulties in the way of any one seeking to leave the empire that it is almost impossible to do so.

Of even more importance is the plan Austria has evolved of causing immigration into her lands of many of her subjects now in the United States. The Austro-Hungarian consul-generals in the United States are ready to put the scheme into execution just as soon as the end of the war is reached.

There are three or four million people in this country of Austro-Hungarian descent. A portion of these are to be tempted back by the promise of flattering wages and special living conces-

sions, while others are to be urged back by more forceful means. This method will apply especially to the large number in this country who have failed to take out American citizenship papers and who are therefore still Austrian subjects and, as such, amenable to Austrian law. Much the same system is to be employed with these as Russia has used to force her subjects back to fight for her. Austria will notify her subjects resident in this country to return to the motherland, and if they do not, they will be punished vicariously through the fining or imprisonment of relatives still living in the old country.

Austria expects to recover almost a million of her subjects in this way, most of them iron-workers, steel-workers, and miners. They are mostly Huns, Poles, Slovaks, Croatians, Slovenes, and Ruthenians. More than Austria's future is in the balance; the whole scheme of German expansion is contingent upon Austrian welfare. That is one reason for her plans for repopulation.

Austria's invulnerability is necessary to the Pan-German scheme to secure the "road to the East," from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.

That is why Austria was supported in her quarrel with Serbia; for Austrian hegemony is essential to Germany in the Balkans, unless Russia be substituted, as she may yet be if she can be won away from her alinement with the Allies. That is why Austria has never been abandoned to her fate; that is why Austrian soldiery has been stiffened by German troops and put under German leadership; that is why neither Germany nor Austria has even remotely approached any assurance as to the reëstablishment of Serbia, lest in other hands that kingdom might again prove an obstacle in "the road."

So far has this great scheme been carried that plans have been drawn and organizations are now under way for giant inland waterways over which 1000-ton vessels can pass by rivers and canals from the North Sea to the Black Sea through the Danube. Included in the network connecting the Danube with the German rivers are to be the Rhine, the Elbe, the Weser, and other streams.

Both banks of the Danube are essential for the success of the proposition, and that is one of the reasons for the active double campaign waged

in Roumania by Mackensen and Falkenhayn. Had Roumania remained neutral, she would have had to be compensated before she would have agreed to the undertaking; her belligerency has changed the price from land or gold to human lives. With Austria and Bulgaria allies and Serbia conquered, Germany controls the whole course of the Danube except the part running through Roumania.

Hungary has a great interest in the outcome of the war, and a definite one in the "road to the East." She will profit by it if Germany does. The end of the war, whether the Allies or the central powers be victorious, will find Hungary supreme in the dual monarchy. She has stood up well under fire. Perhaps it is because each of the twenty million of her people demands the right of participation in her affairs. Hungary is more democratic than Germany, while Austria is one of the most despotically ruled powers of Europe. Hungary's Parliament has been virtually in constant session since the war began.

Baron Burian, minister of foreign affairs in the dual monarchy, is the one officer of the joint service who is of importance at this time. He

COUNT STEFAN TISZA OF HUNGARY, PRIME MINISTER

handles the external politics of the combined empire. He is the creature of Count Tisza, premier of Hungary, who is to all intents the real factor in the dual government to-day, although he holds no actual office under it. There is a separate premier and cabinet for Austria, but they are insignificant. This was shown when Count Stuergkh, the Austrian premier, was assassinated. His death had no political effect whatever.

In Hungary are to be found the strong men of the empire: Andrassy, Tisza's hereditary enemy, and a tremendous Germanophile; Karolyi, leader of the Hungarian independents, opposed to German domination and fearful of Hungary's eventual absorption into the German empire; Apponyi and Polonyi. The pro-Germanism of Andrassy is a heritage of his house, his father, a cabinet minister, having been one of those who established the Triple Alliance—the *Dreibund*—of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. By many Hungarians who believe in the independence that Karolyi preaches, Andrassy and his followers are regarded as blood-red traitors, for the Hungarians do not love the Germans. They

accept them because they think them necessary to Hungary's safety and future.

Nor is the fiery, emotional Hungarian any too happy with his Austrian brother. Kossuth is a never-to-be-forgotten name. To a prominent Hungarian, my train companion, I talked of the beauty of Haydn's music, to which the Austrian national anthem is set.

"That music is never played in Hungary," he replied, with a frown. "We Hungarians do not like to hear it. It was the music the Austrian military bands played as the scores of companions of Louis Kossuth, the patriot leader of the Revolution of '48, were led to the gallows and shamefully put to death. That is why we shall never like it. In Hungary we play our own national air. Besides, that song is for the emperor, so it has no application for us; we have no emperor, we have a king."

When Roumania made her unexpected attack upon the central powers in September it was Hungary that bore the brunt. She had been stripped of defenders where the first blow fell, but the lack was soon repaired; for the protest she made stirred even official Germany to imme-

diate action for fear the Allies' efforts to disengage Hungary from the central powers and persuade her to conclude a separate peace, which the English papers regard as possible, might succeed.

Roumania's declaration of war hurt Hungary in other ways than through the short-lived invasion, for from Roumania she had drawn much of her food supply.

Conquered Serbia also is affected by Roumania's entrance, for her people were being fed by Roumanian supplies obtained by the central powers, and now this source has been shut off. But an American who has made an official investigation in behalf of the Rockefeller War Relief Commission reports that the conditions in Serbia to-day are by no means serious. Serbia is better off than any of the other conquered territories. Her people are not happy, but they do not starve.

The American Red Cross Relief Commission, which has been handling Serbian relief for the Austrian and German governments, under the direction of Washington, and with the consent of the Allies, had completed its work and expected to return to the United States before the winter

of 1916–17. Dr. Edward Stuart, in charge of the commission, said that with the regulations which had been put in force, the crops raised in Serbia would be sufficient for the needs of the Serbians. The commission found the Austrian and German authorities obliging and efficient in coöperating with the relief work.

CHAPTER XXI

TURKEY AND THE BALKAN CALDRON

Roumania's defection a bitter pill to Germany—Balkans the "powder-barrel of the world"—German propaganda in the Balkans—Allies help it in Greece—Turkey fighting with an ally she dislikes for a future she fears—Turco-German alliance selfish on both sides—Germans indifferent to Turkish fate—Vivid word-picture drawn by American in Turkey—Tells of economic weakness—Of beggars who beg in all languages—That "something" may happen to Enver Bey—Of the coolness towards the Germans—Of the scarcity and price of foods.

ROUMANIA'S defection was a bitter pill for Germany to swallow, and with reason. Roumania under a Hohenzollern (the present king is a member of the elder branch of the Kaiser's family) was the special ward of Germany, which organized, trained, and officered her armies, taught her how to make guns and ammunition, and established her industries. All these resources are now being used against the former friend.

In Germany one always hears that Bratianu, the Roumanian premier, was bought by the Allies' gold; but as that is a common charge against all

the empire's enemies—and most of the neutrals, too—it makes no deep impression.

Although Bulgaria is German's stanch friend, the Germans are sick of the whole Balkan question, and disgusted with the peoples of that region.

"Had it not been for the irresponsibility and unworthiness of the Balkans," said a prominent liberal German statesman, "this war would never have come, or at least not for a long time. There is only one solution to the question, and that is to wipe the Balkans off the map; but since that cannot be, they must be taken over and civilized, so that they will no longer be the powder-barrel of the world."

I heard in Berlin that the German Government had spent something like $30,000,000 in propaganda work in the Balkans among the officials and civilians and in subsidizing the native press. German expenditures were great in Roumania, but apparently resultless, and Roumania's entrance into the war is set down as another failure of German diplomacy, which is most execrated in Germany itself.

In Greece the Teutonic efforts seem to have

borne better fruit. A real opposition to the plan of the Allies to force Greece into the war exists, although Berlin fears that eventually Greece will be compelled to enter the conflict on the side of the Allies.

The German representatives who were expelled from Athens by the Allies said that Greece was being starved into submission, and that, to save their lives, the natives would have to yield to Allied pressure. Baron von Schenck, chief of the German propaganda in Athens, when he was put on a ship and sent away, said: "I leave my work of making friends for Germany to the agents of the Allies. They will make more for us than I did." He prophesied truly, for the occurrences in Athens during the closing months of 1916 showed how little popularity the Allies had built up in the country they have virtually seized, much as Germany did Belgium, save for the fact that there was in Greece no armed or organized resistance. The conditions in Greece are such at present that the neutral relief organizations are beginning a campaign of succor among the population. That and the Venizelos revolution are two of the fruits of war brought

to the Greeks by the refusal of either side to permit Greece to maintain a position of unqualified neutrality.

Turkey, the last of the points reached by the *Balkanzug,* is the most interesting. This claim can be made without recourse to her antiquity, but solely with reference to her present and her future.

Turkey is fighting with an ally she dislikes for a future she fears. Turkey knows that, whatever the outcome of the war may be, her stay in Europe is limited. By casting her lot with the Germans, she reasoned, her retention of Constantinople might be prolonged. And so, to postpone the inevitable, she chose to go with the central powers; for, had she not done so, she would have been carved into tidbits wherewith the Allies might tempt the Balkans to an espousal of their cause. She felt safer for the moment with Germany, especially as she had no immediate fear of the Bulgars, since Bulgaria was grinding an ax to be used on Roumania and Serbia on account of the territories wrenched away in the Second Balkan War.

The Turks do not like the Germans, and the

Germans have difficulty in stomaching the Turks. Frequently it is necessary for the German police to command the display of the Star and Crescent when flags are hung out to celebrate victories.

If Turkey made her choice of German alliance for self-gain, Germany was equally selfish in electing the Turk to her friendship, and on this point there is a cynical frankness in Berlin. After Turkey has served her purpose to the Germans, the majority of them are indifferent to her fate. This feeling became so widespread that it was necessary for the German Government to point out that the consummation of the Teutonic "road to the East" may make it necessary to retain Turkish friendship, and so greater care should be employed in maintaining pleasant relations. But the Germans, most of whom believe that their destiny lies with Russia upon or even before the conclusion of this war, do not overexert themselves to help the Turks except in a military way.

Turkey has been a virtually unknown land since the war began. The few newspaper correspondents who have been there have been permitted to send out occasional rosy-colored inter-

views with various officials, but not a word as to the real conditions has been permitted to get by the censors. In fact, newspaper men are given scant encouragement to remain in Turkey, and the few foreigners still there are so circumscribed in their movements that they have small opportunity for observation. Some vivid and interesting details of Constantinople as she is after two years of war are contained in a letter written to me in October, 1916, by a recent arrival in the sultan's capital, who, because of his powerful connections, was able to go almost everywhere and see almost everything in the city. He writes:

I had the intoxicating good fortune to proceed to Turkey from Vienna by the *Balkanzug*. Till the Hungarian boundary it keeps up a jerk-water rate of speed. In Serbia it gets tired. One has plenty of opportunity to look at the Serbian landscape. Very few traces of the war are still to be seen. The country seems to be pretty well planted, though there are few men in sight except German soldiers. The Germans must have some sort of coal-tar formula for replenishing their army; nothing else could explain the plenty of their troops. We saw trainloads of Turkish soldiers moving north, sturdy men, well equipped, chanting to the accompaniment of a sort of Eastern bagpipe.



FERDINAND I, KING OF THE BULGARIANS

Nish, the ancient capital of Serbia, reminds one of Long Island City in the old days when it was still an independent city. There were the same goats and the same tin cans lying about, remnants of Standard Oil containers. These last, all over the near-East, have taken the place of the old goatskins for water-carrying. Anywhere in the Balkans, and they say as far east as Samarkand, one may see water-carriers staggering along under the burden of well-filled ex-oil cans.

Once the train is through Serbia and Bulgaria and across the Turkish frontier, it merely goes picnicking along at holiday speed. This portion of the road was built on a kilometric guarantee granted to the construction company. It proved advantageous, therefore, to crowd as many kilometers into the short distance from the border to Constantinople as possible. And this part of the line gives a very good imitation of a rattle-snake with a cramp.

European Turkey ought to be a fertile, well-cultivated district, supporting thousands of happy peasants. But now it is merely a war-worn, barren waste of rolling country-side, with few or no farms until one is close up to Constantinople.

The latter was really worth waiting for. Baedeker and Pierre Loti have not lied in description of its wonderful location. The people, however, are not inspiring. They are a striking proof of the principle of the survival of the unfittest. The peasants from the country are a different breed of men. I have seen

plenty of them driven in to become soldiers. Naturally, now only the old men and young boys are left. But even the older men of fifty—and I saw many such among the recruits—bear themselves nobly and with a certain sturdy dignity. But the less said about the Levantine in the city the better.

Economic conditions in Constantinople are those of Vienna intensified greatly in the minus direction. "After me the deluge" is here the winged word. All Turkey is being combed with a fine-toothed comb for food with which to feed the metropolis and the army. You see the flocks being driven in every day from the country. Hence food is plentiful—if you can pay for it. Some persons entertain the treasonable assumption that the Turkish pound has depreciated; others say that it is the price of commodities which has gone up. Suffice it to say that a small loaf of bread costs about twenty cents, and sugar twenty-five cents a pound. There are rumors that soon we shall have no flour at all. Coal and wood have become as diamonds; oil as Lachrimæ Christi! Even the Government has recognized the impending crisis. There is big talk in all the papers that, because of the lack of men and beasts on the farms, the Government is going to use machinery on the farms. Quite a jump from the Old Testament plow used by the Turkish peasants to Mr. Perkins's complicated machinery, of which at the beginning of the war there was plenty rusting away, abandoned in the warehouses. Then the Government talks of the

conscription of agricultural labor and a commission to purchase next year's crops and distribute them equitably all over the empire. This pretense of introducing German efficiency and state socialism into a patriarchal despotism on short notice is one of the pathetic jokes of the war.

Some queer things about the money situation here deserve notice. All the gold and coin has long ago gone out of existence. Paper is now the only medium. Unfortunately, the Turks, with their usual lack of foresight, have forgotten to provide any small paper money. They have made it a crime to use tram-tickets in lieu thereof. So it has become impossible to change a bill in any store to pay for a purchase. Next week the new small paper is to arrive, as usual here, two weeks after schedule.

Another oddity of the money market is that Turkish paper is at a premium when compared with marks, and at a tremendous premium when compared with Austrian kronen. Yet nobody imagines for a moment that Turkish credit stands anywhere near that of the Teutonic countries. The secret of the situation is that the Germans are not getting paid for what they send to Turkey, but merely get Turkish I O Us, whereas, for all the food stuffs it has shipped to Germany, Turkey is receiving cash. Hence German money is overplentiful in Constantinople and cheap.

The same is true of Austria. There is a brisk money market here, and a good deal of gambling goes on in

foreign exchange, even in francs and Russian rubles.

As to general conditions of the people. In Pera, the foreign quarter, where the rich people live, things are not so bad as they may become. One sees plenty of beggars about, half-starved children and sickly babies. The beggars are very persistent and versatile. They will talk to you in any language without difficulty. In Constantinople even the babies learn to lisp in three or four languages.

Over in Stamboul the misery of the poor is said to be intense. The Jews, for instance, claim that over twenty thousand of their race are facing starvation. The Government has opened soup kitchens to relieve the pinch. Here the people are used to starving to death. They bear it patiently as one of their prerogatives of long standing.

Turkish politics are rather obscure at present. Only general rumors are afloat. Turkey would like a ticket to America, but what has she got to pay the fare with? Anything adequate would leave her nothing with which to continue business. That is the secret of Germany's hold on the country. Not that the Turks love the Germans. They can be heard damning them heartily even in the street-cars. After the war, if Turkey pulls through, the Turks will want to borrow money to avoid foreclosure of the Teutonic mortgage. That is America's strong hold on Turkey at present and a way she can enforce mercy and humanity in the

treatment of the subject races. The Turks look to America as their post-war broker.

The governing triumvirate, as all the world knows, consists of Enver, Talaat, and Djemal. Djemal got Syria as his slice of empire. Enver and Talaat share the Government on the Bosphorus. There is not always, so rumor says, entire harmony between the two. Some day, they say, "something" may happen to Enver.

There is a big peace party. In Asia, at Sivas, there is rumored to have been a revolt of the troops. All these are unconfirmed reports circulating in the cafés. In the meantime there is absolute tranquillity. And Constantinople is probably the safest city in the world in which to walk about at night. The Turkish policeman has no scruple about using his club on very slight provocation. And Turkish prisons are extremely unpleasant places to live in indefinitely until it suits the Turkish courts to take up one's case.

The German soldiers and sailors in Constantinople deserve a whole column to themselves. The worst thing about them is that they have brought their love of music and sentimentality with them. It oozes out at you from all the little cafés and beer saloons in Pera. It is most distressing until one gets used to it.

Yesterday the new American ambassador [A. I. Elkus of New York] was presented to the sultan. It was raining, and the sultan's master of the palace was

worried because, hoping the weather would stay clear, he had put out the best Kermanshah double-ply rug for the ambassador to walk on up the driveway to Dolmabagche Palace. They came for his Excellency with a gilded coach and outriders, and rear riders in tremendous festoons of gilt, like the angels on an opera-box in the horseshoe. The embassy staff followed in diminishingly less gorgeous vehicles, in strict order of precedence.

A guard of honor turned out to receive his Excellency. The band played the "Star-Spangled Banner." Then followed the reception by the sultan, presentation of credentials, speech by his Excellency, and a return speech by his Majesty. Then introduction of the staff. After that coffee (in diamond-studded cups) and cigarettes of wonderful flavor. Then light conversation with Turkish officials for a few moments, and then return, in same order as coming, to the accompaniment of the strains of the "Star-Spangled Banner."

Later a reception was given by the American colony to the ambassador at Robert College, away up in Bebek, on the hilltop overlooking the green sweep of the Bosphorus and old Mahmoud the Conqueror's ruined towers, where in 1445 he began operations against Constantinople. He was called "Fathi," the conqueror. It is his unique title. Since then the victors have been called Ghazi. The present sultan wears the title Ghazi. On this gorgeous, wind-swept hilltop the American colony welcomed Mr. Elkus. You might have imagined

you were at a faculty tea at Harvard. There was n't a Turkish face in the big hall. And the band played the latest dances for the young people to dance to. They talk of the English taking England with them wherever they go. At that they can't beat our Americans. And where Americans go they carry their speeches with them, in their hip pockets, handy for use in case of emergency. So there were speeches of welcome. The ambassador did his share. He has the knack of getting a laugh one minute and touching the deeper chords the next. After all, they were all Americans, islanded in a stormy sea, with their women and children, who, in true American style, came right along into the front parlor, and it was good to feel that there was a strong man at the helm in case of trouble. His Excellency decidedly gave the American colony this impression—of safety in a crisis.

The German ambassador, Count von Metternich, has left for Germany. "They say" (that 's the nearest you ever get to the real truth) that he has been recalled. Perhaps his recall means a change here in the attitude toward Germany. Certainly he would not be recalled (that is, if he has been recalled) if things were sailing along very smoothly for the Germans. Everybody here is ready to jump at the most extravagant conclusions, because the atmosphere is tense. One has the feeling of sitting on the lid of a pot which contains an unknown quantity.

The simmering pot my correspondent figuratively describes is big enough to hold more than Turkey alone: it holds the Balkans and perhaps Austria, too.

CHAPTER XXII

THE NEUTRALS AND HOW AMERICA MAKES THEM POSSIBLE

Neutrals "damned if they do and damned if they don't"—Germans believe that were it not for American neutrality that of the smaller nations would have become impossible—Greece starved into submission by the Allies—The countries at war, in war, and neutral—Sweden the only pro-German neutral—Change in Dutch sentiment—Spanish feeling mixed—Swiss think first of their own country—Neutrals resent illegal blockade and mail seizures and believe the United States could stop them—Norway may enter the war—Neutral sympathy with the Allies a blow to German vanity—How Britain regulates neutral trade, and how Sweden defied her—Neutrals warm friends of peace.

THE lot of the neutrals in the Great War is not a happy one. They are "damned if they do and damned if they don't," and America, because she is the most important, is damned most of all, particularly in Germany.

But deep in the mind of every thinking German, behind the resentment he feels against his country, is a recognition of the fact that only through America's neutrality has it been possible for the other European neutrals to stay out of the conflict. And that means to stay away from the

ranks of Germany's enemies; for with one possible exception—Sweden—all the European neutrals, had they entered the war, would have been forced by circumstances to come in on the side of the Allies.

The conviction that America's departure from neutrality would have had an enormous effect upon the attitude of the other neutral nations formed an important factor in Germany's decision to accept the American doctrine on U-boat warfare. The hazard to the empire lying in a break with the United States was pointed out by Bethmann-Hollweg in a speech he made to a closed session of the Reichstag, when he said:

"The overwhelming majority of expert opinion regards a rupture of relations with America as a grave peril. . . . It is folly to underestimate the consequences of a conflict with America. . . . *Our information leads us to believe that other neutrals might follow America's lead.* The imperial Government has weighed every factor and is convinced of the necessity of avoiding a breach with America."

This same conclusion was expressed by Zimmermann when he said:

"Apart from the nature of American neutrality, aside from whether it be good or bad so far as Germany is concerned (and I think it is unfair to us), the truth remains that the fact that America has preserved neutrality has made it possible for other nations to remain out of the war, and that means out of war against us."

One of the ministers of state in Denmark told me, when I was in Copenhagen, that so far as that little kingdom was concerned, her neutrality would have long since been made impossible through pressure of the Allies had not America stood out.

There is another reason for this besides the moral influence. It is a physical one. America is supplying the necessities of life to the European neutrals, and if America entered the war, their supplies would at once be cut off, or so sharply restricted that their existence would be seriously threatened unless they also entered the war.

This rule that American neutrality preserves that of other nations is not absolute. If it were, Greece would not be occupying the pitiable position in which she lies to-day. But Greece was

in the danger-zone, and by the law of military necessity, under which Germany says she operated in the invasion of Belgium, her soil has become a battle-ground. The Allies forced this condition upon Greece through the employment of a method that others of the European neutrals fear may be used against them. Her supplies were cut off and, threatened with starvation, she was forced to succumb to the will of the Entente. It is true that there has been no formal declaration of war by Greece against the central powers, but the "benevolent neutrality" she has been forced to maintain toward the Allies is much the same as that of Luxemburg, which, seized by Germany at the outbreak of the war, has been used ever since as a base of operations against the Kaiser's enemies.

There are twenty-six countries in Europe, and of these fifteen are *at* war, four are *in* war, and seven still maintain their neutrality. Those European nations that have actually entered the conflict are Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, Roumania, Portugal, San Marino, and Monaco; and opposed to these, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,

and Turkey. The four nations in war although most unwilling participants are Greece, Luxemburg, Albania, and the little principality of Liechtenstein, which is affiliated with Austria. The neutrals are Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Spain, and Andorra, the tiny republic lying in the Pyrenees between France and Spain.

Of the neutrals Sweden is the only one that is forthright in its support of the German cause. Perhaps this sympathetic inclination is due less to love of the Germans than to fear of the Russians. Norway, officially and popularly, stands opposed to the central powers, and one need be but a few minutes in Denmark to discover the sentiment of that country to be identical with that in Norway. Denmark has not forgotten Schleswig-Holstein or the severity of treatment meted out to the Danes who remained in the lands absorbed by Prussia in 1864.

Holland is preserving a strict neutrality that is rigorously maintained by the Government, which has avoided any display of partiality. But the popular voice of the Dutch is all for the Allies and all against Germany. There is a curious

psychology behind this fact, since from the days of De Ruyter and Tromp the Hollanders have been taught to regard Great Britain as their hereditary enemy, for it was Great Britain which ended the dream of Holland world power, one step having been the seizure of New Amsterdam by the English, who made it New York. But with the close communication that has been maintained for years across the channel and with the historical affiliations, the feeling of enmity died out, and as against the old hostility toward Great Britain, there sprang up a deep fear of Germany, whose desire for the mouth of the Rhine was not calculated to reassure the smaller nation. The overrunning of Belgium gave this fear point and immediacy.

Spain is regarded by the northern European neutrals as having a leaning toward Germany. This is ascribed in part to the fact that the reigning house is related to the Hapsburg family of Austria and to the fact that Spain remembers the sympathy and support Germany gave her in the war with America in 1898 when England alined herself in spirit with the Yankees. But Spaniards in a position to speak with authority say

that among the people of Spain there is to be found much anti-German sentiment, induced by the kinship they feel toward the Romance nations, France and Italy, alined against the Teutons.

Little Switzerland has had the hardest road to travel of all the European neutrals. She is composed of German, French, and Italian regions, and the outbreak of the war found the republic in a political vortex from which she was pulled by the prompt mobilization of her troops. As her army includes virtually all of her citizenship, military duties took the place of scheming and plotting, and now every Swiss thinks first of his own country before he considers the claims of the belligerents, whether he speaks German, French, or Italian.

Switzerland is participating largely in work tending to ameliorate the conditions of the warring nations by housing the International Red Cross headquarters and by offering an asylum for prisoners of war. Through these measures she has been afforded an outlet of a truly neutral nature, for her activities and the national mind have been taken off more dangerous subjects.

In common with America, all the neutral nations, despite the hardships caused by the rising prices, have made money, although this war-bred prosperity has not been widely or evenly distributed. Each of them has its coterie of *Goulash-Baronen*—the title that the Germans give war-stuff purveyors, which is used generally throughout the neutral nations of Europe.

But the money has not blinded them to the existence of certain conditions which they bitterly resent, and the correction of which they believe lies in America's hands.

The Allies' sea blockade, which all denounce as illegal, and the black-list are two of these points; but the most important is the matter of the mails. They ascribe the failure to stop Great Britain from seizing the neutral posts to American laxity, and they believe that a sharper attitude on the part of the United States would have brought about a cessation of this practice. It is of course well known that Great Britain has seized all mails traveling to and from America, and the arguments with which she justifies this operation have been repeatedly set forth. But it is not so generally known that she has gone so far

as to seize all the mail between Denmark and the remote little Danish colony of Iceland. Against this high-handed proceeding Denmark has protested times without number, but always unavailingly, and now she awaits final action on the long-protracted correspondence between this country and the Allies.

By way of contrast, Germany has assumed a conciliatory attitude toward Switzerland, and Swiss mail traveling through the empire is permitted to go by untouched and uncensored. On the other hand, Swiss mail going through France en route to America or elsewhere is held up and examined. This stroke has won Germany friends in the mountain republic.

While Germany's relations with Switzerland have become more friendly as the war progressed, the reverse is true with regard to Norway, and the belief is general in that country that sooner or later she will have to take up arms against the Kaiser; and where the thought is strong the act usually follows.

Each of the neutrals has its secret fear and its private hope, which wax and wane with the rise and fall of the tide of war. But less cynically

frank than Italy and some of the Balkan nations, which began the war as neutrals, they do not place a price upon their participation, but instead seek to suppress their selfish motives and aim at peace with honor.

It is a blow to German vanity to realize that in addition to the number of those in arms against her, the majority of the neutrals also oppose her, if not physically, then spiritually.

"What is the matter with the rest of the world that it should be against Germany?" a well-known official of the empire asked.

"Why not ask what is the matter with Germany? Perhaps the fault is with her," was the answer, and then to give point to the reply the German was told the story, long current in America, of the fond parents who saw their soldier son go marching by with his company, and as he passed exclaimed: "Look at them—every one out of step excepting Mike!" Even the stanch Germanism of the hearer was not enough to keep him from admitting the point of the anecdote.

But this readiness to admit the possibility that they are themselves at fault is by no means char-

acteristic of all the Germans, and least of all of the Junkers, whose creed may be roughly formulated as, Whatever is German is right. To such the defection of some of the former neutrals and the disaffection among the countries still preserving neutrality are inexplicable, and they place the burden of responsibility elsewhere. Count Reventlow, one of the spokesmen of this group, whose intelligence is such as to cause one to doubt that he actually believes all he writes, asks the question in his paper, the "Deutsche Tageszeitung" (not to be confused with the "Tageblat," a high-principled, well-balanced Liberal journal, in contradistinction to the fire-eating, militaristic, aristocratic "Tageszeitung"):

"What is it that induces neutrals to espouse, spiritually or physically, the losing side of the Entente rather than the flourishing cause of the central powers?" Answering himself, he writes, "Obviously because of the fact that the Entente powers all bully neutrals to support them, whereas Germany is scrupulously satisfied with their neutrality." He points out the cases of Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Sweden, and adds: "These powers are neutral and have *de facto* re-

mained really neutral. But the reality of their neutrality vanishes more and more, the more completely they fall into an absolute dependency upon our enemies. The German Empire has never demanded that these powers should abandon their neutrality. It has surpassed itself in considerateness. It has never acted offensively. It has never delivered an ultimatum. But nobody can conceal the fact that the above-mentioned neutral powers, the longer the war lasts, enter more and more into dependence upon our enemies, and look to them to secure their future and their interests. They surrender to the pressure put upon them in various ways."

The pressure that Germany refers to as being used to force the neutrals into line is in connection with the sharp restrictions of supplies that Great Britain has imposed upon all of the European nations still at peace. They have been virtually put upon a ration basis, and no more food or other raw or finished commodities are permitted to enter the various countries than are actually to be consumed by them, after allowance has been made for their own native stock. This is in pursuance of the policy of economic starvation

of Germany that England is seeking to put into execution through her blockade. Through this plan the Allies hope to be able to cut off every source of external supply to the central empires.

To conform to the regulations and to give official assurance to the Allies that shipments passed through the blockade would be employed only for the given purposes, the various neutrals have created governmental bodies similar in their operation to the Netherlands Overseas Trust (the N. O. T.), through which organizations each private shipper, whether importer or exporter, must operate. All imports are bulked, and after reaching the country are officially distributed; but despite these precautions, which are taken only to satisfy the demands of the British, there still continues an enormous illicit trade with Germany from Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Switzerland.

Sweden has always denied the Allies' right to impose conditions upon her, and accordingly much of her import business has been destroyed; but she is still able to sell huge quantities of goods to the central empires at high prices. For the purpose of discouraging the violation of the em-

bargo, Denmark and Norway have imposed, in addition to fines, prison penalties upon offenders who have trafficked with Germany in forbidden articles; but even the fear of jail has not been enough to prevent a big business being done with Germany, whose need makes her indifferent to the prices she must pay.

Sweden's defiance of England caused a royal proclamation to be issued prohibiting export to the Scandinavian country of virtually all commodities, primarily all food-stuffs, metals, and all textile manufactures.

Great Britain has insisted upon the right of compelling all shippers to produce evidence that the goods were actually for neutral consignees, whose names and addresses must be given. The Swedish kingdom operated under this provision through a war trade department which gave official assurance that the goods would reach no other destination than that given; but in the summer of 1916 it found the regulation had become intolerable. The Swedish Parliament passed a law making it illegal for Swedish importers to supply the British customs with information as to the disposal of goods. It was asserted that

the British demand violated Swedish sovereignty. Great Britain's answer to this challenge of her power was to prohibit all exports to Sweden through the United Kingdom. Since every ship en route to Sweden is compelled to touch at British ports, the effect of this embargo was virtually to cut off Sweden from the rest of the world.

Nowhere has peace warmer friends than in the European neutrals. Nowhere is the coming of peace more earnestly sought than by these nations which lie on the brink of the red volcano whose streams of blood and ashes threaten constantly to engulf them.

CHAPTER XXIII

LEAVES FROM A REPORTER'S NOTE-BOOK

Young men all at war—The pathetic cab-horses—Electrified taxis —Laughless Germany—Watery beer—The Germans have an *"Ersatz"* for everything but men—Pleasures taken seriously—Dancing *verboten*—Economy in uniforms—Meat "speak-easies" —"Horse mackerel" in disguise—All dogs at work—Potatoes on the corner-lot—Crossing the North Sea—Weighting flour tickets—Changes in newspapers—Housewives instructed when to put up preserves—Saving rags and old paper—Restrictions on communication—Women school-teachers—"Vienna styles" made in Paris—Selling war helmets—Protective coloration in uniforms—Interned civilians—Commandeering the rubbish stock—Which boys can ride bicycles—American shells—Germany's big men and how she regards them.

Here are brief, random notes of scattered facts and fugitive impressions picked up in the German Empire. They are verbal snapshots of men and things as they are to-day in that embattled land, set down as lifted from my reporter's note-book with no effort at coherence or climax.

One of the most striking reactions one undergoes in Germany, is made by the nearly total absence of young men from its streets and fields.

The youth of the country are all at war; only the *"Zurückgestellte"* remain, and they, for the most part, are those physically incapacitated for military service.

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The cab and delivery horses are one of the most pathetic sights to be seen in the cities of Germany to-day. They are the offscouring and refuse of all horsedom—poor, thin, dispirited, emaciated, hobby-horses that can scarcely lift the weight of their own heads, which usually droop in close proximity to the streets as if looking for grain they never get.

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Fodder is a scarce commodity in Germany to-day because much of it that formerly went to horse and cattle feeding is now being employed for human consumption.

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Almost all the horses left in the cities are white or flea-bitten gray. All the other colors are used for army work. The whites are not—their color is too conspicuous. But the demand for horses has been so great that even the whites are used

when they are young, being painted dark. The horses left for civilian purposes are the old ones. Most of those you find attached to the ancient droschkes on Unter den Linden in Berlin look as if they were cousins to the Eohippus that Noah took with him in the Ark.

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The age of the drivers corresponds to the antiquity of their steeds. Most of them are old graybeards, but, by way of paradox, their girths are as great as those of their horses are small.

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In the picture with the horses belong the taxicabs that Berlin and the other German cities are using. They are old ramshackle affairs that wheeze and groan and threaten to burst apart at the first unkind word. All the good cabs, in common with all the good private automobiles, have been commandeered for military purposes. It is plain to see the reasons for not commandeering those which are running on the streets.

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Four-fifths of the taxis are electrified, which enables them to proceed at a slow, dignified pace

for short stretches. The few internal combustion motors left use benzol instead of gasoline, which is restricted to official needs—military, industrial, and those of the high personages. Benzol is a coal-tar product first developed in Germany, which Edison was the first to make in this country.

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Almost all the machines left in Germany use solid tires of composite rubber, but these are now rapidly disappearing and in their place are the old-fashioned steel tires and the new patent spring wheels which consist of one wheel within another, the rims separated by springs. The manufacturers call them "springs," but the passengers using them call them by another name, especially when they strike a "thank-you-ma'am" or a car track.

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All taxicab and cab rates have been increased 50 per cent., with thirty pfennigs (nominally 7½ cents) added as an extra fee.

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The chauffeurs and cabbies are the most independent lot in all Germany. You have literally

to beg them to accept you as a fare, and the begging is all in vain if you have to travel any considerable distance. They prefer the short hauls, which give them the greatest number of extra fees.

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It is a rare thing to hear a laugh in Germany to-day, and I visited many theaters without hearing any applause. Night life has disappeared. The supper restaurants are morgue-like in their lack of cheer, and none serves more than two or three parties at a time.

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The beer restaurants do better. It is an insult to Gambrinus to call the liquor that they serve in Germany "beer." It is really a pale, weak, emaciated, watery substance that has much the same resemblance to actual beer that water has when drunk from a recently emptied beer glass.

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This is due to the heavy reduction in grain allowances made to the breweries, but with the chemical readiness the Germans are showing they at once invented some form of *"Ersatz,"* which, translated, means a substitute. In Germany to-

day they have an *"Ersatz"* for almost everything —except men.

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They have substitutes for coffee, sugar, beer, milk, butter, eggs used for cooking and condiments, and they believe they are well on their way to have a perfect substitute for rubber.

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The night life of Berlin—that once burned so fiercely bright as to make it the talk of the world, not for its gaiety, but for its lavishness; not for its spontaneity, but for its forcedness—has been entirely wiped out. The street women are still there but in heavily reduced numbers. They have been put to work.

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Such life as is still to be found is grim and lacking in merriment. It is a rare thing for music to be found in restaurants.

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Theaters are open, but the Germans take their pleasures seriously. They go to a comedy as they would to an execution. It is the duty they feel to obtain recreation.

A man or woman wearing evening clothes in any of the German cities is a rare object and one of suspicion. It is considered an evidence of gaiety, and gaiety is tabooed. The women all wear dark clothes, and their evening frocks are rarely more than slightly décolleté.

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Dancing is an unheard of pastime in Germany. It is actually forbidden, both in public and in private, and the Germans, who are always good citizens, never break the rule, even in the privacy of their homes.

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There are fewer soldiers to be seen on the streets than one would expect. This is due to the fact that most of the military are in the field. Those you do see in the city are for the most part convalescents, and seven out of every ten show wounds.

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The uniforms of the German soldiers, once a subject to boast for their neatness and standardization, are now a pretty sorry exhibition. Wool is scarce, so all sorts of cotton combinations are

used. Corduroys and jeans in varied colors are being made up for army use.

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To save cloth the coats of both officers and men are cut almost waist high, and as all the coats are made with little tails behind, the effect is rather striking.

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It is an uncommon thing to see a soldier who has not one or more service decorations. There are probably 400,000 Iron Crosses, second class, worn in Germany to-day—in fact the enormous demand has caused the silver with which the crosses are rimmed to go sky high in price.

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In spite of the heavy losses, there is but little mourning to be seen on the streets. In my visit to France and Belgium, I saw more mourning being worn by the women in a week than I saw in Germany in two months. The absence of the death symbols is due to the wish of the Kaiser expressed at the beginning of the war.

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One of the curious things to be met with in Berlin and some of the other large cities are

"speak-easies" where you can get meat on meatless days. It is almost as bad getting into them as trying to get into a "blind-tiger" to get a drink in Philadelphia on Sunday.

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Meat is permitted on only five days in the week in Germany, and for only one meal on each of these days. The "speak-easies" will sell you meat with your meals at any time. They are given some fancy name to mislead the police in case of a raid. The names mislead the diners too, though perhaps that is just as well because it is to be feared that if the diners knew what they were really eating, they would not eat.

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Fish is the great staple of the German diet today, and of the fish the king is the tuna.

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I had tuna fish disguised as roast beef, Hamburger steak, veal chops, filets and all sorts of other meats, and it was prepared with such skill and concealed with such ingenious sauces that I had difficulty in recognizing it as "horse mack-

erel." It took the Germans to discover the real value of the tuna, and that is one war article that will remain upon their menus in the days to come.

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The most delicate gifts one can make to one's friends in Germany to-day consist of meat, butter, eggs, and soap. To give up any of these things is like submitting to blood transfusion. On October 1 the empire went on a one-egg-a-week-per-person basis. This was to allow for the feminine vagaries of the hens and was figured out as the irreducible minimum of the egg production per week. The actual supply is really eight or ten times as large as the allowance, but with true German precaution the Food Dictatorship is safeguarding the supply in the event that the hens go on an egg strike.

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Most of the dogs that one sees in Germany to-day are being put to work. The army uses a large quantity of them for Red Cross purposes and the others to be found in the cities and towns are used in place of horses to help the men and

women pull carts. Far more dogs are so used than was formerly the case.

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You never see powdered or lump sugar in Berlin to-day. When your coffee is brought you make a careful search of the salver, and you are finally rewarded by the discovery of two tiny particles that look like bits of white chalk. This is saccharin and is a powerful sweetener.

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In Berlin and the other cities the newly recruited troops are usually sent to the front at night. There is an absence of that "pomp and circumstance" of war that marked the departure of the soldiers at the beginning. Now the easiest way is considered the best, and so they are taken out quietly after nightfall.

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Many Americans who visit Germany outdo their German hosts in their vituperation of America. This has been true to such an extent that the average German now sizes up an American visitor as either pro-German or pro-Ally, never

considering that he might be merely pro-American.

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There is much more work than there are workers in Germany, and as a result labor is well paid. Therefore the working class is able to supply itself properly.

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Everywhere in Germany, in the big or little cities, every available corner of ground is utilized to grow something. Usually it is potatoes, which is the greatest staple of Germany, and which enters very largely into the composition of their *"Kriegsbrot"* (war-bread).

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Crossing the North Sea from Kirkwall to the Norwegian coast gives one a rather crawly feeling. It is in the very midst of the danger zone. The lifeboats are all stripped and swung outboard, life preservers distributed, search-lights turned on, flags which are kept flying at stern and mainmast, and high-powered incandescents switched on the ship's sides where in big letters the name and nationality of the vessel are displayed.

In spite of the leather shortage, the German soldier still clings to his boots. The bulk of the German soldiery is recruited from the agricultural class, which has been accustomed to boots and does not willingly use other footwear.

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The German newspapers in the last two years have changed their methods in some respects, basing the changes on what they have learned from the American correspondents who have visited Germany. Feature interviews with important persons, which at first were a monopoly of the Americans, are now being used regularly by the bigger German papers, especially in Berlin.

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The ingenuity of the German industrialist is not confined exclusively to benefiting the populace. Sometimes he seeks to benefit himself. For example: The wholesale bakers must turn in a certain quantity of tickets for a given quantity of flour. The tickets are made out in small units, so a big number of the pasteboard pieces are required for each flour requisition. To save time the German officials originated a system of

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weighing the tickets. Some clever fellow discovered that by dampening the tickets he increased their weight as much as thirty per cent. Thereafter ticket dampening was the favorite indoor sport of the bakers, until an acute inspector discovered the stratagem, and at once an order was issued invalidating tickets that were too moist.

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Paternalism in government has been worked out to such a degree in Germany that even the housewives are instructed at what time they can put up their preserves, and in what quantities and at what prices they may buy their fruits.

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Nothing is permitted to be carried off the battle-fields as souvenirs. The debris is carefully sorted over, and every article that German ingenuity can bring into usefulness again, is sent back to the quartermaster's depot.

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Throughout the empire there are collecting stations for all sorts of old things—old bottles, shoes, pieces of rubber, news and wrapping pa-

per, brass, steel, copper, tin, string, rags,—nothing is thrown away. Once a month these articles are gathered up from every city and village and worked over.

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Good candy in Berlin costs three dollars a pound. This is because chocolate and sugar are so hard to obtain.

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Any one sending a telegram to points within or without the empire, or who sends a telegram in German or any other language to a foreign country, must show a passport if he is a stranger, or his official identification card if he be a native. This is another ceremonial calculated to restrict employment of the wires, thereby reducing labor and also minimizing the danger of espionage communication.

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Postage rates have been increased throughout the empire. Open letters that used to cost 2½ pfennigs now cost 5; domestic mail that was formerly carried for 5 pfennigs now costs 7½ pfen-

nigs; foreign mail has been raised from 20 to 25 pfennigs.

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On many of the street car lines the rates have been increased from 2½ to 5 pfennigs. Even with the increase they are cheaper for short hauls than in America. The city of Berlin is proud of the record it has made in having contributed as a municipality a total of 170,000,000 marks (nominally $42,500,000) for war relief and for subscriptions for the war bonds.

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In the schools, which are run full time, there are now many more women than men teachers. This is a shift from the German scholastic ideal, which insisted upon men teachers for the boys.

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Many Germans say that if their Commissioners make a bad peace when the negotiations are begun, they would decline to accept the agreement and go back to war. The sincerity with which they say this shows more clearly than their words how far they still are from any idea of a peace at any price.

The women of Berlin, Munich, Leipzig, Hamburg, and the other big towns may be suffering, but they positively decline to undergo the extra privations of being deprived of the Paris styles. They get the latest models through Berne. The couturières call them "Viennese," but the ladies know what they get when they buy them.

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The Germans' steel trench helmet is by general consent the best of all. They laughed at the idea at first, but now they have taken it up, and they have profited by the French and English models they have seen. By making them last they are enabled to make them the best. They have a long curving protector over the neck, and have a special forehead vizor which is used by observation officers and is proof against rifle balls.

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The first thing the French and English prisoners do is to sell their steel helmets for a mark or two apiece to their German captors. They in turn sell them as souvenirs, if special permission is granted; otherwise they turn them in to the *"Sammelstellung"* (collection office), where they

are given credit for a little more than they pay. German prisoners in the hands of the Allies do the same. It gives them a little spending money until they are sent back to the regular prison camps, where their prisoners' pay begins.

* * * *

Cover! Cover! Cover! That is the rule of the war. That is why the gray-green uniforms of the German soldiery were selected. It blends best with the brown, yellow, and green of the fields and forests. Even the wicker cases in which the Germans transport their artillery shells are painted green. Bomb-proofs are always covered with exactly the same foliage as is found about the places in which they are built. Trench parapets are never left with the fresh earth exposed to aëroplane scouts, but are carefully tamped down with the top soil, and then covered with the grasses from the surrounding fields.

* * * *

The ambassadors and ministers at Berlin representing the neutral nations are granted the privilege of importing their own food supplies and gasoline for their motors. Some of the pri-

vate neutrals have asked for and received the same privilege.

* * * *

Living is best in the smaller cities and the villages where no great extremes of wealth and poverty are to be found, and where much of the food supply is home-raised. The hotels are supplied with the same foods that private families receive, but the prices in the hotels are considerably higher than those the private householders pay, since the hotel tariffs are not directly controlled by the war food bureau.

* * * *

Ham and other hog meats are to be had only one day a week—on Thursdays. Medicines of all sorts are issued by the druggist only on prescription; the stocks are to be touched only in case of necessity. Alcohol and other inflammable spirits are to be bought only with special written permission.

* * * *

No liquors of any sort except beer and wine are sold after nine o'clock at night. Illumination at night is reduced as much as possible. This is to save coal and gas.

To make the material for shoes more plentiful and cheaper, all leather manufactures have been sharply curtailed.

* * * *

Most of the Germans seem quite sure that Italy and Roumania were bought by the Allies, and they talk of Sonnino of Italy and Bratianu of Roumania as they do of Venizelos of Greece, as having been bought and paid for by England.

* * * *

Reversely those nations and those newspapers which have supported Germany's cause are actuated only—in German eyes—by the highest ethical motives.

* * * *

English and American papers in Germany cost, on an average, twenty-five cents apiece. Ten-cent American magazines cost fifty and sixty cents apiece, and the more expensive periodicals a dollar to a dollar and a half.

* * * *

By way of proving that England is responsible for much of the unnecessary suffering of the war,

the Germans say that she started the system of interning German civilians living within her limits. Thereupon Germany retaliated. There are about 26,000 Germans interned in England and about 6000 British interned in Germany. Recently, through Ambassador Gerard, an exchange was effected of all men over 45 years of age held in the detention camps. The exchange was made regardless of the number, but only on the age basis, so Germany recovered about four times as many of her subjects as did England.

* * * *

Prices in Copenhagen are staggering. This is because the Danish supplies have been sharply delimited to actual needs.

* * * *

Copenhagen, once among the most brilliantly lighted cities of Europe, is now almost as dark as London, due to the heavy reduction in coal shipments forced by England.

* * * *

All bicycle tires have been commandeered in the empire, except where it can be proved that bicycles are necessities. Boys who live more than

three kilometers from school are permitted to keep their wheels, and those used for delivery purposes are left with their tires. The stripped wheels are to be refitted later with a rattan tire that is now being developed, and which is said to have great resiliency and to be "just as good" as rubber.

* * * *

The old *"polizeiliche Reinigung"* (police clean-up) of English and French words in the German language—that ridiculous effort made by Traugott von Jagow, Police President of Berlin (not to be confused with Gottlieb von Jagow, former Secretary for Foreign Affairs)—has ended. The English names have all been restored to shops, hotels, and streets. In fact, one of the most conspicuous signs to be seen on the Linden, with rather an ironical touch to it, reads, "Shortest and cheapest route to London is via Vlissingen and Dover." Von Jagow has been transferred from Berlin to Breslau.

* * * *

I was told in Germany, and received plausible confirmation of the statement in Denmark and

here in America, that Russia was compelling many of her subjects now in this country to return for service in the Czar's army by fining and imprisoning relatives of those who failed to obey the mandate. Information of the danger in which they place their relatives by their refusal to return is conveyed to the Russians in America through the Russian consulates, and it is usually effective in forcing them to go back.

* * * *

Russian steerage travel between American ports and Scandinavia because of this pressure has been unusually heavy in the last year.

* * * *

By way of showing the manner in which the war has broken family ties, the Rothschild family has representatives in the armies of five of the belligerents—Germany, Austria, France, England, and Belgium. All are first cousins.

* * * *

Almost all the big cities of Germany support racing meetings twice a week. Betting machines are used, and the total of the wagers reaches

astounding figures. Sixteen per cent. is taken from the amount bet, 10 per cent. of which goes to the state for charitable work and 6 per cent. remains for the racing associations. American jockeys and trainers are still working in Germany, although their former popularity has waned.

* * * *

Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's son was killed in the war, and late in 1916 Premier Asquith lost his son, too. The Chancellor was deeply affected by his son's death. He is a broken man, and only the pressure of his duties keeps him going.

* * * *

The women conductors of the street cars in Berlin are perhaps frail in physique, but what they lack in strength to subdue unruly passengers they make up in the length of the hat-pins they wear through their caps. These pins have proved great persuaders—even the most boisterous passenger succumbs to their thrusts.

* * * *

At the front one is told either that every American shell has killed a battalion or that it is a

"Blind-ginger" (blind goer, i. e., missed fire). There are no average shells made in America, it seems; either they commit wholesale murder or are utterly worthless.

* * * *

Whenever Bethmann-Hollweg appears in public, he wears the uniform of a lieutenant-general. Apropos of this, Maximilian Harden, the famous journalist of Berlin, said to me: "That is a mistake. He would be far more effective in simple civilian attire. We have in our armies many generals, but in our nation we have only one Chancellor."

* * * *

Von Jagow, the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, seemed to lack the confidence of the public. He was looked upon as a relic of the old school of German diplomacy, to which the Germans attribute a large share of their present misfortunes. Jagow is of a subtle, casuistic, indirect, Metternich type, and because of the Germans' lack of confidence in their diplomatic corps this ultra-diplomatic type is no longer popular in the empire. On the other hand Zimmermann,

who succeeded Jagow, is a man of the people—big, broad, simple, direct, forceful and magnetic.

* * * *

The attitude of the German people toward the big men of the Government is curiously mixed. I could not find one single dissonant note in the chorus of support, sympathy, admiration, and affection that the Kaiser's name always calls out. The people go wild over Hindenburg—he is their idol. Mackensen is another who is enshrined. Falkenhayn was always rather distrusted. Bethmann-Hollweg is pitied, and his good intentions are appreciated, although there is a belief that he lacks force.

* * * *

Zimmermann will bulk big on the German stage when it is re-set by the Liberals who are now engaged in a life and death struggle with the Conservatives for the fatherland. Count von Bernstorff, ambassador at Washington, under attack by his personal enemies at the outbreak of the war, has now won the approval of his Government and the people by his work in this country.

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